.

Michael A. Salvati

Portrait of Michael A. Salvati

A litigator and legal scholar, Michael provides streamlined solutions to his casualty clients’ most complex litigation challenges. With a focus on product liability, premises liability, automobile and other personal injury claims, he provides counsel to manufacturers of consumer goods, regional and national retail chains, manufacturing facilities, restaurants/bars, commercial landowners, pharmacies and more. Michael has experience in all aspects of defense litigation, from initial claim investigation through discovery and trial.  Michael has also assisted in the defense of class actions involving various subject matters, ranging from alleged product failures to data breach claims.

Michael prioritizes efficiency, achieving favorable outcomes, and ensuring the best possible results for his clients. By dissecting the key issues in litigation, he aims to avoid unnecessary complexities and legal disputes. He approaches every client matter strategically, by first assessing the case; identifying critical legal arguments; and creating a well-informed legal strategy.  

An avid reader and life-long student, he keeps abreast of legal topics pertinent to his clients, so he can better understand the current legal landscape and how it may impact their cases. A prolific writer, he has published substantive articles in The Pennsylvania Lawyer, The Legal Intelligencer and Law360. 

Michael’s scholarship and devotion to the law has not gone unnoticed. In 2023, he was selected to serve a five-year term on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s Civil Jury Instruction Subcommittee, which drafts jury instructions used by trial judges throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Admitted to practice in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Michael is a member of the Pennsylvania, Philadelphia and New Jersey State Bar Associations. He is additionally a member of the Defense Research Institute where he has served as an editor for its Product Liability Defenses, a State-by-State Compendium. 

Prior to joining the firm, Michael served as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Timothy G. Farrell of the Superior Court of New Jersey. In that capacity, Michael managed the judge's dockets, drafted opinions and orders, and served as a mediator in Small Claims and Special Civil Part cases.

Michael earned his juris doctor at Villanova Law School, where he graduated in the top 10% of his class, was a member of the Order of the Coif, and served as an Associate Editor of the Villanova Law Review.  He earned his bachelor's degree in history from Villanova University, where he graduated first in his class with a 4.0 GPA.

Michael resides in South Jersey with his wife and twin boys.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2011)
    • Villanova University (B.A., summa cum laude, 2008)
    • New Jersey, 2011
    • Pennsylvania, 2011
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2012
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2013
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2024-2025)
    • New Jersey Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court Subcommittee for Civil Jury Instructions
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
  • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of our client, a nonprofit organization, in a premises liability action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff allegedly fractured her leg after slipping and falling on an icy walkway outside the client’s community center. We argued that her claims were barred by a liability waiver she signed as part of her membership application. Although the plaintiff denied signing the waiver, the court ordered targeted discovery, and both parties retained handwriting experts. The court ultimately found that the defense had persuasively established the authenticity of the signature and that the plaintiff’s unsupported denials were insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. Summary judgment was entered in favor of our client.

    Successfully obtained dismissal of a wrongful death action against a product manufacturer and distributor for lack of personal jurisdiction. The case involved allegations of a defective windshield installed in Pennsylvania, but the defense team demonstrated that the clients—located in Ohio and South Carolina—lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state, overcoming the plaintiff’s stream-of-commerce jurisdiction theory.

    Prevailed on a Motion to Dismiss in a data breach class action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Sixteen named plaintiffs brought claims alleging that a hacker had accessed the personal information of over 1,000,000 individuals nationwide. We defended the debt collection company whose computer servers were compromised. Plaintiffs asserted broad and novel legal theories, including negligent failure to protect data, breach of implied contract, invasion of privacy, negligence per se, and violations of various state consumer protection laws. We successfully contested these claims, resulting in the dismissal of eight plaintiffs for lack of standing and 15 of the 17 asserted causes of action being dismissed.

    Obtained a defense verdict as second chair in a federal jury trial involving an allegedly defective motorcycle that caught fire when left running contrary to instructions in the owner's manual, causing significant fire and smoke damage to the plaintiffs' residence.

    Obtained a summary judgment on behalf of a janitorial franchising company, successfully arguing that it was not responsible for the rogue acts of its franchisee who allegedly stole jewelry and engaged in sexual acts while cleaning the plaintiff's office.

    Obtained summary judgment on behalf of two homeowners, successfully arguing that they had no duty to prevent their general contractor from injuring his subcontractor, the plaintiff, who had fallen from a ladder on the job.

    Successfully defended a retail pharmacy and its delivery driver at arbitration on an auto accident claim for which liability was uncontested.  Michael obtained a limited tort finding and limited plaintiff to recovery of her unpaid medical expenses, which were minimal.  The suit had initially been filed as a major jury case before being remanded to arbitration, and the award was less than 1% of plaintiff's original demand.

    Obtained a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds of product liability and wrongful death claims brought against a truck dealership that was located in Ohio and that did not conduct regular business in Pennsylvania.

    Obtained a summary judgment for the manufacturer of a smoker in a failure to warn claim involving an allegedly defective barbecue smoker by successfully challenging the opinions of the plaintiff's expert as speculative.

    • The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers, A.M. Best Podcast, April 1, 2026
    • Strategies to Mitigate Risk and Avoid Litigation, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, May 14, 2025
    • Panel Member, Nuts and Bolts of Litigation Practice Under the Fair Share Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, April 2016.
    • Litigation Pointers for Defending the Supermarket Slip and Fall Case, Liberty Mutual Insurance, February 2015
    • "Pa. Supreme Court Must Defend Established Venue Standard," Law360, February 17, 2023
    • "A Two-Pronged Test Becomes One - Why the Superior Court's Venue Decision in Hangey Departs From Decades of Prior Precedent," The Pennsylvania Lawyer, January/February 2023
    • "After 'Tincher,' Evidence of Industry Standards Should be Admissible in PI Litigation,"The Legal Intelligencer, Personal Injury Supplement, November 5, 2021
    • “There’s No Turning Back Now: Product Liability Jury Instructions in the Wake of Tincher v. Omega Flex,” Defense Digest, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 2018
    • "There’s No Place Like “Home”: Challenging General Jurisdiction When an LLC Is a Citizen of the Forum State,Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2017
    • “Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act: Practical Pointers for Litigators,” Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 2, June 2014, co-author

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

June 30, 2026

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Case Law Alerts

Superior Court Clarifies Crashworthiness Doctrine and Provides Key Jury‑Instruction Guidance

April 1, 2026

In the much-publicized Amagasu case, a jury returned a verdict of nearly a billion dollars to a plaintiff who was paralyzed in a rollover car accident.  On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the award and remanded for a new trial stating that the trial court did not properly charge the jury on crashworthiness principles. Crashworthiness is a subset of products liability cases in which it is alleged that a vehicle possessed a defect that did not cause an accident, but did not offer sufficient protection to the vehicle’s occupant during the accident. Pennsylvania law recognizes that collisions and other accidents are part of the intended use of a motor vehicle, so manufacturers must design and manufacture a product that is “reasonably crashworthy.” For example, if a plaintiff is involved in a head-on collision and the air bags do not deploy, the lack of air bag deployment did not cause the collision, but possibly increased the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries –  that failure to perform may give rise to a product defect claim. In Amagasu, the Superior Court re-affirmed the elements of a crashworthiness claim, which was first recognized in Pennsylvania in 1994, but has not frequently been analyzed since the landmark Tincher case re-defined the product liability cause of action. Amagasu explained that crashworthiness cases involved a “more rigorous” and a “heightened burden of proof” compared to ordinary products liability cases as a trade off for expanding the scope of liability to an alleged defect that did not cause the underlying accident. Specifically, in addition to proving a product defect, the plaintiff must prove that, at the time the vehicle was designed, a safer and more practical design existed. A plaintiff’s burden to prove causation is also heavier in a crashworthiness case, as he or she must distinguish between the “enhanced injury” caused by the defect, and the “non-compensable injuries” he or she would have sustained in the accident anyway. The Superior Court emphasized that these crashworthiness elements “impose a burden of proof far and above that of a typical” products liability case. Amagasu may have a greater impact than simply crashworthiness cases as the billion-dollar verdict was vacated because the trial court did not give proper jury instructions. The trial court had avoided giving instructions that were not included in the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions, which did not provide a specific instruction on crashworthiness. The Suggested Standard Jury Instructions are an excellent resource and guide, but they are not an exhaustive statement of every area of the law. If a legal issue is raised by the evidence, the jury must be given an appropriate instruction, even if one is not included in the SSJI.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated

Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.