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Defense Digest

Florida’s New Property Insurance Statute Changes Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees and Costs in First Party Homeowner’s Insurance Cases

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021

December 1, 2021

by Corey K. Setterlund

Key Points:

  • Prior to enactment of Florida Statute § 627.70152, insureds’ attorneys obtained attorney’s fees under Florida Statute § 627.428. 
  • The entitlement to fees for either party is dependent on the insurer’s presuit offer and the insured’s judgment. 
  • It is unclear if Proposals for Settlement are still available to insurers to obtain attorney’s fees in first party homeowner’s insurance cases.

Prior to July 1, 2021, insureds suing their homeowners property insurance carriers simply obtained attorney’s fees under Florida Statute § 627.428, which states:

Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any of the courts of this state against an insurer and in favor of any named or omnibus insured or the named beneficiary under a policy or contract executed by the insurer, the trial court … shall adjudge or decree against the insurer and in favor of the insured or beneficiary a reasonable sum as fees or compensation for the insured’s or beneficiary’s attorney prosecuting the suit in which the recovery is had.

This system of obtaining attorney’s fees emboldened insureds to sue their property insurance carriers because they only needed to obtain $1 in a judgment to have all of their attorney’s fees paid for, and it increased the risk for the carrier to take cases to trial. However, the system began to change in 2019 when the Florida legislature amended Florida Statute § 627.7152, which changed the ability of assignees of insureds to get attorney’s fees when they would sue the insured’s carrier for insurance benefits under an assignment. Florida Statute § 627.7152 requires assignees to provide to carriers a written notice of intent to litigate and allows carriers the ability to make a presuit settlement offer. Subsection 10, which specifically addressed attorney’s fees, states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a suit related to an assignment agreement for post-loss claims arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy, attorney fees and costs may be recovered by an assignee only under s. 57.105 and this subsection.

(a)       If the difference between the judgment obtained by the assignee and the presuit settlement offer is:

1.          Less than 25 percent of the disputed amount, the insurer is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees.

2.         At least 25 percent but less than 50 percent of the disputed amount, no party is entitled to an award of attorney fees.

3.         At least 50 percent of the disputed amount, the assignee is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees.

Enactment of these changes appeared to greatly reduce litigation brought by assignees as it more evenly applied the risk of trial between the parties. In 2021, the Florida legislature enacted F.S. § 627.70152, which provides a similar system of notice of intent to litigate and for entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs. F.S. § 627.70152(8) states:

(a)       In a suit arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy not brought by an assignee, the amount of reasonable attorney fees and costs under s. 626.9373(1) or s. 627.428(1) shall be calculated and awarded as follows:

1.          If the difference between the amount obtained by the claimant and the presuit settlement offer, excluding reasonable attorney fees and costs, is less than 20 percent of the disputed amount, each party pays its own attorney fees and costs and a claimant may not be awarded attorney fees under … s. 627.428(1).

2.         If the difference between the amount obtained by the claimant and the presuit settlement offer, excluding reasonable attorney fees and costs, is at least 20 percent but less than 50 percent of the disputed amount, the insurer pays the claimant’s attorney fees and costs under … s. 627.428(1) equal to the percentage of the disputed amount obtained times the total attorney fees and costs.

3.         If the difference between the amount obtained by the claimant and the presuit settlement offer, excluding reasonable attorney fees and costs, is at least 50 percent of the disputed amount, the insurer pays the claimant’s full attorney fees and costs under … s. 627.428(1).

While § 627.70152 is not as restrictive as § 627.7152, it does force insureds to at least take a harder look at their case because, if insureds are unable to beat the 20% threshold, they will have to pay their own attorney’s fees. Further, attorneys have to consider not obtaining their full fees if an insured’s case does not result in 50% more of the pre-suit settlement offer.

One issue not addressed in § 627.70152 that was addressed in the assignee statute was the availability of Proposals for Settlement to protect attorney’s fees for carriers. Section 627.7152 specifically states that the only way to obtain attorney’s fees is under 57.105 (sanctions) or the instant statute. However, § 627.70152 does not specifically state such a restriction on attorney’s fees. Yet, the Senate Summary Committee states:

The bill provides that … attorney fees may only be awarded using the methodology created by the bill or when the court imposes sanctions under s. 57.105, F.S. Accordingly, claimants may no longer obtain attorney fees under s. 627.428, F.S., or s. 626.9373, F.S., nor may insurers recover attorney fees using an offer of judgment under s. 768.79, F.S.

Since it appears there was a change to the bill before it was enacted as § 627.70152, as attorney’s fees are available under 627.428, it would seem this comment is moot; however, challenges to an insurer’s use of the offer of judgment statute may arise in the future.

*Corey is an associate in our Jacksonville, Florida, office. She can be reached at 904.358.4215 or cksetterlund@mdwcg.com.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.