.

Christopher N. Santoro

Senior Counsel

CNSantoro@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Christopher N. Santoro

Chris has over 30 years of litigation experience handling major casualty, toxic tort, and product liability matters. He has significant experience in handling toxic tort matters involving exposure to alleged hazardous substances and has successfully defended major corporations in hundreds of cases at the trial level. Since joining Marshall Dennehey in 2002, Chris has expanded his practice to handling matters involving asbestos, silica, vinyl chloride, benzene, lead, cadmium, legionella, various dusts, lubricants, and other allegedly hazardous materials. He continues to be an active trial lawyer and has tried over 150 jury trials to verdict.

Chris began his career as an associate at Krusen Evans & Byrne and settled upon a defense practice focusing on product liability, personal injury, property damage, and toxic tort matters. He gained experience handling a wide variety of matters and tried numerous jury trials to verdict.

In 1989, Chris was instrumental in forming a firm that concentrated in toxic tort matters, and the firm quickly established itself as one of the leading firms in asbestos litigation. He served as the managing partner for eleven years.  The firm rapidly grew under his leadership. It was during this time that Chris concentrated his practice in the field of toxic torts and quickly became one of the most active and successful toxic tort trial lawyers. Representing Owens Corning, he served as lead trial counsel in the Philadelphia area asbestos litigation. In addition, he participated in the development of strategies and techniques for the handling of complex, multi-party toxic tort litigation.

While at Marshall Dennehey, Chris has tried numerous cases to verdict with all but two (2) resulting in defense verdicts.  One plaintiff's verdict was overturned by the Pennsylvania Superior Court and the grant of a new trial affirmed by an En Banc Panel of the  Pennsylvania Superior Court.

At the request of various clients, Chris has organized and/or given presentations at various seminars. In addition, he has lectured on a variety of topics involving trial techniques and has participated in numerous CLE seminars.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 1984)
    • La Salle University (B.A., cum laude, 1981)
    • Pennsylvania, 1984
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania
    • American Board of Trial Advocates
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants (2023-2026)
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2026)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2006-2007, 2018-2019)
    • American Bar Association
    • American Board of Trial Advocates, Diplomat
    • Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Hearing Committee Member
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Defending Household Exposure Cases, Mealey's National Asbestos SuperConference, Phoenix, AZ, September 2008 
    • Defending Toxic Tort Cases, AIG Environmental Unit, New York, NY, November 2007 
    • Silca Litigation and Assembly Line Diagnosing, AIG Domestic Claims Toxic Tort Unit, May 2006 
    • Opening Statements, Marshall Dennehey Trial Advocacy Class, May 2006 
    • Trying The Automobile Brake Case, Goodyear Tire & Rubber National Counsel Meeting, San Diego, CA, October 2005 
    • Cross Examination, Marshall Dennehey Trial Advocacy Class, October 2005 and October 2006 
    • "Tooey Is Not Just a Bunch of “Hooey”— Practical Tactics for Defending an Employer in the Realm of Toxic Tort Litigation,"Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 3, September 2014, co-author
    • "The Dose Is the Poison --The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Questions the 'Each and Every Breath' or 'Any Exposure' Theory," Defense Digest, Vol. 14, No. 2, June 2008
    • "Assumption of Risk in Product Liability," Counterpoint, April 1989 
    • Obtained a unanimous defense verdict after a nine week trial in Suffolk County, New York, where the plaintiff’s counsel requested that the jury award $40 million in damages.  The plaintiff was 51 years old when she was diagnosed with peritoneal mesothelioma allegedly as a result of being exposed to asbestos containing joint compound manufactured and sold by our client. Plaintiff who was 56 at the time of trial, testified that she had little or no knowledge of ever being exposed to asbestos. However, her older sister, who served as the only product identification witness at trial, testified that she recalled that their father used asbestos containing joint compound on two occasions, approximately fifty years ago when he repaired their home after a fire in 1970 and when he built a home in Florida around 1975. Plaintiff was five and ten years old respectively during the alleged exposures and plaintiff’s sister was seven years older. Plaintiff’s sister testified that she had a vivid memory of her father using six different joint compounds during the two projects, including our client’s product. She also testified that the plaintiff was present hundreds of times when their father mixed, applied and sanded the joint compound. At trial, we called an industrial hygienist, a toxicologist and an epidemiologist who testified that the type of asbestos fiber used in our client’s joint compound did not cause or contribute to her mesothelioma, because the fibers are too short and do not cause disease. Our epidemiologist testified that plaintiff’s mesothelioma developed spontaneously and was not the result of asbestos exposure. We also called a construction expert, who testified that the sister’s testimony regarding the amount of joint compound used and the time the sister was exposed were excessive. The jury deliberated an hour before returning the verdict. Post-trial comments from jurors indicated they did not find the sister to be credible.
    • Obtained a voluntary dismissal on behalf of an aircraft parts supplier in an asbestos mesothelioma case. The plaintiff alleged he was diagnosed with mesothelioma as a result of exposure to numerous asbestos products while doing home renovation work with his father in the 1940s, while in the U.S. Air Force working as an aircraft mechanic between 1953 to 1957, as a self-employed painter between 1958 and 1960, as a civilian aircraft maintenance crew chief at the Willow Grove Air Force Base between 1959 to 1968, and non-occupationally doing automotive and home repair work. The plaintiff contended our client was the exclusive supplier of asbestos-containing fire sleeves for military aircraft hose assemblies that he worked with almost on a daily basis while at Willow Grove. Based upon the plaintiff's description of the product during his trial video and discovery depositions, our client took the position that the product could not have been supplied by them. All other defendants either settled or were dismissed, and our client took a no-pay position. As the case neared trial, plaintiff's counsel presented his evidence as to why the product identified by the plaintiff was accurate and, therefore, why we should settle the case. Through a combination of the plaintiff's testimony, our witness's prior testimony, select portions of catalog pages and drawings from the aircraft the plaintiff worked on, and catalog pages from our client's catalogs, plaintiff's counsel was persuaded to voluntarily dismiss our client shortly before trial was to begin in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
    • Obtained a unanimous 12-0 defense verdict after a two week trial in Santa Fe County, New Mexico, where the plaintiff was seeking approximately $40 million in damages. In this asbestos litigation case, it was alleged that the decedent contracted and died at the age of 76 from mesothelioma as a result of being exposed to asbestos-containing joint compound manufactured and sold by our client. The decedent worked as an electrician for 40 years and contended he worked in the vicinity of drywall workers at various commercial worksites throughout Albuquerque and New Mexico. The plaintiff contended that our client’s joint compound was defective because it was sold without a warning of the well-established dangers of asbestos. Further, the plaintiff argued that our client was negligent, because it knew or should have known of the dangers of asbestos that were readily available from as early as the 1930s. The defense argued that the asbestos fiber used in our client’s joint compound was safe, because the fibers were short fibers and not known to increase the risk of disease. It was further argued that our client acted reasonably and in a timely manner, when it placed a government-mandated warning on their product in the early 1970s. Lastly, it was argued that the only product identification witness called by the plaintiff was not credible, because he gave three depositions in 2017 and did not identify our client’s product. He first identified our client’s product during his fourth deposition in late 2019, when our client was the only remaining defendant. The jury found our client’s product was not defective, but that they were negligent. However, the jury found the negligence was not a cause of the decedent’s mesothelioma.
    • Defense verdicts for welding rod manufacturers in cases involving alleged exposure to asbestos, including:
    • Defense verdict for a welding rod manufacturer following a two week trial in Philadelphia County before Judge Ramy I. Djerassi.   The plaintiff alleged her decedent husband, who died at the age of 77, contracted lung cancer as a result of being exposed to asbestos from welding rods manufactured by our clients. The decedent was a former smoker, quitting 50 years ago but he was diagnosed with emphysema.  The jury returned a defense verdict after deliberating for 50 minutes.  (The Estate of Stephen Matkowsky v. Airco).
    • Defense verdict for a manufacturer of welding supplies following a trial before Judge Ramy I. Djerassi in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.  The plaintiff alleged her decedent husband, who died at the age of 59, contracted colon cancer as a result of being exposed to asbestos from welding blankets manufactured by our client.  The defense argued that there is no medical or scientific causation between asbestos exposure and colon cancer and that it was the decedent's family history of colon cancer and lack of screening which caused his condition.  The jury of 12 returned a unanimous defense verdict.  (The Estate of Louis Goll v. Airco).
    • Defense verdict in a jury trial before Judge Esther Sylvester in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.  The 72 year old living plaintiff claimed he developed lung cancer as a result of working with welding rods manufactured by Lincoln Electric Company, Hobart Brothers and Airco.  As a result of his cancer, the plaintiff had his left lung removed and had multiple post operative complications.  The defendants claimed that their welding rods did not release asbestos fibers and their products did not contribute to the plaintiff's lung cancer.  The jury was charged that if they found that the defendants' products contained asbestos that, as a matter of law, they must find that the product was defective.  After two hours of deliberations, the jury in a 10 to 2 decision, found that all three of the defendants' products contained asbestos, but that they were not defective. (Donald Dimmick v. Airco).
    • Defense verdict in a case tried before Judge John Herron, Administrative Judge of the Complex Litigation Center in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.  Plaintiff alleged her decedent husband contracted lung cancer as a result of being exposed to asbestos from welding rods manufactured by Lincoln Electric Company and Hobart Brothers, while welding when he worked as a maintenance mechanic.  Plaintiff was 70 years old when he died.  The defense was that welding rods to not release free asbestos fibers and that the decedent's lung cancer was caused by his heavy history of smoking cigarettes.  The jury returned a defense verdict in 22 minutes.  (The Estate of Stephen Fitzpatrick v. Lincoln Electric Company).
    • Defense verdict in a case tried before Judge Norman Ackerman in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.  Plaintiff contended he was symptomatic with shortness of breath and had pulmonary function abnormalities as a result of pleural plaques he developed while working with asbestos containing welding rods.  The case was tried reverse bifurcated and during the first phase the defense argued that pleural plaques are a benign condition that do not cause symptoms.  The jury found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded him $150,000 and $0 on the spouse's loss of consortium claim.  During the second phase the defense argued that welding rods do not release respirable fibers and any asbestos related condition the plaintiff developed was caused by exposure to other asbestos containing products.  At the conclusion of phase II, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the defense. (David Myers v. Lincoln Electric Company).
    • Defense verdict in a case tried before Judge George Overton in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, involving a 71 year old gentleman who worked as a plumber and auto mechanic and did welding several hours a week over a 25 year period.  He contended that he developed mesothelioma and died as result of his work with welding rods which contained asbestos. The case was tried reverse bifurcated and the defense did not dispute that the mesothelioma was caused by asbestos in the first phase of the case.  The jury returned a damage verdict of $365,000.  In the liability phase of the trial, the welding rod defendants were the only defendants that chose to defend their product and contended that welding rods do not release asbestos fibers that are respirable and the mesothelioma was caused by extensive exposure to asbestos insulation products and not welding rods.  Both phases of the case took two weeks to try and at the conclusion of the second phase of the case, the jury returned a defense verdict after deliberating just 30 minutes. (Estate of Rollin Bankes v. Hobart Brothers).
    • Defense verdict in a case tried before Judge Eugene Maier in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas involving a 63 year old Septa mechanic who contended that he developed lung cancer and died as a result of working with welding rods which contained asbestos.  The defense contended that the lung cancer was caused by the decedents long history of smoking, including continuing to smoke after he was diagnosed with the lung cancer.  The case was tried reverse bifurcated and after 40 minutes the jury returned a verdict for the defense after the first phase of the case.  (Orlando Williams v. Airco).
    • Defense verdict after a three week jury trial in front of Judge Stephen Baratta in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas.  Plaintiff alleged that he had developed mesothelioma, a cancer of the lining of the lung that is almost exclusively caused by asbestos, as a result of working with welding rods manufactured by our client The Lincoln Electric Company.  Plaintiff was 80 years old at the time of trial.  The theory was that the flux coating on welding rods when manipulated released respirable asbestos fibers into the air which the plaintiff inhaled over many years while working as a steamfitter from 1950's until the 1970's.  On the eve of trial, plaintiff produced two cans of Lincoln asbestos containing welding rods that he contended were removed from a jobsite over thirty years ago and stored in his garage.  Lincoln's defense was that because the asbestos in the flux coating is encapsulated in a sodium silicate binder that it was not possible that fibers of the proper size and shape could be released and inhaled by the plaintiff.  In support of the defense an expert witness in fracture mechanics from MIT was called, as well as a certified industrial hygienist and a pulmonology expert.  After deliberating for about seven hours, the jury returned an unanimous verdict in favor of Lincoln.  (Michael Messinger v. Lincoln Electric Company).
    • Other representative matters:
    • Dooley v. Bondex.  Reverse bifurcated trial before Judge Victor DiNubile in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.  Plaintiff/Decedent died at the age of 84 as a result of pleural mesothelioma he alleged was caused by his work with asbestos containing products, including Bondex joint compound, primarily while performing home repairs and renovations.  The decedent was a high ranking union official with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America Local 454.  Plaintiff's counsel made a mid six figure demand prior to trial.  A favorable settlement was reached while the jury was deliberating after phase I when plaintiff's counsel accepted what had been offered prior to trial.
    • Davis v. Goodyear.  Obtained a defense verdict for Goodyear Tire and Rubber, after a three week jury trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas before Judge Stephen Levin.  Plaintiff contended that he developed lung cancer and asbestosis as a result of working with asbestos containing brakes that he allegedly purchased at Goodyear service centers over a period of many years.  Plaintiff had surgery in 2003 where half of his lung was removed.  He was 72 years old at the time of trial and plaintiff's expert pulmonologist opined that the plaintiff's prognosis was poor and most likely would not survive five years after the surgery.  Goodyear contended that plaintiff could not have purchased brakes from them, because they were not a retailer of automotive parts and do not sell to the general public.  Rather, they operate service centers where they install all parts that they sell.  During the first phase of the reverse bifurcated trial, the defense contended that plaintiff did not have asbestosis and his lung cancer was caused by a long cigarette smoking history, although the plaintiff had stopped smoking 10 years before his diagnosis.  After deliberating for two days, the jury returned a defense verdict.  It was the first asbestos case in the country where Goodyear had gone to verdict.
    • Roth v. Kaiser Gypsum.  Plaintiff contended that he developed and died as a result developing pleural mesothelioma from working with various asbestos containing product including wall board manufactured by Kaiser Gypsum.  The case was tried reverse bifurcated before Judge Alex Bonivitacola in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.  Plaintiff's counsel settlement demand was in the low six figures with approximately ten shares in the case.  After phase I the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $200,000.  A favorable settlement was reached after phase I.
    • Bednar v. DAP.  Defense verdict obtained in a trial before Judge Ricardo Jackson in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas .  Plaintiff alleged that he developed and died at the age of 43 as a result of peritoneal mesothelioma. It was contended that the decedent was exposed to various asbestos containing products, including asbestos containing caulk manufactured by DAP, which were a substantial factor in the cause of the decedent's disease.  The defense contended that the chrysotile asbestos to which plaintiff was exposed was not a cause of the peritoneal  mesothelioma.    The case was tried reverse bifurcated and after phase I the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defense, finding that the decedent's mesothelioma was not caused by his asbestos exposure.
    • Engro v. Pep Boys.  In a reverse bifurcated trial, tried before Judge Richard Glazer in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas it was contended that the decedent contracted pleural mesothelioma as a result of his exposure to asbestos while performing brake changes on his personal vehicles.   It was alleged that the brakes were purchased at various Pep Boys' stores.  Prior to trial plaintiff's counsel issued a mid-six figure settlement demand.  After phase I the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $400,000.  A favorable settlement was reached after phase I.
    • O'Kane v. Safeway Steel Products, Inc., 1988 WL 54024 (Fed Dist Low ATL PA 3 1988) 
    • Golden v. Williard Co., 521 Pa. 528, 557 A.2d (1989)  
    • Bittinger v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 1986 WL 14195 (E.D.Pa 1986) 

Results

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After Nine-Week Trial, Unanimous Defense Verdict in Asbestos Case Where $40 Million in Damages Had Been Sought

We obtained a unanimous defense verdict after a nine-week trial in Suffolk County, New York, where the plaintiff’s counsel requested that the jury award $40 million in damages. The plaintiff was 51 years old when she was diagnosed with peritoneal mesothelioma, allegedly as a result of being exposed to asbestos-containing joint compound manufactured and sold by our client. The plaintiff, who was 56 at the time of trial, testified that she had little or no knowledge of ever being exposed to asbestos. However, her older sister, who served as the only product identification witness at trial, testified that she recalled that their father used asbestos-containing joint compound on two occasions, approximately 50 years ago, when he repaired their home after a fire in 1970 and when he built a home in Florida around 1975. The plaintiff was five years old during the alleged exposures, and her sister was seven years older. The plaintiff’s sister testified that she had a vivid memory of her father using six different joint compounds during the two projects, including our client’s product. She also testified that the plaintiff was present hundreds of times when their father mixed, applied and sanded the joint compound. At trial, we called an industrial hygienist, a toxicologist and an epidemiologist, who testified that the type of asbestos fiber used in our client’s joint compound did not cause or contribute to her mesothelioma because the fibers are too short and do not cause disease. Our epidemiologist testified that the plaintiff’s mesothelioma developed spontaneously and was not the result of asbestos exposure. We also called a construction expert, who testified that the sister’s testimony regarding the amount of joint compound used and the time the sister was exposed were excessive. The jury deliberated an hour before returning the verdict. Post-trial comments from jurors indicated they did not find the sister to be credible.

Voluntary Dismissal of Client in Asbestos Mesothelioma Case

Our attorneys secured a voluntary dismissal on behalf of an aircraft parts supplier in an asbestos mesothelioma case. The plaintiff alleged he was diagnosed with mesothelioma as a result of exposure to numerous asbestos products while doing home renovation work with his father in the 1940s; while in the U.S. Air Force working as an aircraft mechanic between 1953 to 1957; as a self-employed painter between 1958 and 1960; and as a civilian aircraft maintenance crew chief at the Willow Grove Air Force Base between 1959 to 1968. The plaintiff contended our client was the exclusive supplier of asbestos-containing fire sleeves for military aircraft hose assemblies that he worked with almost on a daily basis while at Willow Grove. Based upon the plaintiff’s description of the product during his trial video and discovery depositions, our client took the position that the product could not have been supplied by them. All other defendants either settled or were dismissed, and our client took a no-pay position. As the case neared trial, plaintiff’s counsel presented evidence as to why the product identified by the plaintiff was accurate and, therefore, why the case should be settled. Through a combination of the plaintiff’s testimony, our witness’s prior testimony, select portions of catalog pages and drawings from the aircraft the plaintiff worked on, and catalog pages from our client’s catalogs, plaintiff’s counsel was persuaded to voluntarily dismiss our client shortly before trial was to begin. 

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Firm Highlights

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial

Casey Alan Coyle Joins Marshall Dennehey's PA Appellate Practice as a Shareholder in Harrisburg and Philadelphia

News

Marshall Dennehey Expands Leading Pennsylvania Appellate Practice With Addition of Shareholder Casey Coyle

Result

Unanimous Verdict Obtained in a Medical Malpractice Matter in Bergen County, New Jersey

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Congratulations to our 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Rising Stars: Elizabeth Ferguson, A.C. Nash, Taylor Naughton, Sophia Philor, Amara Rodriguez

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Florida Rising Stars

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

News

Veteran Trial Attorney Joseph M. Toddy Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department in Philadelphia

Thought Leadership

PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated

Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.