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Arthur F. Wheeler

Portrait of Arthur F. Wheeler

Art is a shareholder in the Casualty Department and a member of the firm's Fraud and Special Investigation Unit (SIU) group where he focuses primarily on large loss and medical provider fraud.  His practice in the area of fraud investigation consists of assessing and analyzing fraud by both medical providers and falsified claims brought by his client's insureds.

Art has also represented a large number of product manufacturers, designers and distributors in products liability actions. Additionally, he has defended numerous restaurants, hotels and businesses in premises liability claims involving allegations of serious and permanent injuries. 

Art has also defended complex professional liability matters with an emphasis on defense of attorneys in legal malpractice matters; real estate agents and brokers  as well as architects, engineers, directors and officers.

Art has successfully arbitrated and mediated approximately 100 cases in the Superior Court of New Jersey and Common Pleas Courts of Pennsylvania.

In 1990, Art graduated, cum laude, from St. Joseph's University. Following graduation, he attended Georgetown University Law Center and received his juris doctor in 1993. He worked as a law clerk for the United States Department of Justice while he was a student at Georgetown. In addition Art went on to earn his LLM Degree in Trial Advocacy from Temple University in 1998. In 2009, Arthur received an AV Preeminent peer review rating from Martindale-Hubbell which he has maintained in each of the subsequent years.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (LL.M., 1998)
      • Trial Advocacy
    • Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., 1993)
    • Saint Joseph's University (B.A., cum laude, 1990)
    • New Jersey, 1993
    • Pennsylvania, 1994
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1993
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1995
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
      The Martindale Hubbell rated attorney list is issued by Internet Brands, Inc. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • American Bar Association
    • Burlington County Bar Association
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • New Jersey Bar Association
    • “Statutory Exemption from Consumer Fraud Act for Realtors,” Defense Digest, December 2018, Vol. 24, No. 4
    • “Disqualification of Counsel and the Substantially Related Matters Test,” Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 4, December 2010
    • "Defense of Legal Malpractice Claims Asserted by Non-Clients," Defense Digest, Vol. 13, No. 4, December 2007 
    • "You Sold The Land But Did You Keep The Liability?," Defense Digest, Vol. 12, No. 4, December 2006 
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of a real estate closing attorney in a matter filed in Cape May County, New Jersey, involving the refinance of a marital home in connection with a divorce settlement. The plaintiff's claims of legal malpractice, misrepresentation, and detrimental reliance upon our client's advice and actions were successfully defeated. 
    • Obtained summary judgment and successfully defended an appeal of the dismissal on behalf of a deputy surrogate of Mercer County, New Jersey. The trial court's decision was upheld, which granted summary judgment in connection with the administration of an estate involving properties worth several million dollars in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 
    • Obtained summary judgment for a well-known Camden County plaintiff's law firm which had been sued for legal malpractice by their former client because the underlying personal injury matter had been dismissed by the trial court. Summary judgment was granted since the plaintiff could not prove that the necessary doctor's report, setting forth the analysis to overcome the New Jersey verbal threshold statute, would have been unable to be obtained by the plaintiff in the underlying matter. 
    • Obtained dismissal of a legal malpractice claim against a large, well-known plaintiff's firm in New Jersey in which the plaintiff was counseled by one of the two original defendant law firms concerning a workers' compensation claim for asbestosis. Subsequently, the first firm referred the matter to the other co-defendant firm for handling. Our client was asked to consult for a potential third party asbestos claim against the asbestos manufacturer. We successfully argued that the claim was referred to our client for review after the statute of limitations and, further, we argued that there was no attorney-client relationship with the plaintiff in the underlying matter, nor was there any duty owed to the referring law firm. 
    • Obtained summary judgment in a legal malpractice action by successfully arguing that our client's actions in representing the plaintiff in connection with the appeal of his police sergeant's exam in Camden County, New Jersey, were not the proximate cause of the unsuccessful appeal. Although our client did not file an Appellate Brief within the time prescribed by the court, we successfully argued that the underlying sergeant's exam appeal would have been rejected by the Appellate Division even if the filing deadline had been met by the client. 
    • Obtained dismissal of a dram shop, premises liability case by showing through deposition testimony that our client did not serve the plaintiff while visibly intoxicated. 
    • Obtained summary judgment in a premises liability claim against a restaurant in southern New Jersey in which the plaintiff claimed to have fallen, sustaining knee injuries and an aggravation of an arthritic condition. The court granted summary judgment in the matter where the plaintiff admitted in depositions that she could not describe the area where she fell. Further, emergency room records showed that the plaintiff, in fact, went to the emergency room on the day before the subject accident. 

Results

Defense Verdict Affirmed in Complex Legal Malpractice Case

We successfully defended an appeal in a complex series of legal malpractice actions arising out of an $11 million investment in an illegal venture in Brazil. In the initial trial, the plaintiff’s economic loss expert had offered a net opinion in connection with what plaintiff would have earned from the illegal venture in Brazil. We established the plaintiff’s knowledge of that illegality, which had been demonstrated in the previous legal malpractice action. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s expert report was barred in the first legal malpractice action, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied, and the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s order, which barred the expert report in the second legal malpractice action. In addition, the court found that profits derived from the illegal venture are worthless and cannot form the basis for a claim.

Dismissal of Complex Legal Malpractice Action

We obtained a dismissal of a legal malpractice action arising from a Law Against Discrimination and Conscientious Employment Practices Act action against a municipality and its School Board. In this complex multi-party action, our client, an expert in school law, was retained by the school district to handle a hearing against the plaintiff, a teacher and coach. The plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy among the lawyers and the school board to oust the plaintiff. There were also allegations of malicious prosecution and malicious abuse of process against the town and its attorneys. The court granted our motion and dismissed based on the litigation privilege.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.