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Daniel P. McGannon

Portrait of Daniel P. McGannon

Dan is a member of the Professional Liability Department where he focuses his practice in matters related to school leaders' liability, employment law, municipal liability and civil rights law. He has litigated cases before state and federal courts, as well as the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. 

Dan has an established legal career in both the public and private sector. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, he was the director of policy and legal affairs for a large public school district counseling the district in a variety of matters such as employment, contract, and general school law matters. He also previously was an attorney with the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General where he counseled and litigated on behalf of Commonwealth agencies in matters regarding employment, constitutional claims, and contract matters. With his extensive legal background, Dan is adept at identifying and mitigating legal risks for clients. 

Dan holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Shippensburg University and a juris doctor from Widener University School of Law. He is admitted to practice in all Pennsylvania state courts as well as the United States District Court for the Middle District, Eastern District and Western District of Pennsylvania, and The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Outside of work, Dan is very active in his community coaching youth sports and moderating various activities through his local parish.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2010)
    • Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania (B.A., 2007)
    • Pennsylvania, 2010
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association, Labor & Employment Section
    • NAGTRI Instructor

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Updates from the U.S. Department of Education

January 1, 2026

PA Supreme Court Provides Flexibility to Municipal and School Boards under the Sunshine Act with Its Ruling in Coleman v. Parkland School District Background A dispute arose regarding the 2021 amendments to the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act (Act 65). These amendments required agencies (including school boards and borough councils) to post meeting agendas at least 24 hours in advance of a public meeting and generally prohibited taking official action on items not listed on those pre-meeting agendas. In October 2021, the Parkland School Board added a vote to ratify a teachers' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) to its agenda during a public meeting. However, the board only learned of the contract's ratification by the union shortly before the meeting began. A resident, Jarrett Coleman, challenged the vote, arguing it violated the Sunshine Act because the CBA was not on the 24-hour posted agenda and did not meet the specific "emergency" or "de minimis" exceptions listed in the Act. The Commonwealth Court initially ruled against the District, holding that agencies could only add items if they fell into three narrow categories: (1) emergencies, (2) matters arising 24 hours before the meeting that are de minimis, or (3) matters raised by a resident during the meeting that are de minimis. The District appealed, setting the stage for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision. The Decision The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and reinstated the School District’s victory. Justice Donohue, writing for the majority, focused on a strict plain language interpretation of Section 712.1 of the Sunshine Act. The "Fourth Exception": The court held that the statute’s use of the disjunctive "or" in Section 712.1(a)—which references subsections (b), (c), (d), or (e)—indicates that there are four independent exceptions to the 24-hour notice rule. The Court determined that Section 712.1(e), often called the "Majority Vote Clause," is a standalone exception. It allows an agency to add any matter of business to the agenda during a meeting, provided they follow specific procedural steps. The “spirit of the law” argument was rejected by the majority, explaining that the Commonwealth Court had essentially "redrafted" the statute. The Supreme Court emphasized that if the text is unambiguous, the court cannot ignore the literal interpretation of the law to pursue its perceived intent. Takeaways For solicitors and legal counsel representing Pennsylvania municipal bodies and school districts, the Coleman ruling provides much-needed flexibility, but requires strict procedural adherence. The Coleman decision removes the “de minimis” requirement to Majority Votes under the Sunshine Act. Given that agencies have a majority vote to create a last-minute addition to an agenda, they no longer need to prove that it is an "emergency" or "minor" (de minimis). However, local agencies must follow the Four-Step Procedural Mandate to lawfully add an item under the "Majority Vote" exception. Practitioners must ensure their clients:  1.    Announce the reasons for the change publicly before the vote. 2.    Conduct a separate majority vote to amend the agenda before voting on the substance of the item. 3.    Post the amended agenda online and at the principal office by the next business day. 4.    Record the reasons and the vote clearly in the meeting minutes. Solicitors or attorneys representing local agency clients would be wise to monitor legislation by the General Assembly in response to the Coleman decision. The Assembly may respond with further clarification to the Act in the event of potential “absurd” results cautioned by some justices and whether the “broad flexibility” offered by the Coleman decision is, in fact, what the legislature intended.  Legal Update for Special Education Law – January 2026 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.  

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Updates from the Pennsylvania Department of Education

December 1, 2025

Pennsylvania Expands School Notification Requirements for Weapons Incidents Last month, Governor Shapiro signed Act No. 2025-44, which amends Pennsylvania’s School Code. Specifically, the new law requires Pennsylvania schools to notify parents and educators within 24 hours when a student is found in possession of a weapon on school property, school transportation or at a school-sponsored activity.  The Bill aims to increase transparency and school safety by requiring schools to use communications methods “likely to reach” (e.g., phone, email, SMS) parents and staff impacted by a student’s possession of a weapon. In instances where the student possesses a weapon in a school building, the District should notify only parents and staff directly involved. However, the law requires broader dissemination of a student’s weapon possession when the student possesses the weapon on a multi-building campus. In such a case, all staff and parents with students in the other on-campus buildings must be notified. The law further states that notices of student weapon possessions discovered at “school-sponsored activities” should be directed to “the appropriate population” impacted by the weapon possession.  Importantly, Districts are not required to include personally identifiable information in their notices to parents and staff. Further, Districts must provide more detailed information to families and staff with “legitimate educational interests” in the student who possessed the weapon.  Districts must continue to report weapon possession incidents to the Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE). In addition, Districts must also continue to report weapon possessions that constitute violations of 24 P.S. § 1317.2 (Possession of weapons prohibited), 18 Pa.C.S. § 912 (Possession of weapon on school property), or any other weapon identified by District policy or local ordinance.  As with any new legislation, there is language in Act 44 that may prove ambiguous, such as what constitutes notification “likely to reach” staff and parents. However, Pennsylvania school districts should discuss updates to their policies with their solicitors to ensure compliance with Act 44’s new requirements, review FERPA requirements with staff to ensure personally identifiable information is not disclosed to unintended parties, and review and refine notification workflows. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.