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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Appellate Court Rules Homeowner Adequately Alleged Breach of Contract After Insurance Carrier Denied Windstorm Claim

Ronald Zabriskie v. First Protective Insurance Company d/b/a Frontline Insurance Company, Fla. 5th DCA, No. 5D2024-1072, LT Case No. 2022-CA-685, June 13, 2025

September 1, 2025

by Seth B. Altman

The appellate court reversed a trial court’s dismissal of a homeowner’s third amended complaint with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff had adequately alleged a cause of action for breach of contract. The plaintiff claimed that the insurance carrier wrongfully denied coverage for windstorm damage to his residence, and the court held that his complaint sufficiently pled the essential elements of a breach of contract claim under Florida law.

The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s final order dismissing his third amended complaint and the entire case with prejudice. The plaintiff’s third amended complaint asserted a claim for “Breach of Contract.” The issue on appeal was whether the third amended complaint sufficiently plead a cause of action that Frontline Insurance breached when it denied coverage for the claim. Frontline argued the plaintiff failed to comply with the pleading requirements of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(b) to allege a “short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Frontline argued that the plaintiff failed to identify the specific policy provision that was allegedly violated and did not adequately explain what action by Frontline constituted a breach.

The court noted, “[t]o prevail on a breach of contract action, a plaintiff, such as Zabriskie, must plead and prove (1) a valid contract; (2) a material breach; and (3) damages. Murciano v. Garcia, 958 So. 2d 423, 423 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Cap., 765 So. 2d 737, 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)).” 

Since the case was determined at the pleading stage, the court’s analysis focused on whether, as a matter of law, the third amended complaint failed to allege a cause of action for breach of contract. The court also noted that when evaluating the adequacy of a complaint, an appellate court must “take the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader,” (quoting Graulau Maldonado v. Orange Cnty. Pub. Libr. Sys., 273 So. 3d 278, 279 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (citing Jordan v. Nienhuis, 203 So. 3d 974, 976 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016); Ray Coudriet Builders, Inc. v. R.K. Edwards, Inc., 157 So. 3d 484, 485 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015).

Zabriskie’s third amended complaint alleged (which if accepted as true): (1) the policy of insurance issued by Frontline to the insured on his subject residence was an “all-risk” or “all-peril” policy that insured against the risk of direct physical loss to the residence, unless otherwise specifically excluded, limited or excepted in the policy; (2) the policy was in full force and effect on October 28, 2021, when a windstorm caused damage to the roof and the interior of the residence; (3) the amount of damage to the residence caused by this windstorm totaled $53,738.47, as detailed in the composite exhibit attached to the complaint; (4) the insured timely reported this loss to Frontline, which thereafter assigned the matter a claim number; (5) Frontline subsequently denied coverage for the loss, asserting that it was not a covered loss under the policy; (6) the insured complied, to the best of his ability, with the post-loss obligations required under the policy and has otherwise fully complied with the terms of the policy; (7) Frontline has not paid insurance proceeds owed to the insured for this covered loss; and (8) Frontline’s actions constituted a breach of the insurance policy for which the insured has sustained and continues to sustain damages. The insured also plead that all conditions precedent to the lawsuit had occurred, were waived or were performed. 

The court found these factual allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action for breach of contract and reversed the trial court, with an order directing the trial court to reinstate the third amended complaint. 


 

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – September 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

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