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Jonathan E. Kanov

Portrait of Jonathan E. Kanov

Jonathan concentrates his practice of law in complex, high-exposure litigation and has litigated a wide array of professional liability and commercial cases in federal and state courts, as well as arbitration forums, throughout the country. He zealously defends professionals in tort and contract actions, including attorneys, accountants, architects, engineers, contractors, directors and officers, brokers, dealers and fiduciaries. He has extensive experience with real estate actions, defending numerous parties, including real estate agents, brokers, developers, appraisers, title and settlement agents, and lenders.

Jonathan devotes considerable time on behalf of his clients in complex commercial, contract, construction, fraud, professional negligence/malpractice, statutory violations, shareholder/member disputes, directors/officers, business tort, and whistleblower litigation, and he has tried many cases to verdict. He brings to the firm a unique combination of business and litigation skills developed during his career. This background is invaluable to his representation of various individuals, private and public companies, including Fortune 500 corporations, and non-profit entities in a broad range of matters. He is highly sought after by clients and insurance carriers for his ability to handle extremely complex and difficult matters.  

Jonathan graduated from the University of Texas at Austin in 1992, where he received his Bachelor of Business Administration degree in finance. He obtained his juris doctor in 1996 from the University of Miami School of Law, graduating cum laude. Jonathan is admitted to the Bar of the state of Florida. He is also admitted to practice before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States District Court for the Southern, Middle and Northern Districts of Florida.
 

    • University of Miami School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1996)
    • The University of Texas at Austin (B.A., 1992)
    • Florida, 1996
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida, 1997
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 1997
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 11th Circuit, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2001
    • Who's Who In American Law - Top Lawyers
    • American Bar Association
    • Association of Trial Lawyers of America
    • Miami-Dade County Bar Association
    • Professional Liability Underwriting Society
    • Anatomy of a Real Estate Transaction: How Actions of Participants Give Rise to Claims, Client Presentation, July, 2019
    • FDIC Actions Against Appraisers, 2012 - 2013
    • Trends in Florida Real Estate E&O Claims, 2010 – 2013
    • Subprime Lending Crisis and the Growing Litigation Claims Against Real Estate Professionals: Understanding How This Happened and Planning for Actionable Defense Strategies, 2008
    • Internet Research for Florida Legal Counsel and Staff, CLE Speaker Series, 2000-2008
    • Accounting Malpractice Pre- and Post Sarbanes-Oxley and When It Is Appropriate To Withdraw From A Public Audit, 2005-2006
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, 2010-2018
    • "Developer Scores Big Victory in Federal Court in Miami Concerning Condo Deposit Recovery Cases," Defense Digest, Vol. 15, No. 2, June 2009
    • "Subprime Woes May Lead To More Regulations And Duties Placed On Mortgage Brokers," Florida Professional Liability and Ethics Law Letter, April 2008, Vol. 4, No. 4 
    • Successfully defended West Palm Beach lawyer and law firm in a malpractice claim stemming from a former client who was prevented from exercising option to purchase property worth in excess of $2 million.
    • Won complete defense verdict and affirmative damages in high-profile federal court trial in Southern District of Florida in defense of auditors/accountants of public real estate company. Plaintiff had sought approximately $7 million in damages for alleged botched audit and improper withdrawal from engagement.
    • Prevailed at trial in Broward County in defense of a property management company of a tax-credit housing community in Lauderhill. Plaintiff, the corporate owner of the property, brought claims for negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and statutory breaches in the management and operation of the property. The case was litigated over seven years and Plaintiff sought millions of dollars in damages. After a week of Plaintiff’s testimony, and eviscerating cross-examinations, we were successful in obtaining a directed verdict.   
    • Won complete defense verdict in legal malpractice case in Broward County concerning defendant's representation of borrowers in a secured loan transaction.
    • Won a directed verdict at trial in $650,000 litigation on behalf of a national engineering firm in a professional negligence action in Miami-Dade County.
    • Summary judgment secured in defense of claims against real estate broker and agent for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence in $500,000 case in Broward County.
    • Successfully defended law firm and lawyer as plaintiffs walked away with no damages from a heavily litigated case concerning lawyer's representation of one of the parties to the sale of a nurse staffing business in Orange County, Florida.
    • Victorious after trial in Miami-Dade County in a will contest brought by three children of decedent with estate over $10 million alleging undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, and lack of capacity.
    • Successfully defended title agent against claims brought by title insurer. Tracked down and collected the ill-gotten gains from the beneficiary of an unrecorded mortgage so that client did not have to satisfy those losses.
    • Counsel for a leading provider of outpatient information systems in successful $12 million federal litigation in Northern District of California regarding development of software application for radiology facilities.
    • Counsel for partner in South Florida real estate conglomerate in successful action to terminate partnership agreement and buy out other partners in development deal for Miami-Dade County multi-use project.
    • Victorious after trial against one of largest U.S. spirits distributors, alleging breach of distribution agreement, business torts and copyright infringement causes of action.

Results

Court affirms dismissal of real estate agent and his broker.

Our attorneys succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The Fourth District affirmed the dismissal, with prejudice, of our clients, a listing real estate agent and his broker, in an alleged negligence and fraud case. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing their pleadings due to their attorney’s conduct. The court detailed how the plaintiff’s attorney dropped the ball in litigating the case in a separate opinion reversing the plaintiffs’ attorney’s contempt conviction.

Arbitration Defense Verdict for Prominent Florida Real Estate Developer

Marshall Dennehey and its shareholder, Jonathan E. Kanov, Esq., were successful in a South Florida arbitration representing a prominent Florida real estate developer against construction damage claims brought by a neighboring property’s condominium association. In a final, binding ruling, the arbitrator issued a complete defense verdict, plus an award of attorney’s fees and costs to the developer. The plaintiff condominium association had contended that construction of the developer’s luxury condominium tower caused many areas of their property to be damaged, largely from vibrations/seismic activity during demolition and construction. The plaintiff demanded $1.2 million in damages pursuant to a contract that was entered into by the parties covering the construction activity.   The arbitrator agreed with the defense’s arguments that the “conditions the claimant contends were caused by vibration damage from construction activities are actually age-related deterioration and the result of deferred maintenance. Additionally, there is no evidentiary basis to allocate uncompensated damage associated with the pool and pool deck to the developer, as opposed to preexisting conditions requiring repair and upgrades required for code compliance.” Marshall Dennehey presented highly credible experts and fact witnesses in support of its defense.    Another key to the defense verdict was Marshall Dennehey’s effective cross examination of the claimant’s structural engineering expert on construction vibration/seismic activity data, which formed the crux of their damage claims.

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Florida Fourth DCA Clarifies Limits of Attorney Liability in Third‑Party Opinion Letters

March 1, 2026

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal recently affirmed that an attorney who prepares an opinion letter on behalf of the borrowers for the benefit of the lender in an arms-length transaction does not owe a duty to the lender. In this case, a $7.5 million loan was issued to the operators of ultra-luxury auto dealerships, and its cars, such as a 2019 McLaren Senna, were used as collateral for the loan. The defendant issued an opinion letter on behalf of the borrowers, which was required by the claimant as a condition for funding the loan. The opinion letter contained representations based on the loan documents, such as that the borrowers had no known pending or threatened claims, no other encumbrances, and that claimant would have a valid security interest in the autos used as collateral. After the borrowers defaulted on the loan, claims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty were brought against the defendant for alleged misrepresentations in the opinion letter. The claimant demanded $9,000,000 in damages, contending that it wouldn’t have made the loan if not for the defendant’s misrepresentations. The claimant filed competing summary judgment motions. Ultimately, the judge agreed with the defense argument that despite stating in the opinion letter that the claimant could rely on his representations, there is no duty imposed on a party or its counsel to act for the benefit or protection of the opposing party in an arms-length commercial transaction. If the claimant chose to rely on such representations, that is a calculated risk with no recourse against the defendant for its own failure to investigate further. A final judgment in favor of the defendant with an award of costs was entered. The claimant appealed to the 4th DCA, who affirmed the judgment. This case expands past precedent and is highly instructive for attorneys issuing third party opinion letters and those that choose to rely upon them.

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability - CASE LAW UPDATE

September 1, 2025

Arbitration Clause in Attorney Retainer Agreement Covering Professional Negligence Claims Found to Be Valid and Binding Hill v. Farah & Farah, No. 2024-11972-CICI (Volusia) A Florida state circuit court enforced a mandatory arbitration clause in a retainer agreement, thus dismissing a legal malpractice claims against a law firm filed by a former client. The agreement contained a mandatory arbitration clause, which stated that any and all legal disputes arising out of or relating to the agreement will be resolved through a binding arbitration proceeding administered in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Rejecting arguments that the clause failed to comply with Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(i) and that the firm waived its right to arbitrate by delay, the court held that the agreement was enforceable and compelled arbitration under Florida’s Revised Arbitration Code. The law firm filed a motion to dismiss and/or to compel arbitration. In opposition, their former client, the plaintiff, argued that the agreement failed to comply with Florida Bar Rule 4-1.5(i), which provides required language notifying the client that he or she should consider consulting with another lawyer about the advisability of entering into an agreement with an arbitration provision concerning fee disputes. That language was included in the agreement, but the law firm added “and other” to the first sentence of the notice, which states in full: “NOTICE: This agreement contains provisions requiring arbitration of fee and other disputes.”  Further, the plaintiff contended that the notice language in the agreement was ineffective since it was underlined rather than solely in bold type. These arguments were rejected by the court.  The plaintiff also argued that the law firm waived its right to arbitrate her malpractice claims by failing to invoke the arbitration clause or to reserve the right to do so in the order of withdrawal as counsel, or in the two years before the plaintiff filed her complaint.  Waiver of the right to arbitrate may be found if the party seeking arbitration first answered the complaint and then engaged in discovery regarding the merits of a claim before moving to compel arbitration. Olson Elec. Co. v. Winter Park Redev. Agency, 987 So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Ibis Lakes HOA, Inc. v. Ibis Isle HOA, Inc., 102 So. 3d 722, 731 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“The active participation in litigation or the propounding of discovery would be circumstances where the right to arbitrate would be deemed waived.”). All doubts regarding waiver should be construed in favor of arbitration. Retail Detail Merch., LLC, v. Murphy, 373 So. 3d 670, 674 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023).  The trial court also rejected the plaintiff’s position that the law firm waived its right to arbitrate, as the motion to dismiss and/or to compel arbitration was filed as the firm’s initial response to the malpractice complaint. The trial court held that the agreement required the plaintiff to submit her claims for professional negligence to binding arbitration. The case was dismissed pursuant to Fla. Stat. Chapter 682, Revised Florida Arbitration Code. The plaintiff has appealed the ruling to the 5th District Court of Appeal, which remains pending.     Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – September 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated

Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.