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Coryn is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she focuses her practice on the defense of public entities, police, prison and correctional officers, as well as elected officials in civil rights, employment and land use matters. In addition to the core areas of her practice, Coryn also has experience with general liability, automobile liability, premises and retail liability, and property litigation matters. 

Coryn attended Arcadia University, where she graduated cum laude, with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Pre-Law. Thereafter, she attended Penn State Dickinson Law, where she graduated cum laude with a juris doctor and a Certificate in Entrepreneurship Law – Concentration in Intellectual Property and Technology in 2023. 

While in law school, Coryn received CALI Excellence for the Future Awards (highest grade) in Insurance Law, Intro to Intellectual Property, Constitutional Law, and Family Law. She also served as a research assistant for the Associate Dean of Academic and Student Affairs and as the Vice President of the Intellectual Property Law Society. Upon graduation, Coryn was inducted into the Woolsack Honor Society for ranking in the top 15% of her class. 

    • Penn State Dickinson Law (J.D., cum laude, 2023)
    • Arcadia University (B.A., cum laude, 2018)
    • Pennsylvania, 2023
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2023
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2023
    • Dauphin County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association

Results

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Summary Judgment Won in a Premises Liability Action

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of two homeowners in a premises liability action. One of the homeowners called his father, the plaintiff, asking him to come to his house because he was having his roof replaced and had concerns about the work being done. The plaintiff arrived at the home and observed nails and other debris strewn about the entire property. Nonetheless, he entered the property to assess the roofing work and took care to avoid stepping on any nails. As he was leaving the property, he stepped on a nail, which went through his foot. The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence against both homeowners and also attempted to assert that, because his son requested that he come to inspect the roofing work, he was a business invitee rather than a licensee. We argued that the plaintiff was a licensee as he was a social guest who was merely providing advice to his son. They further argued that the homeowners owed no duty to the plaintiff as he knew the nails were strewn about the property and he understood the risk involved in walking there. We also argued that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by assumption of risk because as he was aware of the nails on the property and, nonetheless, voluntarily proceeded to walk onto the property. The court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners.

Summary Judgment Obtained for a Homeowners’ Association

We secured summary judgment for a homeowners’ association. The plaintiff owned an apartment in a planned community and sought to drill a hole through the exterior wall of the building to vent an HVAC unit. The HOA denied his request, and the plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealings, alleging that the HOA treated him unfairly by denying his request. Despite providing numerous photos of other holes through the exterior wall of the building, the plaintiff admitted during his deposition that they did not know whether the HOA had ever permitted another unit owner to drill a hole in the exterior wall. We successfully argued that the plaintiff could not put forth any evidence demonstrating unfair treatment, or that the request had been denied in bad faith. 

Thought Leadership

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Defense Digest

Highly Specific: Supreme Court Reiterates Exacting Standard for Clearly Established Constitutional Rights

June 30, 2026

Key Points: The United States Supreme Court continues to underscore the need for specific precedent to find a constitutional right “clearly established” for the purpose of qualified immunity. To satisfy this standard, courts generally need to identify a prior case where an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Constitution. Clearly established rights cannot rest on broad or generalized propositions; they must be defined with a high degree of specificity. In the past decade, the United States Supreme Court strengthened qualified immunity protections for government actors in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases. Building on its 2015 decision in Mullenix v. Luna, the Supreme Court has increasingly emphasized the demanding nature of the “clearly established” prong. Under this framework, precedent must define constitutional rights with a high degree of specificity, such that every reasonable official is on notice of what conduct is unlawful. In Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. __, 146 S. Ct. 926 (2026), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this exacting standard. The case arose from a January 8, 2015, protest at a Vermont Statehouse, where approximately 200 individuals participated in a nonviolent sit-in. The plaintiff, Shela Linton, was among these protestors. At approximately 8:00 p.m., 29 protestors, including Linton, remained seated on the Statehouse floor with their arms linked. Law enforcement informed them that the Statehouse was closed, instructed them to leave, and warned that refusal would result in arrest for trespassing. When the protestors declined to comply, officers began arresting and removing them individually. Protestors who refused to comply thereafter were lifted and escorted, dragged, or carried out of the Statehouse chamber. After removing sixteen protestors, the defendant, Sergeant Zorn, approached Linton and asked her to stand. Linton refused, remaining seated with her arms interlocked with the other protestors. After several seconds, Sergeant Zorn and a second officer took hold of Linton’s arms and separated her from the group. Sergeant Zorn then placed Linton’s left hand behind her back in a rear wristlock and twisted her arm. As Linton cried in pain, Sergeant Zorn repeatedly asked her to stand. Linton refused to stand and verbally reinforced this refusal. In response, Sergeant Zorn warned Linton that he would ask her one more time to stand up prior to using more pain compliance. Linton again refused to stand, and Sergeant Zorn applied pressure to her wrist and lifted her. Linton screamed, briefly stood, and then fell back to the floor after jerking her arms. Sergeant Zorn and two other officers ultimately carried her out of the building. Linton subsequently brought a Section 1983 claim, alleging Sergeant Zorn used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment to Sergeant Zorn, concluding it was not clearly established that lifting Linton while applying wrist pressure violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The Second Circuit reversed, relying on its decision in Amnesty America v. West Hartford for the proposition that the “gratuitous” use of pain compliance techniques against passively resisting protestors constitutes clearly established excessive force. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Second Circuit contravened the principles of a clearly established right by relying on Amnesty America as dispositive. The Court explained that government officials are shielded by immunity unless existing precedent places the constitutional question “beyond debate,” such that it is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official is on notice of what conduct is unlawful. This generally requires a court to identify a prior case where an officer acting under similar circumstances was found to have violated the constitution. Said case must further define the constitutional right with a high degree of specificity. According to the Court, Amnesty America did not meet these requirements. The Supreme Court identified three principal flaws in the Second Circuit’s analysis. First, Amnesty America involved a wide variety of alleged uses of force against passively resisting protestors, ranging from ramming a protestor’s head into the wall to using rear wristlocks to lift protestors up, and did not definitively hold that any of those actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the Amnesty court remanded the case because a reasonable jury could have found either excessive force or reasonable conduct, which is insufficient to define a clearly established right. Second, the conduct in Amnesty America differed in a key respect: there was no indication that officers warned protestors before using force. In contrast, Sergeant Zorn repeatedly warned Linton and gave her an opportunity to comply. The Court reasoned that a reasonable officer could not have interpreted Amnesty America to establish “that using a routine wristlock to move a resistant protester after warning her, without more, violates the Constitution.” Third, the Second Circuit relied on an overly general principle: “that the gratuitous use of pain compliance techniques—such as a rear-wristlock—on a protestor who is passively resisting arrest constitutes excessive force.” The Supreme Court emphasized that such generalizations are insufficient. Even if that principle was established by Anmesty America, it lacked the high degree of specificity necessary to clearly define what conduct is prohibited, particularly because it failed to delineate when force becomes “gratuitous.” Although brief, the Supreme Court’s opinion reinforces the stringent requirements for clearly established law. To overcome qualified immunity, there must be precedent that: (1) squarely governs the specific conduct at issue and places the constitutional question beyond debate; (2) is not materially distinguishable from the facts of the case; and (3) defines the right with a high degree of specificity rather than at a general level. Absent these elements, qualified immunity will shield government officials from liability. Coryn works in our Harrisburg, PA office. He can be reached at (717) 651-3703 or CDHubbert@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

graphic announcing our 6 2027 Super Lawyers & Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group