.

Ariel C. Brownstein

Portrait of Ariel C. Brownstein

Ariel, a shareholder in the Casualty Department, focuses his practice on insurance fraud and Special Investigation Unit (SIU) litigation with particular emphasis on large loss fraud and medical provider fraud. His practice in the area of fraud investigation consists of assessing and analyzing fraud by both medical providers and falsified claims brought by his client's insureds. In doing so, Ariel has represented a significant number of insurance carriers on these issues and has assisted in multi-million dollar high-profile medical provider fraud investigations and law suits in various states.

Moreover, Ariel has litigated on behalf of many different clients in favor of protecting the interests of insurance carriers in court seeking to disclaim coverage for fraudulent claims. He has taken numerous comprehensive Examinations Under Oath on SIU-related issues throughout New Jersey and Pennsylvania. In particular, he has assisted in several high-value and high-profile matters regarding carrier recovery of monies paid to fraudulent medical providers and fraudulent motor vehicle accidents. Furthermore, Ariel has litigated extensive insurance fraud and other personal injury protection related matters in the National Arbitration Forum (NAF)/Forthright and Superior Court for his clients.

During his career, Ariel has handled several high value cases on behalf of his clients. In one particular case, the amount sought by the Claimant was denied by the arbitrator due material misrepresentations made by the insured regarding his prior medical history and his injuries at the time of the subject loss during an Examination Under Oath, conducted by Ariel.  In another matter, Ariel successfully argued that a claimant was subject to a personal injury protection benefit limit selected by the named insured, a live-in boyfriend and the amount demanded, was denied.

Prior to joining the firm, Ariel served as a law clerk for the Honorable Richard Geiger in Cumberland County Superior Court. His responsibilities included researching criminal law precedence, reviewing memoranda and pre-trial motions, and mediating civil lawsuits.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2008)
    • University of Delaware (B.S., 2005)
    • New Jersey, 2008
    • Pennsylvania, 2008
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star (2013-2023)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • International Association of Special Investigative Units
    • New Jersey Special Investigations Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Modern Staged Accidents & Provider Fraud, NICB Mid-Atlantic Region Training Event 2026, February 4, 2026  
    • Ping! Utilizing Modern Technology to Answer the Who, Where and When of First-Party Claims, NJSIA General Membership Meeting, December 9th, 2022
    • Ping! Utilizing Modern Technology to Answer the Who, Where and When of  First-Party Claims, Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud 360 Seminar, Lafayette Hill, PA, June, 2022 
    • Medical Investigator's Guide to the Modern SIU Claim, Speaker, New Jersey Special Investigators Association (NJSIA) Annual Conference, Atlantic City, NJ, October 2019
    • NJ PIP: Building Better Medical Reviews, Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud 360 Seminar, Lafayette Hill, PA, June, 2018
    • Current Fraud Trends PIP - NJ, Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud 360 Seminar, Lafayette Hill, PA, June, 2016
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, January 2018-present
    • “Put a Pin in It: Getting a Grip on Medical Provider Fraud Costs and Acupuncture Claims**,” Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2015
    • "PUT A PIN IN IT - Getting a Grip on Medical Provider Fraud Costs and Acupuncture Claims," Claims Management, December 2014
    • “When a Vehicle Is an Automobile – The Maze of Statutory and Case Law in New Jersey for Determining Eligibility for PIP Benefits,” Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2014
    • "Winning Legal Strategies for Combating A Prickly Problem "Sticking" New Jersey PIP Carriers," co-author, Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2013

Thought Leadership

Legal Update for Fraud/Special Investigation

SIU Gets a Boost: NJ Supreme Court Affirms Insurers' Right to Litigate, Not Arbitrate, Fraud Claims

July 21, 2026

In a significant win for insurers' Special Investigation Units, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that statutory insurance fraud and racketeering claims may proceed in court rather than through PIP arbitration. At issue was whether insurance fraud claims brought under New Jersey's Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA) and the state's Anti-Racketeering Act (NJ RICO) are subject to mandatory arbitration under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act’s (AICRA) PIP dispute-resolution framework. Allstate had sued a network of medical practices, physicians, and related corporate entities, alleging a scheme to extract more than $1.7 million in PIP benefits through fraudulent and misleading billing. The trial court dismissed Allstate's complaint and compelled arbitration, reading AICRA's arbitration clause — which covers "any dispute regarding the recovery of... benefits" under PIP coverage, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) — as sweeping in fraud and racketeering claims along with routine benefit disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal, adopting Judge Gilson's opinion below (480 N.J. Super. 566 (App. Div. 2025)) as its own reasoning. The Court held that IFPA and RICO claims fall outside the scope of AICRA's PIP arbitration mechanism because that "streamlined and specialized" process cannot grant the relief those statutes contemplate — treble damages, injunctive relief, broad discovery, and joinder of third parties — and because arbitrators lack authority to award compensatory or treble damages to an insurer. The Court also rejected the argument that Allstate's own Decision Point Review Plans independently compel arbitration, finding those plan provisions no broader than AICRA's own arbitration clause. Notably, the Court expressly disagreed with the Third Circuit's contrary holding in GEICO v. Mt. Prospect Chiropractic Center, 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024), concluding it is not bound by that federal interpretation of New Jersey law. Insurers retain the right to pursue IFPA and RICO claims in the Law Division, with a jury trial. For SIU units and NJ insurance carriers, this decision is a significant win: it forecloses defense clinics' primary procedural tool for shunting fraud investigations into limited-scope PIP arbitration, where treble damages, RICO relief, and meaningful discovery were never realistically available. Carriers building cases against fraudulently structured clinics, straw-owned practices, or coordinated billing networks can now proceed with confidence that a well-pleaded IFPA/RICO complaint stays in the Law Division rather than being diverted to arbitration on a motion to compel. Practically, this strengthens SIU's leverage in settlement negotiations, preserves civil discovery tools (subpoenas, depositions, joinder of related corporate entities) critical to unwinding complex ownership and referral schemes, and resolves the split with the Third Circuit in favor of NJ insurers — at least as a matter of state law. Expect increased reliance on IFPA civil actions, rather than PIP arbitration demands, as SIU's primary enforcement vehicle going forward.

Case Law Alerts

Minnesota Court of Appeals Upholds Insurance‑Fraud Conviction, Validating Industry Fraud‑Impact Testimony

July 20, 2026

The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed Mark Jenni's insurance fraud conviction, which arose after he certified a Park Rapids property as his primary residence on a Liberty Mutual homeowner's policy and then filed an $80,000-plus burglary claim he never reported to the sheriff—on a property where he had previously submitted denied claims through a different carrier. On appeal, Jenni argued prosecutorial misconduct, contending the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that roughly 10% of claims are non-meritorious and that fraud costs run into the "billions" ultimately borne by consumers. He also claimed that closing arguments improperly appealed to Hubbard County jurors' financial self-interest. The court rejected both arguments, holding the investigator's testimony was relevant to establish his background and context, finding that the prosecutor's "cost to consumers" framing explained why application misrepresentations are criminalized rather than urging conviction on community-interest grounds. For the industry, the decision is favorable to SIU and fraud-prosecution efforts: it endorses carrier fraud-investigator testimony about industry-wide fraud prevalence and cost as admissible context, and it gives prosecutors latitude to argue the downstream consumer-cost rationale without crossing into impermissible community-conscience appeals. The practical takeaway for carriers and SIU referrals is that the "fraud drives up everyone's premiums" narrative—long a staple of fraud-bureau messaging—has now been validated as proper evidentiary and argumentative framing, at least in Minnesota.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.