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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Florida Appeals Court Rules Defendant’s Proposal for Settlement Was Neither Ambiguous nor Designed to Extinguish Separate, Future or Pending Claims

Infinity Auto Insurance Company v. Miami Open MRI, LLC, Fla. 3d DCA, No. 3D24-0945, June 4, 2025

June 1, 2025

by Seth B. Altman

In a continuation of protracted litigation between Infinity Auto Insurance Company and Miami Open MRI, LLC, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court’s denial of Infinity’s motion for attorney’s fees. The dispute centered on whether Infinity’s proposal for settlement (PFS), rejected by Miami Open, met the clarity and specificity required under Florida law to trigger a fee award under section 768.79. Although the trial court had found the PFS invalid, the appellate court disagreed, concluding that the proposal—when read in full—was sufficiently clear and unambiguous and did not improperly attempt to extinguish future or unrelated claims. The court remanded the matter with instructions to award Infinity its attorney’s fees.

Infinity Auto Insurance Company, the appellant, appealed the trial court’s denial of its motion for attorney’s fees. The motion, which was based on Miami Open MRI, LLC’s rejection of Infinity’s PFS, was filed after the Third District Court of Appeal’s earlier ruling in Infinity Auto Insurance Company v. Miami Open MRI (Infinity 1), 361 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023). That ruling reversed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment for Miami Open and remanded the matter to the trial court, directing the trial court to grant summary judgment for Infinity and to conditionally grant Infinity’s motion for appellate fees, subject to a determination pursuant to section 768.79. The trial court, however, found the PFS to be invalid.

The question on this appeal was whether the PFS was “sufficiently clear and definite” so Miami Open could “fully consider the proposal” and whether the PFS extinguished any pending or future claims arising from this case (citing Allen v. Nunez, 258 So. 3d 1207, 1211 (Fla. 2018)). The provision at issue was paragraph 8 of Infinity’s PFS which read:

This proposal for settlement is not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the Defendant. The Defendant accordingly reserves any and all rights and defenses it may have in this case and any and all other actions or lawsuits now or hereafter pending relating to the claim which forms the basis for this lawsuit, and payment would accordingly be made under such reservation of rights if this proposal is accepted. Instead, this proposal is being made in an effort to resolve the case and avoid future costs and fees.” (Emphasis added.)

Paragraph 4 of the proposal, which the District Court also discussed, clearly and unambiguously stated that the PFS was to resolve any and all claims “that were or could have been brought in this case (emphasis added) by Plaintiff”… “as set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint.”

Miami Open’s response to the motion for fees claimed that the PFS was invalid because it was defective. It claimed it “lacked the required particularity and specificity; fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 1.442 and Fla. Stat. 768.79; contains conflicting provisions; impermissibly seeks to extinguish related claims and causes of action; and is ambiguous and vastly overbroad.” Infinity replied that Miami Open was “nit-picking”; Paragraph 4 limited the PFS to “just this case” and paragraph 8, read in its entirety and in conjunction with the other provisions of the PFS, was a standard reservation of rights and clarified the PFS was not an admission of liability.

The court held that paragraph 8, when read as a whole, particularly in conjunction with paragraph 4, was not ambiguous nor required future claims to be extinguished. First, the court noted, and the parties agreed at trial level and on appeal, that paragraph 4 unambiguously released only the claims raised (or that could have been raised) in the underlying lawsuit. Second, the court held that a common sense reading of paragraph 8 provides that if Miami Open brought a claim in the future, the PFS would not extinguish any of Infinity’s rights or defenses. Paragraph 8 was a reservation of rights, not an extinguishment of future claims. Additionally, it was not ambiguous where there were no other pending cases between the parties. Read as a whole, the PFS sought to extinguish only Miami Open’s claims as set forth in the complaint, and Paragraph 8 was merely a reservation of rights. As such, the court reversed the denial of the motion for fees and remanded the case with instructions to grant Infinity’s motion for attorney’s fees. 


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – June 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

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