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Daniel D. Krebbs

Portrait of Daniel D. Krebbs

With three decades of litigation experience, Dan is a trusted advocate for clients facing complex, high-exposure claims. He focuses his practice on the defense of catastrophic matters involving Trucking & Transportation Liability, Premises & Retail Liability, Property Litigation, Construction Injury Litigation, Automobile Liability, and other serious casualty claims.

Dan is recognized for his ability to navigate high-stakes litigation with precision and efficiency. He has tried numerous civil cases to verdict in state and federal courts throughout Pennsylvania, consistently delivering results that protect his clients’ interests. By collaborating with leading medical, vocational, and construction experts, he develops defense strategies that not only withstand scrutiny but also drive down potential exposure and settlement costs.

Honored in The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants, Dan is widely regarded for his experience and results in catastrophic and complex litigation. Clients and insurers rely on him for his strategic insight, courtroom skill, and unwavering commitment to achieving the best possible outcomes when the stakes are highest.

As a senior shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s largest department, Dan also serves as a resource and mentor to colleagues, sharing his trial experience and deep knowledge of casualty law to strengthen the team and advance client success.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1994)
    • Duquesne University (B.A., 1990)
    • Pennsylvania, 1994
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1998
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2023-2027)
    • BV® Distinguished™ Rating by LexisNexis Martindale-Hubbell
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Negligent Security Claims, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, January 25th, 2023
    • Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Update, Dispute Resolution Institute’s (DRI) 2021 Personal Injury Practicum, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, November, 2021
    • Landowner Liability For Third Party Criminal Acts, CLE Presentation for PBI, December 2005
    • Defending The Automobile Injury Case, Presented for The Institute of Paralegal Education, June 23, 2004
    • "Tuning Out The Siren Song Of Sales Displays," Defense Digest, Vol. 13, No. 4, December 2007
    • "The Pennsylvania Superior Court Invalidates Rule 212.2 Sanctions," Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 2002
    • "Plaintiff in Products Liability Suit Permitted To Introduce Evidence Of Subsequent Design Change," The Journal of the Allegheny County Bar Association, March 9, 2001 and Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 6, December 2000
    • Successfully defeated a tort action with claims for compensatory and punitive damages where the demand at trial was $3 million by convincing the jury that my client's alleged conduct was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's post-traumatic epilepsy and cognitive impairment.
    • Successfully defeated a tort action brought on behalf of a minor pedestrian severely injured following a collision with the client driver by convincing the jury that the client was not negligent.  The demand at trial was $1.5 million.
    • Successfully defeated a tort action where the demand was $1.5 million at trial for a claim by an injured security guard who fell from a loading dock sustaining significant injuries to her neck, shoulder, wrist and low back, by convincing the jury that the client was not negligent in maintaining the property.
    • Through the use of a construction management expert, an architect and a real estate expert, I was able to bring the plaintiffs' settlement demand down from $1 million to $100,000 in a case involving claims of negligent construction management.
    • With our use of medical experts, vocational experts and an expert civil engineer, the plaintiff's settlement demand was reduced from $1.25 million to $375, 000 in a product liability matter.
    • Deverant v. Selective Insurance Company, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1204 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
    • Transamerican Office Furniture v. Traveler's Property & Casualty, et al, 222 F.Supp.2d 689 (E.D.Pa.)
    • Sieradzki v. Realen Homes Construction Company, et al, 34 Pa. D&C 4th 264 (1997)

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.