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Defense Digest

Navigating New Jersey’s New Bad Faith Landscape for the Modern SIU

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022

October 1, 2022

by Matthew J. Burdalski

Key Points:

  • New Jersey’s Insurance Fair Conduct Act now imposes stringent and dangerously vague duties and requirements on New Jersey insurers and special investigators.
  • The passage of the Act brings New Jersey in line with several other states and jurisdictions in creating a statutory cause of action for bad faith in certain first-party claims.
  • When SIU investigates claims, best practices will be crucial in establishing good faith and avoiding the punitive consequences of violation of the Insurance Fair Conduct Act.

Earlier this year, Governor Phil Murphy signed into law Senate Bill 1559, now known as the New Jersey Insurance Fair Conduct Act (Act), that created a new statutory cause of action for bad faith in first-party insurance claims in the state of New Jersey. Prior to passage of the Act, bad faith claims in New Jersey were governed by the seminal case of Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993). There, the court found that, to establish bad faith, a claimant had to show the “absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of a policy and the defendant’s knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.” Under Pickett, a denial of coverage could not be considered bad faith so long as there was a reasonable basis to support the denial. This provided claimants with a remedy for an insurer’s reckless and unreasonable actions, but it also allowed insurers to deny claims where there were reasonable questions or law or fact.

The passage of the Act significantly reduces the burden to establish bad faith in New Jersey. While the bill was initially drafted to cover all first-party claims, the final enacted version is limited to UM and UIM claims. The Act creates a private civil cause of action against an automobile insurer for:

  1. any unreasonable delay or unreasonable denial of a claim for payment of benefits under an insurance policy; or
  2. any violation of the provisions of section 4 of N.J.S.A. 17:29B (the New Jersey Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act or “UCSPA”).

Significantly, “Insurer” is defined under the Act as any individual, corporation, association, partnership, or other legal entity which issues, executes, renews or delivers an insurance policy in New Jersey, or which is responsible for determining claims made under the policy. Arguably, this could be interpreted to include individual claims handlers or investigators as insurers for the purposes of the Act.

Penalties for violation of the Act are severe. The Act provides that a successful plaintiff shall be entitled to: (1) actual damages caused by the violation of the Act, which shall include, but need not be limited to, actual trial verdicts that shall not exceed three times the applicable coverage amount; and (2) pre-and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorney’s fees, and reasonable litigation expenses. In short, treble damages plus fees and costs.

Frighteningly vague, the Act does not provide any guidance at all as to what might be considered an unreasonable delay or denial. Further, violations of the UCSPA were previously enforced only upon a showing that they were committed by an insurer with routine frequency. The Act has stripped that element, specifically stating that a claimant “shall not be required to prove that the insurer’s actions were of such a frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” In sum, one singular violation of the UCSPA could be used by a claimant to establish a violation of the Act by an insurer.

The UCSPA sets forth 15 specific examples of deceptive acts or practices that could constitute a violation of the Act if committed by an insurer. Relevant examples include: misrepresenting pertinent facts or policy provisions; failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims; refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available information; failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time; and not attempting in good faith to effectuate fair settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear. Again, in the context of the Act, there is no requirement to show the above violations occur at such frequency to indicate a general business practice.

Similar statutes passed in other jurisdictions have been used to attempt to hold individual insurance employees personally liable for bad faith. In the matter of Keodalah v. Allstate Ins. Co., 449 P.3d 1040 (Wash. 2019), the Washington Supreme Court narrowly found that a similar bad faith bill did not create a cause of action against individual claims handlers. The Colorado Supreme Court also refused to hold individual insurance employees liable in Skillet v. Allstate Ins. Co., 505 P.3d 664 (Colo. 2022). These narrow decisions show that the plaintiff’s bar is willing and eager to push these vague statutes to their limits. The vagueness of the Act will likely invite comparable attempts by plaintiffs in New Jersey.

The New Jersey Insurance Fair Conduct Act is new, vague and harsh. The future landscape of the Act, its impact and implications are uncertain. What is certain is that claimants and the plaintiff’s bar will test the limits of the Act. The insurance industry, and SIU in particular, must be ready to adapt and meet the challenge.

*Matt is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office. He can be reached at 856.414.6035 or mjburdalski@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.