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Daniel P. McGannon

Portrait of Daniel P. McGannon

Dan is a member of the Professional Liability Department where he focuses his practice in matters related to school leaders' liability, employment law, municipal liability and civil rights law. He has litigated cases before state and federal courts, as well as the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. 

Dan has an established legal career in both the public and private sector. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, he was the director of policy and legal affairs for a large public school district counseling the district in a variety of matters such as employment, contract, and general school law matters. He also previously was an attorney with the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General where he counseled and litigated on behalf of Commonwealth agencies in matters regarding employment, constitutional claims, and contract matters. With his extensive legal background, Dan is adept at identifying and mitigating legal risks for clients. 

Dan holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Shippensburg University and a juris doctor from Widener University School of Law. He is admitted to practice in all Pennsylvania state courts as well as the United States District Court for the Middle District, Eastern District and Western District of Pennsylvania, and The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Outside of work, Dan is very active in his community coaching youth sports and moderating various activities through his local parish.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2010)
    • Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania (B.A., 2007)
    • Pennsylvania, 2010
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association, Labor & Employment Section
    • NAGTRI Instructor

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Updates from the U.S. Department of Education

January 1, 2026

PA Supreme Court Provides Flexibility to Municipal and School Boards under the Sunshine Act with Its Ruling in Coleman v. Parkland School District Background A dispute arose regarding the 2021 amendments to the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act (Act 65). These amendments required agencies (including school boards and borough councils) to post meeting agendas at least 24 hours in advance of a public meeting and generally prohibited taking official action on items not listed on those pre-meeting agendas. In October 2021, the Parkland School Board added a vote to ratify a teachers' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) to its agenda during a public meeting. However, the board only learned of the contract's ratification by the union shortly before the meeting began. A resident, Jarrett Coleman, challenged the vote, arguing it violated the Sunshine Act because the CBA was not on the 24-hour posted agenda and did not meet the specific "emergency" or "de minimis" exceptions listed in the Act. The Commonwealth Court initially ruled against the District, holding that agencies could only add items if they fell into three narrow categories: (1) emergencies, (2) matters arising 24 hours before the meeting that are de minimis, or (3) matters raised by a resident during the meeting that are de minimis. The District appealed, setting the stage for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision. The Decision The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and reinstated the School District’s victory. Justice Donohue, writing for the majority, focused on a strict plain language interpretation of Section 712.1 of the Sunshine Act. The "Fourth Exception": The court held that the statute’s use of the disjunctive "or" in Section 712.1(a)—which references subsections (b), (c), (d), or (e)—indicates that there are four independent exceptions to the 24-hour notice rule. The Court determined that Section 712.1(e), often called the "Majority Vote Clause," is a standalone exception. It allows an agency to add any matter of business to the agenda during a meeting, provided they follow specific procedural steps. The “spirit of the law” argument was rejected by the majority, explaining that the Commonwealth Court had essentially "redrafted" the statute. The Supreme Court emphasized that if the text is unambiguous, the court cannot ignore the literal interpretation of the law to pursue its perceived intent. Takeaways For solicitors and legal counsel representing Pennsylvania municipal bodies and school districts, the Coleman ruling provides much-needed flexibility, but requires strict procedural adherence. The Coleman decision removes the “de minimis” requirement to Majority Votes under the Sunshine Act. Given that agencies have a majority vote to create a last-minute addition to an agenda, they no longer need to prove that it is an "emergency" or "minor" (de minimis). However, local agencies must follow the Four-Step Procedural Mandate to lawfully add an item under the "Majority Vote" exception. Practitioners must ensure their clients:  1.    Announce the reasons for the change publicly before the vote. 2.    Conduct a separate majority vote to amend the agenda before voting on the substance of the item. 3.    Post the amended agenda online and at the principal office by the next business day. 4.    Record the reasons and the vote clearly in the meeting minutes. Solicitors or attorneys representing local agency clients would be wise to monitor legislation by the General Assembly in response to the Coleman decision. The Assembly may respond with further clarification to the Act in the event of potential “absurd” results cautioned by some justices and whether the “broad flexibility” offered by the Coleman decision is, in fact, what the legislature intended.  Legal Update for Special Education Law – January 2026 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.  

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Updates from the Pennsylvania Department of Education

December 1, 2025

Pennsylvania Expands School Notification Requirements for Weapons Incidents Last month, Governor Shapiro signed Act No. 2025-44, which amends Pennsylvania’s School Code. Specifically, the new law requires Pennsylvania schools to notify parents and educators within 24 hours when a student is found in possession of a weapon on school property, school transportation or at a school-sponsored activity.  The Bill aims to increase transparency and school safety by requiring schools to use communications methods “likely to reach” (e.g., phone, email, SMS) parents and staff impacted by a student’s possession of a weapon. In instances where the student possesses a weapon in a school building, the District should notify only parents and staff directly involved. However, the law requires broader dissemination of a student’s weapon possession when the student possesses the weapon on a multi-building campus. In such a case, all staff and parents with students in the other on-campus buildings must be notified. The law further states that notices of student weapon possessions discovered at “school-sponsored activities” should be directed to “the appropriate population” impacted by the weapon possession.  Importantly, Districts are not required to include personally identifiable information in their notices to parents and staff. Further, Districts must provide more detailed information to families and staff with “legitimate educational interests” in the student who possessed the weapon.  Districts must continue to report weapon possession incidents to the Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE). In addition, Districts must also continue to report weapon possessions that constitute violations of 24 P.S. § 1317.2 (Possession of weapons prohibited), 18 Pa.C.S. § 912 (Possession of weapon on school property), or any other weapon identified by District policy or local ordinance.  As with any new legislation, there is language in Act 44 that may prove ambiguous, such as what constitutes notification “likely to reach” staff and parents. However, Pennsylvania school districts should discuss updates to their policies with their solicitors to ensure compliance with Act 44’s new requirements, review FERPA requirements with staff to ensure personally identifiable information is not disclosed to unintended parties, and review and refine notification workflows. 

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.