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Florida Adopts the Federal Summary Judgment Standard, Leading a Path for More Successful Summary Judgment Practice

Legal Updates for Florida Defense Litigation

January 5, 2021

by Kimberly Kanoff Berman

The Florida Supreme Court has adopted the federal summary judgment standard, effective May 1, 2021. This is a welcome change for defendants and defense practitioners, especially in light of the backlog that Florida courts are still facing due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This rule change was prompted by a recent certified question from the Fifth District Court of Appeal to the Florida Supreme Court in Lopez v. Wilsonart, LLC, 275 So. 3d 831 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).

In Wilsonart, LLC v. Lopez, SC19-1336 (Fla. Dec. 31, 2020), the certified issue before the court was: “[s]hould there be an exception to the present summary judgment standards that are applied by state courts in Florida that would allow for the entry of final summary judgment in favor of the moving party when the movant’s video evidence completely negates or refutes any conflicting evidence presented by the non-moving party in opposing to the summary judgment and there is no evidence or suggestion that the videotape evidence has been altered or doctored?” The court answered no.

Wilsonart arose from a fatal car crash. The decedent’s estate sued the front car driver and the driver’s employer. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants in reliance on video evidence from the front car’s dashboard camera. The trial court held the video refuted the plaintiff’s position and demonstrated the defendants were not negligent. On appeal, the Fifth District reversed, finding the trial court improperly weighed competing evidence on material facts. The above question was certified to the court. The court asked the parties to brief whether Florida should adopt the federal summary judgment standard articulated by the United States Court and, if so, whether the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 be amended. Ultimately, the court found no reason to adopt an ad hoc video evidence exception to the existing summary judgment standard. As such, the court approved the Fifth District’s reversal of the defendants’ summary judgment.

On the same day, the court on its own motion issued In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, No. SC20-1490 (Fla. Dec. 31, 2020). In the rules opinion, the court addressed the definition of “genuine issue” found in Florida’s summary judgment standard and explained why adoption of the federal summary judgment standard was warranted. The court amended Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, adopting the federal summary judgment standard, effective May 1, 2021.

In its opinion, the court explained the misalignment of Florida and federal courts’ application of the summary judgment standard. First, Florida courts do not recognize the similarity between a motion for directed verdict and a motion for summary judgment—whereas the federal summary judgment standard mirrors the directed verdict standard. Second, Florida courts require the party moving for summary judgment to disprove the nonmoving party’s facts in order to eliminate any genuine issue of material fact—whereas the federal summary judgment standard does not require the moving party to negate the nonmovant’s position. Rather, pursuant to the federal standard, the moving party’s burden varies depending on which party bears the burden of persuasion at trial. Finally, Florida courts have characterized the summary judgment standard as “the existence of any competent evidence creating an issue of fact, however credible or incredible, substantial or trivial, which stops the inquiry and precludes summary judgment, so long as the ‘slightest doubt’ is raised”—whereas the federal summary judgment standard considers whether “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

The implications of the court’s adoption of the federal summary judgment standard are significant. When the rule change takes effect, not only will dispositive motion practice proceed in a more meaningful way, but defendants will be able to prevail on plaintiffs’ failure to produce sufficient record evidence to support their claims—the directed verdict standard that for decades Florida courts have declined to recognize in summary judgment proceedings.

The court has invited the public to comment on the sua sponte rule change on or before March 2, 2021.

 

The material in this law alert has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

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