Blake J. Hood

In a per curium opinion from the First District Court of Appeal on May 7, 2025, the court addressed what at first glance appeared to be an arcane case about collective bargaining agreements. Yet, this case addressed the fundamental source and scope of jurisdiction in Florida workers’ compensation cases. 

While employed as a crane operator, the claimant was involved in an accident on October 29, 2020. The first recorded activity with the Office of Judges of Compensation Claims took place when the employer/carrier filed a motion to preserve blood and urine samples within a few days of the accident. The employer/carrier thereafter provided benefits, though the claimant later filed four petitions for benefits a few years later, between June and October of 2023. The claimant requested indemnity and medical benefits, and the employer/carrier provided some, but not all, of the benefits requested. In certain of its responses, the employer/carrier also stated that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because the “case is governed by Collective Bargaining Agreement authorized per FL Statute 440.211.” The employer/carrier filed a motion for summary final order, requesting that the judge of compensation claims dismiss any pending claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This motion was denied due to factual disputes regarding the existence of the collective bargaining agreement. A final hearing regarding certain benefits in dispute was scheduled, and the parties agreed to bifurcate the issues, with the issue of subject matter jurisdiction to be addressed first.

The claimant argued that the type of collective bargaining agreement (CBA) at issue, a so-called Negotiated Workers’ Compensation Insurance Program (NWCIP), was not in place. He also argued that the employer/carrier waived any right to invoke the NWCIP by initiating proceedings before the judge of compensation claims, to preserve evidence in the immediate aftermath of the industrial accident, but before the claimant filed petitions for benefits. The judge determined that a valid NWCIP was in place and rejected the waiver argument.

In affirming the judge, the First District Court of Appeal explained the unique jurisdictional issues in workers’ compensation cases. Unlike courts established by Article V of the Florida Constitution, the judge of compensation claims is created by statute, specifically § 440.45(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2020). The Florida Constitution does authorize the judge of compensation claims’ existence and their authority to exercise quasi-judicial power, but their operative powers have a statutory origin. Prior case law has consistently established that a judge of compensation claims has only those powers expressly provided by statute and, conversely, has no jurisdiction or authority beyond that which is specifically conferred by statute.

The Florida Legislature also enacted statutory provisions that explicitly divest the judge of compensation claims of jurisdiction when a NWCIP is in place. The NWCIP at issue in the Sapp case was a CBA created pursuant to section 440.211 of Florida Statutes, which provides as follows:

(1) ... [A] provision that is mutually agreed upon in any collective bargaining agreement between an individually self-insured employer or other employer upon consent of the employer's carrier and a recognized or certified exclusive bargaining representative establishing any of the following shall be valid and binding:
(a) An alternative dispute resolution system to supplement, modify, or replace the provisions of this chapter which may include, but is not limited to, conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. Arbitration held pursuant to this section shall be binding on the parties.
(b) The use of an agreed-upon list of health care providers of medical treatment which may be the exclusive source of all medical treatment under this chapter.
(c) The use of a limited list of physicians to conduct independent medical examinations which the parties may agree shall be the exclusive source of independent medical examiners pursuant to this chapter.
(d) A light-duty, modified-job, or return-to-work program.
(e) A vocational rehabilitation or retraining program.

§ 440.211(1) Fla. Stat. (2020) (emphasis supplied). The District Court affirmed the judge of compensation claims’ order on both grounds. 

Regarding the waiver question, the court held that a party's conduct cannot confer jurisdiction on the judge where the law does not authorize such jurisdiction. The court noted a bedrock principle that “judge of compensation claims always have jurisdiction (and an obligation) to determine the existence and scope of their own jurisdiction. The court reiterated that subject matter jurisdiction is never waivable or dependent upon the parties’ actions.” 

Thus, even in cases such as Sapp in which employers/carriers take the first actions to invoke jurisdiction in workers’ compensation cases and continue to litigate and even provide benefits over an extended period of time, subject matter jurisdiction is not thereby created if it never actually existed in the first place. 

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