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Chris is a member of the Casualty Department where he handles cases involving New York State Labor Law, construction accidents, premises liability, products liability, auto liability and general liability.

Prior to joining the firm, Chris worked for a medium-size defense firm, handling auto claims throughout the New York Metropolitan area, successfully arguing summary judgment motions and obtaining a defendant's verdict in the Bronx.

Chris spent more than a decade working for a national insurance carrier after college and during law school in various positions including claims adjuster, claims supervisor as well as nationwide claims oversight with experience participating in both claim and law firm audits. After law school, Chris spent seven years as a trial attorney with the insurance carrier and later became their Litigation Director for 13 years. His first-hand knowledge of the insurance industry and familiarity with their policies allows him to effectively and efficiently counsel clients on their litigation issues.

Chris graduated cum laude from The State University of New York at Utica Rome in 1978 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Criminal Justice. He received his juris doctor from Touro School of Law in Huntington, New York in 1996.

    • Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (J.D., 1996)
    • State University of New York Polytechnic Institute (B.S., cum laude, 1978)
    • New York, 1996
    • Suffolk County Bar Association
    • Successfully defended a tow truck company in an "open and obvious" case in Nassau County, NY. The company had been called to tow a broken-down minibus from the plaintiff’s workplace. While removing the bus, the plaintiff walked between the tow truck and the bus, tripped over the tow rope, and broke his hip. Chris relied on precedent from a similar Nassau County case where a judge ruled that a tow rope was an open and obvious condition, with no duty to warn. Although the trial judge denied his motion for a directed verdict, she allowed him to argue to the jury that the defendant had no duty to warn. Plaintiff’s counsel did not object. In summation, Chris emphasized that the condition was open and obvious and urged dismissal. The jury deliberated for just 15 minutes before returning a verdict for the defendant.  

Results

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Defense Verdict Obtained in a Theft Case in New York Civil Court

We obtained a defendants’ verdict in New York Civil Court where we represented an appliance company and their employee, who was accused of stealing a Rolex watch. The client’s employee installed a light fixture in the plaintiff’s residence. After the installer left the residence, the 85-year-old plaintiff could not locate his $31,000 Rolex watch. He filed a claim with his homeowner’s carrier and received $500 because the watch was not scheduled. He also filed a police report. He then retained counsel and commenced suit against the defendants for conversion, breach of contract and negligent hiring. During dispositions of both the plaintiff and his wife, we elicited testimony that neither had any proof that the defendants stole his Rolex watch. He further elicited that no criminal charges were ever brought against the employee. We filed for summary judgment, denying the allegations, and included affidavits from the employee and the owner of the appliance company in which it was indicated that there were no prior complaints regarding the company and/or the installer. The motion was denied. At the trial conducted in June 2025, Chris again elicited testimony from the plaintiff that he had no proof that the installer stole his Rolex watch, nor did the plaintiff provide any proof that the installer’s employer engaged in negligent hiring, as there were no prior complaints regarding this employee. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, we again moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the plaintiff had not established his claim for damages or proven the allegations in the complaint. The motion was denied. Rather than hearing oral summations, the court directed the parties to submit written summations. In our written summation, we outlined dismissal of the case, arguing that any finding against the defendants for theft would be tantamount to accusing them of stealing when neither the police nor the district attorney found any probable cause to criminally charge them. The court dismissed the case in its entirety. 

Defense Verdict Obtained in a Slip and Fall Case

We obtained a defense verdict in a slip and fall case in Suffolk County Supreme Court. The plaintiff was a physician’s assistant who alleged he slipped and fell on a wet area inside his medical facility. He testified at his deposition that he saw mop swirls in the wet spot. He brought suit against the facility’s cleaning company over one year later. Unrelated to this incident, the plaintiff had a pancreatic cancer relapse after his 2019 slip and fall and was out on workers’ compensation for over one year. At trial, plaintiff’s counsel produced a note from the plaintiff’s wife stating that he would not be testifying due to his medical condition; therefore, his deposition testimony would be read to the jury, which the court allowed. We argued that plaintiff’s counsel had the opportunity to secure statements from numerous witnesses and former employees whom counsel never subpoenaed for non-party depositions or trial. The cleaning company’s owner, our client, testified that the plaintiff’s employer had access to his janitorial equipment, including mops, which were always at their disposal. We argued that it would be speculation that a wet spot on a floor would have been caused by our client. The jury deliberated for 55 minutes and rendered a defendant’s verdict.

Firm Highlights

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

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Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

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News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case