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Blake devotes his practice to the defense of employers and insurance carriers in claims and appeals arising under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act as well as claims brought under the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.

Blake is Board Certified by The Florida Bar in Workers’ Compensation, a designation he earned in 2013. He is experienced in workers’ compensation law dealing with the analysis and litigation of problems or controversies arising out of the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law.

In addition to his practice that extends throughout the state of Florida, Blake is also licensed to practice law in North Carolina. He represents many insurance carriers and third party administrators. Additionally, he lectures on various topics concerning state and federal workers’ compensation claims.

An active member of the Jacksonville Bar Association, Blake currently serves as the co-chair of the Social Security and Workers' Compensation Law Committee. He previously served as co-chair of the Workers’ Compensation Section. Blake also proudly served as Co-Chair for the Friends of 440 Scholarship Fund between 2010 and 2012 and helped coordinate numerous fundraising events for the purpose of raising scholarship funds for the organization.

When not working, Blake enjoys spending his time with his wife and daughter, cooking, reading and playing classical guitar.

    • Florida State University College of Law (J.D., 2002)
    • Emory University (B.A., 1999)
    • Oxford College of Emory University (A.A., 1997)
    • Florida, 2002
    • North Carolina, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2007
    • E. Robert Williams Inn of Court, Barrister
    • Florida Bar
    • Friends of 440 Scholarship Fund, Inc., Jacksonville Division Co-Chair, 2010-2012
    • Jacksonville Bar Association, Social Security and Workers' Compensation Law Committee Co-Chair, 2025-2026
    • North Carolina Bar
    • Florida Workers’ Compensation Update webinar, August 12, 2026
    • Indemnity Benefits: Let the Claims Begin!, 2026 Florida Bar Workers' Compensation Forum, April 24, 2026
    • Requests for One-Time Changes in Medical Providers webinar, January 21, 2026
    • "One Time Changes” in Medical Providers Under Florida Statutes Section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Bar Workers’ Compensation Section Webinar, June 11, 2025
    • Hot Topics for Attorneys, Workers’ Compensation Institute 77th Annual Workers’ Compensation Educational Conference, Orlando, FL, August 2023
    • Repetitive Trauma, Exposure and Occupational Disease, The Florida Bar Workers’ Compensation Forum, 2015-2017
    • Board Certified Specialist, Workers' Compensation, The Florida Bar

Thought Leadership

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Florida Appeals Court Holds Guardianship Expenses Necessary to Secure Workers’ Compensation Benefits Are Recoverable

October 20, 2026

The First District Court of Appeal reversed a Judge of Compensation Claims' (JCC) order denying reimbursement of guardianship-related expenses, including court costs and attorney's fees. The claimant in the Fish case was the mother and court-appointed guardian of the injured worker, who suffered a catastrophic brain injury in a compensable workplace accident after being struck by a motor vehicle while operating a utility vehicle along a highway. The claimant retained a workers' compensation attorney to pursue benefits on her son's behalf, and multiple Petitions for Benefits (PFBs) were filed. The attorney subsequently requested that the employer/carrier (E/C) assist in obtaining a guardian for the injured worker, but the E/C declined. The attorney then filed a Motion to Appoint Guardian and requested that the claimant be designated as the payee for workers' compensation benefits. Following a hearing, the JCC denied the request because no PFBs were pending and no compensation awards had been issued at that time. Nevertheless, the JCC found that the appointment of a guardian was both appropriate and necessary and directed the claimant to pursue guardianship proceedings in circuit court. To comply with the JCC's directive, the claimant retained a guardianship attorney, who filed a petition for guardianship in circuit court. The guardianship proceedings required various court costs, examination expenses, and attorney's fees. After the circuit court entered an order appointing the claimant as guardian, the workers' compensation attorney filed a PFB seeking reimbursement of the guardianship expenses, as well as attorney's fees and costs under Chapter 440. The JCC denied reimbursement for both the guardianship expenses and the guardianship attorney's fee, along with fees and costs incurred in litigating the reimbursement claim. The JCC reasoned primarily that the expenses and legal services were incurred exclusively in the guardianship proceeding rather than the workers' compensation proceeding. The First District rejected that reasoning. Relying on prior precedent, the court reiterated that guardianship expenses are recoverable when incurred in connection with the handling of a claimant's rights, duties, and responsibilities under Chapter 440. The court emphasized that recoverable workers' compensation expenses are not limited to services performed directly before a JCC. Rather, they include expenses and attorney's fees that are inherently linked to the workers' compensation claim and necessary to secure benefits, even when those services are performed outside a formal workers' compensation proceeding. Although a JCC lacks authority to oversee the guardianship proceeding itself or award fees within that action, the court explained that, once the circuit court awards guardianship fees and costs, the JCC has authority to determine what portion of those expenses are recoverable because  they are inherently connected to the workers' compensation case. Accordingly, the First District reversed the JCC's order and remanded the case with instructions to award reimbursement of the guardianship expenses and to address the remaining claim for attorney's fees and costs incurred in litigating the reimbursement issue before the JCC.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Florida Supreme Court Adopts Traditionally More Expansive Concept of Occupational Causation

September 22, 2026

The Florida Supreme Court issued a significant decision rebuking the First District Court of Appeal (1st DCA) in the high-profile case of Bouayad v. Normandy Insurance Co., a case addressing the compensability of workplace injuries resulting from assaults by third-party tortfeasors. The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found the claimant was entitled to workers' compensation benefits, relying in part on the Florida Supreme Court's earlier decision in Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria from 1980. In Strother, the Court upheld an award of benefits to a cashier who was assaulted and robbed by individuals who followed her home from work under the mistaken belief that she was carrying restaurant cash deposits. In Bouayad, the 1st DCA concluded that the claimant's injuries were not compensable because they did not arise out of his employment. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the 1st DCA applied too narrow an interpretation of the "arising out of employment" requirement. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed a broader and more traditional view of occupational causation than that recently adopted by the 1st DCA. The claimant in Bouayad was the general manager of a car rental business operating from a hotel near an airport. Around midnight, while walking along a covered outdoor walkway from the hotel's atrium, where the rental kiosk was located, to an office near the pool, he was shot multiple times by an unidentified assailant. As part of his regular duties, the claimant carried rental agreements and cash receipts from the kiosk to the office at the end of each shift. After the shooting, the claimant managed to return to the hotel atrium, where he stated that he believed "Robert" had shot him, referring to an individual who had threatened the claimant's son the previous day. The assailant, however, was never identified. Consequently, the Supreme Court analyzed the case as involving an unknown third party while the claimant was acting within the course and scope of his employment. The central issue therefore was whether the injury "arose out of" the claimant’s employment. At the final hearing, the claimant presented evidence regarding the risks and hazards associated with his employment, including the nature of his duties, his late-night work schedule, and the location of the business in a high-turnover hotel near a major airport. His expert opined that these factors exposed him to an increased risk of becoming the victim of a crime while at work. In contrast, the employer/carrier's expert characterized the shooting as a targeted attack rather than a robbery and asserted that the risk of violent crime was actually higher near the claimant's residence than at the hotel. Based on that analysis, the expert concluded that the claimant was not exposed to an increased workplace risk. The 1st DCA focused narrowly on the specific activity the claimant was performing at the moment of injury. According to the court, the claimant's “work performed” at the time of the shooting was simply "walking" between two employer-operated locations, and that act of walking did not itself cause the injury. The Florida Supreme Court found this analysis far too myopic and inconsistent with decades of workers' compensation precedent. Reaffirming longstanding principles of workplace causation, the Court explained that the proper inquiry is not whether the precise physical task being performed at the moment of injury directly caused the harm. Rather, the relevant question is whether the employment, viewed as a whole, exposed the worker to risks and hazards that contributed to the injury. The decision is significant because it reinforces a broader conception of work-relatedness in the “arising out of” compensability analysis. Instead of limiting the causation analysis to the employee's discrete physical activity at the time of injury, courts must consider the totality of the employment circumstances, including the employee's duties, work environment, hours, and occupational risks. Under that framework, an injury may arise out of employment when the employment places the employee in a position of increased hazard, even if the specific task being performed at the moment of injury is not itself the direct cause of the harm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.