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Chris is a member of the Casualty Department where he handles cases involving New York State Labor Law, construction accidents, premises liability, products liability, auto liability and general liability.

Prior to joining the firm, Chris worked for a medium-size defense firm, handling auto claims throughout the New York Metropolitan area, successfully arguing summary judgment motions and obtaining a defendant's verdict in the Bronx.

Chris spent more than a decade working for a national insurance carrier after college and during law school in various positions including claims adjuster, claims supervisor as well as nationwide claims oversight with experience participating in both claim and law firm audits. After law school, Chris spent seven years as a trial attorney with the insurance carrier and later became their Litigation Director for 13 years. His first-hand knowledge of the insurance industry and familiarity with their policies allows him to effectively and efficiently counsel clients on their litigation issues.

Chris graduated cum laude from The State University of New York at Utica Rome in 1978 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Criminal Justice. He received his juris doctor from Touro School of Law in Huntington, New York in 1996.

    • Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (J.D., 1996)
    • State University of New York Polytechnic Institute (B.S., cum laude, 1978)
    • New York, 1996
    • Suffolk County Bar Association
    • Successfully defended a tow truck company in an "open and obvious" case in Nassau County, NY. The company had been called to tow a broken-down minibus from the plaintiff’s workplace. While removing the bus, the plaintiff walked between the tow truck and the bus, tripped over the tow rope, and broke his hip. Chris relied on precedent from a similar Nassau County case where a judge ruled that a tow rope was an open and obvious condition, with no duty to warn. Although the trial judge denied his motion for a directed verdict, she allowed him to argue to the jury that the defendant had no duty to warn. Plaintiff’s counsel did not object. In summation, Chris emphasized that the condition was open and obvious and urged dismissal. The jury deliberated for just 15 minutes before returning a verdict for the defendant.  

Results

Defense Verdict Obtained in a Theft Case in New York Civil Court

We obtained a defendants’ verdict in New York Civil Court where we represented an appliance company and their employee, who was accused of stealing a Rolex watch. The client’s employee installed a light fixture in the plaintiff’s residence. After the installer left the residence, the 85-year-old plaintiff could not locate his $31,000 Rolex watch. He filed a claim with his homeowner’s carrier and received $500 because the watch was not scheduled. He also filed a police report. He then retained counsel and commenced suit against the defendants for conversion, breach of contract and negligent hiring. During dispositions of both the plaintiff and his wife, we elicited testimony that neither had any proof that the defendants stole his Rolex watch. He further elicited that no criminal charges were ever brought against the employee. We filed for summary judgment, denying the allegations, and included affidavits from the employee and the owner of the appliance company in which it was indicated that there were no prior complaints regarding the company and/or the installer. The motion was denied. At the trial conducted in June 2025, Chris again elicited testimony from the plaintiff that he had no proof that the installer stole his Rolex watch, nor did the plaintiff provide any proof that the installer’s employer engaged in negligent hiring, as there were no prior complaints regarding this employee. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, we again moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the plaintiff had not established his claim for damages or proven the allegations in the complaint. The motion was denied. Rather than hearing oral summations, the court directed the parties to submit written summations. In our written summation, we outlined dismissal of the case, arguing that any finding against the defendants for theft would be tantamount to accusing them of stealing when neither the police nor the district attorney found any probable cause to criminally charge them. The court dismissed the case in its entirety. 

Defense Verdict Obtained in a Slip and Fall Case

We obtained a defense verdict in a slip and fall case in Suffolk County Supreme Court. The plaintiff was a physician’s assistant who alleged he slipped and fell on a wet area inside his medical facility. He testified at his deposition that he saw mop swirls in the wet spot. He brought suit against the facility’s cleaning company over one year later. Unrelated to this incident, the plaintiff had a pancreatic cancer relapse after his 2019 slip and fall and was out on workers’ compensation for over one year. At trial, plaintiff’s counsel produced a note from the plaintiff’s wife stating that he would not be testifying due to his medical condition; therefore, his deposition testimony would be read to the jury, which the court allowed. We argued that plaintiff’s counsel had the opportunity to secure statements from numerous witnesses and former employees whom counsel never subpoenaed for non-party depositions or trial. The cleaning company’s owner, our client, testified that the plaintiff’s employer had access to his janitorial equipment, including mops, which were always at their disposal. We argued that it would be speculation that a wet spot on a floor would have been caused by our client. The jury deliberated for 55 minutes and rendered a defendant’s verdict.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.