.

Results

  • Defense Verdict Obtained in a Theft Case in New York Civil Court

    We obtained a defendants’ verdict in New York Civil Court where we represented an appliance company and their employee, who was accused of stealing a Rolex watch. The client’s employee installed a light fixture in the plaintiff’s residence. After the installer left the residence, the 85-year-old plaintiff could not locate his $31,000 Rolex watch. He filed a claim with his homeowner’s carrier and received $500 because the watch was not scheduled. He also filed a police report. He then retained counsel and commenced suit against the defendants for conversion, breach of contract and negligent hiring. During dispositions of both the plaintiff and his wife, we elicited testimony that neither had any proof that the defendants stole his Rolex watch. He further elicited that no criminal charges were ever brought against the employee. We filed for summary judgment, denying the allegations, and included affidavits from the employee and the owner of the appliance company in which it was indicated that there were no prior complaints regarding the company and/or the installer. The motion was denied. At the trial conducted in June 2025, Chris again elicited testimony from the plaintiff that he had no proof that the installer stole his Rolex watch, nor did the plaintiff provide any proof that the installer’s employer engaged in negligent hiring, as there were no prior complaints regarding this employee. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, we again moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the plaintiff had not established his claim for damages or proven the allegations in the complaint. The motion was denied. Rather than hearing oral summations, the court directed the parties to submit written summations. In our written summation, we outlined dismissal of the case, arguing that any finding against the defendants for theft would be tantamount to accusing them of stealing when neither the police nor the district attorney found any probable cause to criminally charge them. The court dismissed the case in its entirety. 

  • Defense Verdict Obtained in a Slip and Fall Case

    We obtained a defense verdict in a slip and fall case in Suffolk County Supreme Court. The plaintiff was a physician’s assistant who alleged he slipped and fell on a wet area inside his medical facility. He testified at his deposition that he saw mop swirls in the wet spot. He brought suit against the facility’s cleaning company over one year later. Unrelated to this incident, the plaintiff had a pancreatic cancer relapse after his 2019 slip and fall and was out on workers’ compensation for over one year. At trial, plaintiff’s counsel produced a note from the plaintiff’s wife stating that he would not be testifying due to his medical condition; therefore, his deposition testimony would be read to the jury, which the court allowed. We argued that plaintiff’s counsel had the opportunity to secure statements from numerous witnesses and former employees whom counsel never subpoenaed for non-party depositions or trial. The cleaning company’s owner, our client, testified that the plaintiff’s employer had access to his janitorial equipment, including mops, which were always at their disposal. We argued that it would be speculation that a wet spot on a floor would have been caused by our client. The jury deliberated for 55 minutes and rendered a defendant’s verdict.

  • Summary Judgment Secured in a Case Involving a High-Speed Chase with a Rental Car

    We successfully obtained a motion for summary judgment, dismissing our client from a negligence case. We represented a car service which was acting as a rental agent for Avis Rent-A-Car. Our client had repeatedly rented vehicles to the defendant/third-party defendant (renter) in the case. At the time of each rental, the renter would produce a valid driver’s license that was run through a system to confirm its validity. Several days after renting a vehicle to the renter, the renter was involved in a high-speed chase with the Nassau County Police Department. While being pursued by the police, the renter t-boned the plaintiff’s vehicle at an intersection. The plaintiff underwent three surgical procedures involving bleeds to her liver and one procedure to her lung, as well as sustaining a traumatic brain injury, collapsed lung and fractured ribs. After the completion of depositions, we moved for summary judgment to dismiss our client from the litigation as our client was not the owner of the vehicle, nor was there any proof submitted that there was anything mechanically wrong with the vehicle rented to the third-party defendant. We further argued the plaintiffs failed to prove our client’s actions in renting the vehicle could be deemed as a matter of law to be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.   

  • Defense Verdict Obtained in New York Trucking and Transportation Case

    We obtained a defense verdict for a tow truck company in an “open and obvious” case in Nassau County, NY. We represented a tow truck company that was called to a plaintiff’s workplace to tow a broken-down minibus for scrapping. Our client attached a tow rope to the bus and began operating the winch but was asked to stop so the mirrors could be removed. The plaintiff removed the passenger-side mirror and, instead of walking around the bus, walked between the tow truck and the bus, tripping over the tow rope and breaking his hip. We prepared a motion for a directed verdict based on precedent from a previous Nassau County case, involving a plaintiff who tripped over a tow rope, where the judge ruled the condition was open and obvious, with no duty to warn. However, the trial judge in this case denied the motion. We then requested a curative charge instructing the jury that the defendant had no duty to warn of an open and obvious condition. While the trial judge declined to charge the jury, she permitted us to make the argument ourselves during summation. During summation, we argued the condition was open and obvious and there was no duty to warn and asked the jury to dismiss the case. The jury deliberated for just 15 minutes before returning a verdict for the defendant.   

  • Defense Verdict for Trucking Company

    We successfully defended a tow truck company in an "open and obvious" case in Nassau County, NY. The company had been called to tow a broken-down minibus from the plaintiff’s workplace. While removing the bus, the plaintiff walked between the tow truck and the bus, tripped over the tow rope, and broke his hip. The defense relied on precedent from a similar Nassau County case where a judge ruled that a tow rope was an open and obvious condition, with no duty to warn. Although the trial judge denied his motion for a directed verdict, she allowed him to argue to the jury that the defendant had no duty to warn. Plaintiff’s counsel did not object. In summation, we emphasized that the condition was open and obvious and urged dismissal. The jury deliberated for just 15 minutes before returning a verdict for the defendant.

  • Defense Verdict Secured in Highly-Contentious Slip and Fall Case

    We obtained a defense verdict in a slip and fall case which allegedly occurred in a New York supermarket. The plaintiff, a supermarket employee, claimed that he slipped and fell on water from a floor washing machine being used to clean the floors. During investigation of the claim, we discovered that the plaintiff slipped and fell on water from frozen food that he was unpacking. At trial, we successfully argued to preclude the plaintiff’s expert from testifying that the floor washing machine was leaking water in that this expert never inspected the floor washing machine. As the plaintiff never produced witnesses of the accident or photographs of the accident location, the jury rendered a defense verdict in 26 minutes.

  • Airport Fall Not Fault of Terminal's Cleaning Service

    We were successful in having a case dismissed on summary judgment in Brooklyn, New York. The plaintiff was a ticket agent for an international airline at LaGuardia airport. Our client was the cleaning service for the airport terminal. The plaintiff claimed she tripped and fell over a “worn/torn defective” floor mat behind the ticket counter. Depositions of the defendant indicated that they did not own, control, maintain or supervise the mats behind the airlines’ ticket counter. Summary judgment was filed in 2020. After two lengthy oral arguments in February 2022, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action.

  • Defense Smokes Pipefitter’s Claims

    The plaintiff, a pipefitter employed on a construction site, claimed he tripped and fell over a 2’ x 4’ metal stud, causing him to sustain a shoulder injury and subsequent surgery. The plaintiff sued the owner and general contractor under the New York State Labor Law. At his deposition in 2018, the plaintiff produced a photograph showing a loose metal stud lying on the floor of the construction site. When questioned as to who took the photograph, he stated his friend a co-worker, took the photo but that he was not there when it was taken. Four days later, the defense visited the friend and showed him the photograph produced. The friend denied ever taking the photograph and showed the defense the one photograph that he did take of the plaintiff merely sitting on a bench after the incident.  During trial, the plaintiff again produced the photograph (which was entered into evidence) and testified that it was taken by his friend and co-worker, Brian. The plaintiff also testified that he was not wearing sunglasses at the time of his fall, despite an email from a co-worker to his employer who witnessed the incident stating that he was. The email also stated that the plaintiff tripped and fell while trying to squeeze between two vertical metal studs while wearing a work backpack and carrying two energy drinks.  When the plaintiff rested his case, we called the eyewitness to the stand, who testified that the plaintiff tripped and fell trying to fit through two vertical studs while wearing a backpack and sunglasses. He further testified that the plaintiff tripped over a fixed plate on the floor, not a loose stud. The defense then called the plaintiff's friend and co-worker to the stand, who testified that he did not take the photograph produced by the plaintiff, nor did he give the photograph to the plaintiff. The jury rendered a defense verdict.  

  • New York Labor Law Case Dismissed on Summary Judgment

    Our client owned a parcel of land upon which a building was being erected. The plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor, was at the premises cleaning up the worksite on a Saturday morning. He was standing on top of a company-owned work van in the parking lot, securing ladders to the roof of the van, when he slipped and fell off the van to the ground, sustaining serious leg and knee injuries. He underwent two knee surgeries and was also told he needed back surgery. The plaintiff sued our client, as the owner of the property, and the general contractor under Labor Law sections 200, 240 and 241(6). Labor Law section 240, also known as the “scaffold law,” imposes absolute liability to the landowner for height-related injuries that occur at construction sites when someone falls off a building or building under construction. Section 241(6) involves violations of the Industrial Code. At the close of depositions, we filed a summary judgment motion to dismiss all allegations of the Labor Law in that our client was not directing or controlling the plaintiff when he was injured. We further argued that the plaintiff fell off a motor vehicle, not from a building or anything construction-related, as the vehicle was in the parking lot adjacent to the construction and, therefore, the scaffold law did not apply. The court granted our motion in its entirety.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.