.

The Quarterly Dose

New Rules, New Risks: Florida’s Latest Health Care Legislation Explained

The Quarterly Dose – August 2025

August 1, 2025

by Megan J. Nelson

On July 1, 2025, the following laws were enacted and may affect health care providers in Florida. These legislative changes introduce updates to regulatory compliance, patient care protocols and provider responsibilities. This overview highlights key provisions and their practical implications for providers across the state.

HB 519 — Administration of Controlled Substances by Paramedics
The Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (Chapter 893, Fla. Stat.) allowed for specific licensed practitioners to authorize the administration of a controlled substance by a licensed nurse or an intern practitioner. It did not expressly include paramedics. Under federal law, the Protecting Patient Access to Emergency Medications Act of 2017 (PPAEMA) created specific rules relevant to the EMS setting, allowing for a paramedic to administer controlled substances outside the physical presence of a medical director if the EMS agency was authorized to do so by state law, was registered with the DEA, and had a standing order or verbal order from a medical director.

What the changes mean:
A licensed practitioner may now authorize a certified paramedic to administer controlled substances in the course of providing emergency services.

HB 647 —Advanced Practice Registered Nurse Services (APRN)
Advanced practice registered nurses were not authorized to file a death certificate or complete a medical certification of cause of death, unless they were registered for autonomous practice.

What the changes mean:
An advanced practice registered nurse providing hospice care may certify the cause of death and file the certificate of death.

SB 958 — Type 1 Diabetes Early Detection Program
This bill created § 381.992, Fla. Stat., and requires the Department of Health, in collaboration with school districts throughout the state, to develop Type 1 diabetes information material related to early detection for the parents and guardians of students. The material must include a description of Type 1 diabetes, the risk factors and warning signs associated with Type 1 diabetes, the process for screening students using a blood autoantibody test, and recommendations for further evaluation for students displaying warning signs or positive early detection screening results.

What the new law means:
Medical providers may see an increase in concerned parents wanting to discuss Type 1 diabetes. However, some parents may not be able to seek medical care due to financial and insurance reasons.

It may be beneficial for pediatricians to reach out to their local school districts and assist with providing additional education and/or workshops for parents.

HB 791 - Surrendered Infants
Section 383.50, Fla. Stat., allows parents to safely surrender infants up to 30 days of life at an emergency medical services station, fire station, or hospital without civil or criminal liability. Existing provisions related to the presumption that the parent intended to surrender the infant, consented to appropriate medical treatment and care, and to the termination of parental rights; the care and custodial processing of an infant upon lawful surrender; and the parent’s anonymity upon surrender remain in effect.

New additions to the law:
The new law extends the previous law to include the surrender of an infant using an infant safety device. An infant safety device is a device that is installed in a supporting wall of a hospital, an emergency medical services station, or a fire station and that has an exterior point of access allowing an individual to place an infant inside and an interior point of access allowing individuals inside the building to safely retrieve the infant.

The infant safety device must be:

  • Physically part of the hospital, emergency medical services station, or fire station and be in a conspicuous and visible area to employees;
  • Temperature controlled and ventilated;
  • Equipped with a dual alarm system which automatically triggers an alarm inside the building when an infant is placed in the device, and the alarm must be tested at least once a week;
  • Equipped with a surveillance system that allows for monitoring the inside of the device 24 hours a day; and 
  • Physically checked at least twice a day.

If the infant safety device is located at an emergency medical services station or fire station, the alarm must also immediately alert 911, and dispatch must send the nearest first responder to retrieve the infant.

HB 1089 — Newborn Screenings
Newborn screening is a preventive public health service provided in every state to identify, diagnose and manage newborns at risk for selected disorders that, without detection and treatment, can lead to permanent development and physical damage or death. The Florida Newborn Screening Program serves to promote the screening of all newborns for metabolic, hereditary and congenital disorders known to result in significant impairment of health or intellect. The program currently screens for 37 core conditions and 23 secondary conditions, nearly all of which are screened for through the collection and testing of blood spots. Hearing screening, critical congenital heart disease and targeted testing for congenital cytomegalovirus are completed at the birthing facility through point of care testing.

What the changes mean:
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD) will be added to the Newborn Screening beginning January 1, 2027. DMD is a rare genetic condition, but it is also the most common childhood-onset form of muscular dystrophy. It affects approximately one in every 3,300—5,000 live male births. DMD is an X-linked inherited neuromuscular disorder that can be carried by females, but typically only presents symptomatically in boys. DMD is considered a lethal condition for which there is no curative treatment. However, early diagnoses and a multidisciplinary approach can slow the progression of the disease, prolong the survival rate and maintain a quality of life.

SB 1156 — Home Health Aide for Medically Fragile Children Program
The Home Health Aide for Medically Fragile Children (HHAMFC) Program was created in 2023 in response to the national health care provider shortage and its impact on medically fragile children and their family caregivers to provide an opportunity for family caregivers to receive training and gainful employment. Other Medicaid programs exist that pay a family member to provide home health services to a Medicaid enrollee, but the HHAMFC Program is the only one that pays a family member who is not a licensed nurse for the provision of home health services to a medically fragile child. The program allows a family caregiver to be reimbursed by Medicaid as an HHAMFC once they have completed an approved training program or graduated from an accredited pre-licensure nursing education program and are waiting to take the state licensing exam.

What the changes mean:
The HHAMFC must complete an approved training program, and the employing home health agency must provide validation of the HHAMFC prior to the aide providing services to an eligible relative. The employing home health agency must also provide training on HIV/AIDS and ensure that the HHAMFC holds and maintains a CPR certification.

The training program must consist of at least 76 total hours of training with at least 40 hours of home health aide training, 20 hours of skills training tailored to the needs of the child, 16 hours of clinical training related to the child’s needs, and training on HIV infections and CPR.

Increased the Medicaid utilization cap from eight hours per day to 12 hours per day.

Requires the home health agency to report an adverse incident within 48 hours of the incident.

HB 1195 — Fentanyl Testing
The bill created § 395.1042, Fla. Stat., and requires a hospital or hospital-based off-campus emergency department treating patients for possible drug overdose or poisoning to include testing for fentanyl in the urine drug screening. If the urine test is positive for fentanyl, a second analytical confirmation test must be performed. The results of the urine drug test and confirmation test must be retained as part of the patient’s medical record for the period of time required by the hospital’s current practice.

What the new law means:
Providers must include testing for fentanyl when a patient is suspected of a possible drug overdose or poisoning.

The addition of testing for fentanyl should not be limited to patients who are suspected of a possible drug overdose or poisoning. As fentanyl overdoses are becoming more common in patients who unknowingly take a substance that contains fentanyl, emergency medical providers should include testing for fentanyl when ordering any urine drug screening, including for patients who are disoriented or unconscious for unknown reasons.

HB 1353 — Home Health Care Services
What the changes mean:
An administrator may now manage up to five home health agencies that have the same controlling interest, regardless of where they are located in the state.

The initial admission visit, all service evaluation visits, and the discharge visit that a home health agency must provide may now be performed by a registered nurse who is contracted but not a direct employee of the home health agency.

HB 1421 — Improving Screening for and Treatment of Blood Clots
This bill aims to improve the screening for and treatment of venous thromboembolism or deep vein thrombosis (blood clots).

New additions to the law:
Every hospital with an emergency department and every ambulatory surgical center must develop and implement policies and procedures for the rendering of appropriate medical attention for patients at risk of forming blood clots.

All non-physician personnel must be trained on the policies and procedures annually. A certified nursing assistant (CNA) employed by a nursing home must undergo in-service training which includes recognizing the signs and symptoms of a blood clot and techniques for providing an emergency response.

A CNA wishing to administer medication, as delegated by a registered nurse, must complete training on identifying signs and symptoms of a blood clot and response protocols to assist a patient with a blood clot as part of the 34-hour training course on medication administration.

Assisted living facilities must provide a pamphlet to residents upon admission which contains information about risk factors for, and recognizing signs and symptoms of, a blood clot.

SB 1768 - Stem Cell Therapy
The new law, §§ 458.3245 and 459.0127, Fla. Stat., authorizes physicians to perform stem cell therapies that have not been approved by the FDA when used for orthopedic conditions, wound care or pain management. It sets forth standards for the retrieval, manufacture, storage and use of stem cells, ensuring the stem cells used are obtained from facilities that meet rigorous regulatory and accreditation requirements. Before administering any stem cell therapy, a physician must provide written notice to the patient that the therapy is not approved by the FDA and must obtain signed informed consent clearly informing the patient of the nature and purpose of the proposed treatment prior to initiation of therapy. Any advertisements must include clearly legible writing indicating the stem cell therapy is not approved by the FDA.

Who does the law not apply to:
Physicians who have obtained FDA approval for an investigational new drug or device for the use of human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue-based products.

Physicians who perform stem cell therapy under an employment or other contract on behalf of an institution that is certified to perform stem cell therapy or has expertise in stem cell therapy as determined by the Department of Health.

Violations of the law:
A violation may subject the physician to disciplinary action by their regulating board.

A physician who willfully performs, or actively participates in, treatment or research using human cells or tissues derived from a fetus or embryo after abortion commits a felony of the third degree.

A physician who willfully performs, or actively participates in, the sale, manufacture or distribution of computer products created using human cells, tissues or cellular tissue-based products commits a felony of the third degree.

SB 1808 — Refund of Overpayments Made by Patients
This bill requires anyone who accepts payment from a patient’s insurance for services rendered by a health care practitioner and determines that a patient has overpaid for said services to refund the overpayment within 30 days. If a health care practitioner fails to timely refund the overpayment, the failure will constitute grounds for disciplinary action. If a facility or provider licensed by the Agency for Health Care Administration fails to timely refund an overpayment, the agency may impose an administrative penalty of up to $500 on the license.

HB 597 — Diabetes Management in Schools
Public schools may acquire and maintain a supply of undesignated glucagon for use on students with diabetes experiencing hypoglycemic emergencies. Public schools are authorized to obtain the glucagon through a prescription from a county health department or authorized healthcare practitioner, or through arrangements with manufacturers or suppliers. This will help decrease the delay in treatment as students with diabetes experiencing a hypoglycemic emergency can now be treated with glucagon even if they don’t have their own medication at school.

SB 1514 —Anaphylaxis in Public and Charter Schools
Schools may maintain a supply of epinephrine auto-injectors (epi-pens), accessible to trained school personnel or authorized students. They must adopt a physician-developed protocol for school personnel, medical and non-medical, who are trained to recognize an anaphylactic reaction and to administer an injection of epinephrine via auto-injection during emergencies. This will help decrease the delay in treatment as students who are experiencing an anaphylactic emergency can receive an injection of epinephrine via an auto-injector by a school nurse or other trained school employee, even if they don’t have their own epi-pen with them. 


 

The Quarterly Dose – August 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Not So Fast. . . The Limitations of the Pennsylvania RELRA in Plaintiffs’ Civil Actions Against Real Estate Broker and Licensee Defendants

Much has been made of the importance and weight of the Pennsylvania Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act, 63 P.S. §§ 455.101, et. seq. (RELRA or Act). After all, a real estate broker generally cannot recover any commission absent a signed agreement that complies with RELRA. But can a plaintiff rely on RELRA as a distinct cause of action in a civil action as to a real estate broker or licensee defendant? The Superior Court has emphatically held that he or she cannot. In the unpublished opinion P. Perez Real Est. Holdings, LLC et. al. v. Home Sale Real Est. Servs., Inc., et al., No. 256 MDA 2025, 2025 WL 35389888 (Pa. Super. Ct. December 10, 2025), the Superior Court held that the Act “does not contemplate private actions for money damages as an enforcement mechanism and consequently, does not create a private cause of action.” citing Schwarzwaelder v. Fox, 895 A.2d 614, 620 (Pa. Super. 2006). While the Act authorizes the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, State Real Estate Commission, to regulate the conduct governed by RELRA, the Act alone does not create a stand-alone legal cause of action as to a broker-defendant in a civil action. See P. Perez, citing Schwarwaelder at 620. Nor can it be stated that RELRA creates or imposes any legally cognizable duties on real estate brokers or licensees. While the Act contains and refers to general concepts of duty (e.g. the agent must “exercise reasonable professional skill and care which meets the practice standards required by this act” and “to deal honestly and in good faith” 63 P.S. §§606.1 (a)(1),(2), or the broker has a duty to the buyer of property to take “action that is consistent with the buyer’s interest in transaction.”  63 P.S. §§606.3 (1)), these general concepts are secondary to the duties imposed by the required written agreement between the broker and consumer. For example, in P. Perez, a case in which the buyers-plaintiffs argued that the real estate broker failed to investigate recent legislation that would affect buyer’s intentions to convert the property to commercial space, the agreement between buyer and broker contained the following provision in the “Buyer’s Due Diligence” clause: Buyer acknowledges that Brokers, their licensees, employees, officers or partners have not made an independent examination or determination of the structural soundness of the property, the age or condition of the components, environmental conditions, the permitted uses, nor of conditions existing in the locale where the property is situated. . . Accordingly, the broker defendants expressly disclaimed any duty to buyers to inform them or determine whether any applicable zoning classifications, laws, or ordinances in the township applied to the properties in question. Moreover, the Superior Court refused to read provisions of the Act into the Agreement, citing Skiff re Buss, Inc. v. Buckingham Review, LP, 991 A.2d 956 (Pa. Super. 2010). In defending civil actions it is important for the defense attorney to identify any causes of action predicated solely on RELRA. Preliminary objections may be warranted to the extent that the plaintiff asserts RELRA as a stand-alone cause of action for monetary damages, a position struck down by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in P. Perez.  Moreover, any attempt to create or heighten duties as to the broker defendants may be countered by the general proposition that the courts will not inject the vague concepts of “reasonable professional skill” or “good faith” where the written agreement has express provisions regarding the duties of the parties. Ironically, although RELRA is an important Act with which all realtors, brokers, and licensees should be familiar to guarantee that their commissions are in fact timely paid, it is not a strong stand-alone mechanism for a plaintiff’s attempts to recover monetary damages in a civil action.

News

106 Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Recognized in the 2027 Editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America

Marshall Dennehey is proud to highlight the firm’s 106 attorneys who have been recognized in the 2027 editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America. Less than 6% of all practicing lawyers in the U.S. were selected by their peers for this recognition. Additionally, four of the firm’s attorneys received the Best Lawyers® 2027 “Lawyer of the Year” awards in their respective practice areas and demographic regions. Since it was first published in 1983, Best Lawyers® has become universally regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence. Best Lawyers lists are compiled based on an exhaustive peer-review evaluation. For more information, please visit https://www.bestlawyers.com/. OUR 2027 LAWYERS OF THE YEAR Harrisburg, PA Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers Compensation Law - Employers Roseland, NJ Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants   OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA Philadelphia, PA Nicholas D. Bowers, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Josh J. T. Byrne, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Jefferey J. Chomko, Insurance Law James H. Cole, Insurance Law John J. Delany III, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Laurianne Falcone, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John P. Gonzales, Employment Law - Management John Hare, Appellate Practice Daniel D. Krebbs, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Michele Punturi, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Bradley D. Remick, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Andrea Cicero Rock, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robin M. Romano, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Daniel J. Ryan, Jr., Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Gary M. Samms, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Christopher N. Santoro, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation -Defendants Josh D. Scheets, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Robert P. Schenk, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robert E. Smith, Insurance Law Robin Snyder, Litigation - Health Care Michael L. Turner, Commercial Litigation; Criminal Defense: White-Collar; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Claire Breaux Ventola, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Melissa Devich Cochran, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants  John F. Deasy, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Daniel W. Deitrick, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Douglas C. LaSota, Litigation - Construction; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Joseph V. Lesinski, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants   Christian D. Marquis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia A. Monahan, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Patrick T. Reilly, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Brett C. Shear, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Teresa O. Sirianni, Education Law; Employment Law – Management; Litigation - Labor and Employment Stuart Sostmann, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Danielle M. Vugrinovich, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Scranton, PA Sarah E. Argo, Litigation - Insurance Michael J. Connolly, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Matthew Keris, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants John T. McGrath, Jr., Insurance Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants William J. McPartland, Insurance Law John R. Nealon, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Victoria Scanlon, Health Care Law; Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Michael A. Sebastian, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Thomas A. Specht, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Suzanne Tighe, Litigation Insurance Harrisburg , PA Casey Alan Coyle, Administrative/Regulatory Law; Appellate Practice; Commercial Litigation Brittany E. Bakshi, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Shannon P. Fellin, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Allison Krupp, Insurance Law John R. Ninosky, Litigation – Insurance; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers King of Prussia, PA  Michael L. Detweiler, Construction Law Joseph L. Hoynoski III, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Gregory J. Kelley, Construction Law, Litigation - Construction Anthony Natale III, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Francis X. Wickersham, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers A. Judd Woytek, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers Erie, PA Patrick M. Carey, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Joel M. Snavely, Health Care Law; Insurance Law New Haven, CT Michael Wrona, Commercial Litigation, Litigation - Bankruptcy  Mount Laurel, NJ David D. Blake, Litigation - Insurance Barbara Davis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lynne Nahmani, Litigation - Health Care John H. Osorio, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John L. Slimm, Legal Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law – Defendants Roseland, NJ Robert T. Evers, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Julia Klubenspies, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard C. Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia M. McDonagh, Appellate Practice Sunny Sparano, Litigation - Construction Randall S. Watts, Health Care Law New York, NY Tonya M. Lindsey, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Tampa, FL Michael Archibald, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lindsay G. McCormick, Litigation – Construction Orlando, FL Thomas F. Brown, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Dante C. Rohr, Commercial Litigation Fort Lauderdale, FL Kimberly Kanoff Berman, Appellate Practice Patrick M. Delong, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Jacksonville, FL  Heather Byrer Carbone, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Linda Wagner Farrell, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Elizabeth B. Ferguson, Litigation - Construction James P. Hanratty, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Wilmington, DE Sarah B. Cole, Litigation - Insurance Benjamin K. Durstein, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Maria R. Granaudo, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants  Keri L. Morris-Johnston, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Cincinnati, OH Timothy B. Schenkel, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David E. Williamson, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Cleveland, OH Vincent E. Cononico, Litigation – Insurance, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Jillian L. Dinehart, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David J. Fagnilli, Insurance Law Jason P. Ferrante, Health Care Law, Litigation - Health Care Andrew H. Isakoff, Transportation Law Leslie M. Jenny, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendant OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS: ONES TO WATCH Jacksonville, FL Sean J. Reeves, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Orlando, FL Carolin A. Pacheco, Insurance Law Mount Laurel Stacey Gorin, Insurance Law Melville, NY Kimberly Gitlin, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Matthew A. Gray, Insurance Law; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Philadelphia, PA Holli K. Archer, Health Care Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law Emily Pritchyk, Commercial Litigation; Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Taylor E. Kosko, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Alana Staniszewski, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Michael D. Winsko, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants; Transportation Law King of Prussia, PA Richard Lechette, Commercial Litigation; Insurance Law, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Superior Court Confirms RESDL Claims Are Subject to a Two-Year Statute of Repose

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently concluded that claims under the Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law (“RESDL”) are subject to a two-year statute of repose running from the settlement date. This decision will further assist defending errors and omission claims against real estate agents as it bars any RESDL action commenced more than two years after the settlement date regardless of when the defect was discovered.  In Hollinger v. Deitrich, 2026 Pa. Super. LEXIS 328 (June 23, 2026), the buyers entered into an agreement of sale in April of 2017 to purchase a residential property. The settlement occurred in June of 2017. The buyers reviewed the seller disclosures that revealed the property had a sump pump in working order and a sump pit. The disclosures further noted no water infiltration into the basement, but disclosed rehab, an addition to the property and prior sewage backup.  Shortly after the settlement and closing, the buyers experienced flooding in their basement. In March of 2020, the buyers filed suit against the seller, the buyers’ real estate agent and broker and the seller’s real estate agent and broker alleging various causes of action including a violation of RESDL. The buyers alleged that they sought assurances from the agent defendants that no water infiltration occurred on the property. They further alleged that both agents lived in the area and should have known about the neighborhood water infiltration issues. The trial court granted summary judgment for the seller and the seller’s agents and dismissed the RESDL violation.  Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 345 A.3d 629 (Pa. 2025), the court explained that a statute of limitation begins to run from the time of the injurious occurrence or a discovery of the same. However, a statute of repose runs for a statutorily determined period after a definitively established event. Notably, a statute of repose eliminates a cause of action regardless of when the claim accrues. Because of this, a plaintiff may not invoke the discovery rule or other equitable tolling considerations.  RESDL requires that an action for damages, as a result of a violation of this chapter, must be commenced within two years after the date of final settlement. The court found that Section 7311(b) was clear and unambiguous that an action for damages pursuant to this chapter must be commenced within a certain time after a definitely established event that is independent of any injury or discovery of any injury. Since the buyers sued over two years after closing on the property, their statutory claims were time-barred. The court explained that the seller disclosure statement could not support common law or consumer protection claims, as using it would improperly expand remedies beyond the statute’s terms. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court’s summary judgment ruling that the buyers’ claims under RESDL were barred by the statute of repose.  Accordingly, defense counsel should scrutinize complaints involving RESDL claims to ensure that such claims have been timely brought within two-years of the settlement date. A plaintiff will no longer be able to invoke the discovery roll to expand the time frame.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.