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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Florida Court Strikes Proposed Workers’ Compensation Rules That Allow Physicians to Dispense Medications

Publix Super Markets, Inc., et.al. v. Dept. of Financial Services, et. al., ---So.3d---(Fla. 1st DCA 2026)

March 2, 2026

by Blake J. Hood

The First District Court of Appeal issued a blockbuster opinion on February 25, 2026, in the case of Publix Super Markets, Inc., et.al. v. Dept. of Financial Services, et. al., ---So.3d---(Fla. 1st DCA 2026). The court held that, while injured workers have an absolute right to choose their own “pharmacy or pharmacist,” physicians may not dispense medications directly to their patients under Chapter 440. This marks a significant development in the often contentious relationship between insurance carriers and dispensing physicians. Those opposing the dispensing practice claim that it has resulted in practitioners charging more for medications, and that ending the practice could save insurance carriers millions of dollars.

For many years, the Department of Financial Services (DFS) interpreted the “free, full, and absolute choice in the selection of the pharmacy or pharmacist” language of section 440.13(3)(j) to exclude dispensing physicians. Thus, insurers could deny reimbursement when physicians dispensed medications to injured workers. In 2020, however, DFS reversed course and issued an Informational Bulletin stating that dispensing practitioners were considered pharmacists under the absolute choice provision. Then in 2023, DFS proposed two administrative rules confirming that “physicians (including oral surgeons), physician assistants, ARNPs, and any other recognized practitioners registered to dispense medications pursuant to section 465.0276, F.S., may dispense medications” to injured workers. The rules were challenged by Publix and various insurance companies. After a final hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a final order upholding the proposed rules.

The First DCA disagreed with the ALJ’s final order and set it aside. The court held that the proposed rules were invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority because they enlarged, modified, or contravened the plain language of the “absolute choice” provision in section 440.13(3)(j). It explained that a “pharmacist” is someone licensed to practice pharmacy by obtaining a degree from a pharmacy school, completing a board-certified internship program, and passing a pharmacy exam. The statutes governing and regulating pharmacists under Chapter 465 of the Florida Statutes do allow for certain non-pharmacists, defined as “dispensing practitioners,” to distribute medications. The crux of the First DCA’s opinion is its holding that the plain language of the absolute choice section 440.13(3)(j) of Chapter 440 only applies to pharmacists and does not encompass dispensing practitioners.

The issue, however, may not be permanently resolved, as an appeal to the Supreme Court could follow. The court also implied that an opposite result would have been reached if section 440.13(3)(j) expressly included dispensing practitioners or if the statute used a broader term like “health care provider.” In effect, the opinion provided a potential roadmap for groups to lobby for statutory amendments that could survive judicial review.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.