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Blake devotes his practice to the defense of employers and insurance carriers in claims and appeals arising under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act as well as claims brought under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.

Blake is Board Certified by The Florida Bar in Workers’ Compensation, a designation he earned in 2013. He is experienced in workers’ compensation law dealing with the analysis and litigation of problems or controversies arising out of the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law.

In addition to his practice that extends throughout the state of Florida, Blake is also licensed to practice law in North Carolina. He represents many insurance carriers and third party administrators. Additionally, he lectures on various topics concerning state and federal workers’ compensation claims.

An active member of the Jacksonville Bar Association, Blake currently serves as the co-chair of the Social Security and Workers' Compensation Law Committee. He previously served as co-chair of the Workers’ Compensation Section. Blake also proudly served as Co-Chair for the Friends of 440 Scholarship Fund between 2010 and 2012 and helped coordinate numerous fundraising events for the purpose of raising scholarship funds for the organization.

When not working, Blake enjoys spending his time with his wife and daughter, cooking, reading and playing classical guitar.

    • Florida State University College of Law (J.D., 2002)
    • Emory University (B.A., 1999)
    • Oxford College of Emory University (A.A., 1997)
    • Florida, 2002
    • North Carolina, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2007
    • E. Robert Williams Inn of Court, Barrister
    • Florida Bar
    • Friends of 440 Scholarship Fund, Inc., Jacksonville Division Co-Chair, 2010-2012
    • Jacksonville Bar Association, Social Security and Workers' Compensation Law Committee Co-Chair, 2025-2026
    • North Carolina Bar
    • "One Time Changes” in Medical Providers Under Florida Statutes Section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Bar Workers’ Compensation Section Webinar, June 11, 2025
    • Hot Topics for Attorneys, Workers’ Compensation Institute 77th Annual Workers’ Compensation Educational Conference, Orlando, FL, August 2023
    • Repetitive Trauma, Exposure and Occupational Disease, The Florida Bar Workers’ Compensation Forum, 2015-2017
    • “Repetitive Trauma, Exposure and Occupational Diseases," The Florida Bar Workers’ Compensation Forum Course Book, 2015-2017
    • “Florida Common Law Jurisprudence,” by Michael Cavendish and Blake J. Hood, The Florida Bar Journal, January 2007, Volume 81, No. 1, Page 8
    • Board Certified Specialist, Workers' Compensation, The Florida Bar

Thought Leadership

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Employer/Carriers Must Explicitly Invoke Right to Deny Claim Under “Pay and Investigate” Statutory Provision; Employes Must Always Prove Medical Necessity of Treatment

July 16, 2026

Koren v. City of Kissimmee/PGCS, ___So.3d___(Fla 1st DCA 6/10/26) The majority opinion in Koren holds that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) properly denied psychiatric treatment because the claimant did not challenge on appeal the JCC’s finding that the requested treatment was not medically necessary. However, Judge K. Thomas authored a detailed concurrence agreeing with the result on the ground that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proving medical necessity. In doing so, Judge K. Thomas also emphasized an important principle: employer/carriers must expressly invoke the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act if they intend to preserve their right to deny compensability. Merely authorizing evaluations, without explicitly invoking the 120-day rule, may be insufficient to preserve the right to deny compensability of specific injuries. In Koren, the claimant sustained injuries to his upper lip, tooth, right knee, and right foot when a board gave way on a deck he was repairing for the employer/carrier. The accident was accepted as compensable, and multiple specialists were authorized to treat his physical injuries, including an ear, nose, and throat physician, dentist, orthopedist, and plastic surgeon. The claimant later sought psychiatric treatment and attended an independent medical examination (IME) with a psychiatrist. The IME diagnosed adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, opining that the condition was caused by “the actual appearance of the scar” resulting from the industrial accident. The IME recommended continued medication, including an antidepressant, as well as follow-up care with a psychiatrist and psychologist. Critically, however, the IME did not offer an opinion regarding the medical necessity of this treatment. The claimant then filed a petition for benefits attaching the IME report and requesting authorization of psychiatric care. The employer/carrier responded by authorizing a psychiatrist, whom the claimant did, in fact, see. However, the employer/carrier neither denied the claim nor issued written notice invoking the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision. The authorized psychiatrist subsequently opined that the claimant’s psychiatric condition was unrelated to the industrial accident and instead attributable to prior employment as a law enforcement officer and volunteer firefighter. The psychiatrist further concluded that the work accident was not the major contributing cause of the condition. Although the employer/carrier stipulated to the authorization of the psychiatrist, it ultimately denied the claimant’s entitlement to psychiatric treatment. The JCC denied the requested benefit. The majority opinion affirmed on the narrow ground that medical necessity had not been established. Judge K. Thomas’s concurrence, however, expands on the legal framework. Under Florida law, an employer/carrier presented with a claim must “pay, pay and investigate, or deny.” To avail itself of the 120-day pay-and-investigate protection, the employer/carrier must affirmatively and explicitly invoke that option, typically through a written 120-day letter. The statutory investigative period does not arise automatically upon the provision of care. Furthermore, an attempt to characterize authorization as a “one-time evaluation” does not avoid waiver, as even a single evaluation may constitute the provision of a compensable benefit. By authorizing psychiatric care without invoking the 120-day provision, the employer/carrier in Koren effectively accepted compensability of the claimant’s PTSD condition. Nonetheless, it retained the ability to contest entitlement to ongoing treatment. While the employer/carrier failed to demonstrate a break in the causal chain, the claimant still bore the burden of proving that the requested treatment was medically necessary. Because the JCC found that the claimant failed to meet this burden, and the claimant did not challenge that finding either below or on appeal, the denial of psychiatric benefits was ultimately affirmed.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Workers’ Compensation Decision Clarifies that Out‑of‑State Family Visits Don’t Meet Medical Necessity Standard

June 8, 2026

Purple Pride, Inc. v. Burgess, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D479 (Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 18, 2026), reh'g denied (Mar. 31, 2026) The claimant suffered a work-related motor vehicle accident in 2019 that caused him to become tetraplegic (or quadriplegic), requiring around-the-clock attendant care. In 2024, the claimant filed a petition for benefits, requesting certain attendant care benefits he felt were necessary to allow him to take a trip to visit family in New York. The benefits he sought included the extra cost of traveling attendants, including their overtime pay and accommodations, and the extra cost of renting a Hoyer lift, commode chair, and other durable medical equipment (DME) needed for the trip. The employer/carrier denied the request as not being medically necessary. The claimant obtained an opinion from the treating psychotherapist that a visit to see family in New York would improve claimant's mental health. The psychotherapist opined that the trip was “medically necessary” in the sense that it could improve claimant's symptoms related to depression and anxiety. The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) rejected the claimant’s position that the trip to New York itself was medically necessary under the definition of medical necessity in § 440.13(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (2024). However, the JCC found that the employer/carrier should nonetheless be required to pay for the additional costs the claimant would incur to travel with the attendants and DMEs. In the JCC's view, the employer/carrier should cover those costs anywhere, pursuant to “the maxim that industry is responsible for what industry causes.” The First District Court of Appeal set aside the JCC’s order and held that because the JCC concluded that the claimant's trip to New York was not medically necessary, it was error to require the employer/carrier to pay for the additional medical benefits he sought for the trip.  The court explained that “transportation other than to a doctor” reflects on quality of life rather than medical necessity and is “generally considered gratuitous and not compensable.” Therefore, the JCC’s order was set aside.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.