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Angela Y. DeMary

Portrait of Angela Y. DeMary

Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a workers' compensation attorney, Angela focuses the entirety of her practice on New Jersey workers’ compensation, representing the interests of employers, carriers and self-insureds. Throughout her career, Angela has gained significant experience handling claims involving issues of employment, coverage, compensability, causation/liability and permanency. Her cases also include specific issues of total disability (SIF), lack of coverage (UEF) and subcontractor/general contractor issues (Section 79).

Notably, Angela has argued multiple cases before the Appellate Division. She has secured favorable decisions on issues of entitlement to temporary total disability benefits addressed under Section 38 (commonly referred to as the Cunningham issue). Her experience also extends to issues involving jurisdiction and liability against a subsequent carrier (most often referred to as a Peterson or Bond-type issue).

In addition to her legal speaking engagements, Angela is actively involved with youth activities in her community. She participates in career day programs at the elementary and high school levels and devotes time to youth mentoring and motivation.

Prior to her career in law, Angela worked as a probation officer and as an advocate for victims of domestic violence.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2000)
    • Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (B.A., 1994)
    • New Jersey, 2003
    • Top Women in Law, The New Jersey Law Journal (2016)
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star (2010, 2012-2013)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • American Bar Association
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • New Jersey Bar Association
    • Assessing the Injury and Case, NBI: New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Fundamentals: Attain the Best Possible Results for Your Clients, webinar, November 29, 2023
    • Diversity, Equity, Inclusion & the Elimination of Bias in Workers’ Compensation – Why This Matters to You and Your Clients to Achieve the Best Possible Outcome, New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Bench Bar Conference, Edison, New Jersey, December 13, 2022
    • Practicing Workers’ Compensation Law Remotely and COVID-19 Type Cases, Camden County Bar Association CLE program, January 27, 2021
    • Are You Coming or Going – Do You Know Your Course and Scope?, Marshall Dennehey webinar, October 26, 2020
    • Workers' Compensation: Key Concepts and Issues, National Business Institute, Atlantic City, New Jersey, June 2019
    • Navigating Workers' Compensation Processes, Procedures and Forms, National Business Institute, Atlantic City, New Jersey, June 2019 
    • Bad Eggs: Defending Injuries Stemming from Violence in the Workplace, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 19, 2017
    • Human Resource Law from A to Z, National Business Institute, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, September 20, 2016
    • Anatomy and Physiology 101 for Attorneys, National Business Institute, Atlantic City, New Jersey, October 28, 2015
    • Advanced Workers' Compensation - Selected Issues in Workers' Compensation Law, National Business Institute, Atlantic City, New Jersey, April 27, 2015
    • Career Day, Cramer College Preparatory Lab School, Camden, New Jersey, June 2014
    • Fourth Annual Workers' Compensation Seminar, New Jersey Department of Labor-Division of Workers' Compensation, May 2014
    • Your Top Workers' Compensation Questions – Answered, National Business Institute, Atlantic City, New Jersey, December 12, 2013
    • New Jersey Workers' Compensation Update, Insurance Society of Philadelphia, Affinity Insurance, Hatboro, Pennsylvania, April 13, 2012
    • Overview of New Jersey Workers' Compensation, Atlantic City, New Jersey, May 2010 
    • New Jersey Workers' Compensation Update, Council on Education in Management, 2005 
    • Introduction to New Jersey Workers' Compensation, Sheraton Hotel, Atlantic City, New Jersey, 2005
    • “Celebrating 30 Years of the Defense Digest: A Look at the Last 30 Years in New Jersey Workers’ Compensation,” Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024
    • "Navigating the Waters of a Motion for Med and Temp," New Jersey Law Journal, November 9, 2015
    • "Whether Going or Coming, It's Still Not Compensable," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 3, September 2013
    • "Proof? You Can’t Handle The “Proof”!" Defense Digest, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 2012
    • "Appellate Division Upholds Dismissal of Occupational Heart Attack Claim and Claim of Entitlement to Second Injury Fund Involvement," Defense Digest, 2011-09, Vol. 17, No. 3
    • "Determining Who's Liable: Analyzing Causation and Liability Issues When There Are Multiple Carriers, Employers and/or Claims," Defense Digest, 2010-06, Vol. 16, No. 2
    • "Supreme Court Renders Decision Regarding Application of Dependency Rate In Workers’ Compensation Matters," Defense Digest, 2008-12, Vol. 14, No. 4
    • "Applying the Increased Dependency Rate," New Jersey Law Journal, 2008-01-07
    • "The Pending Issue of How To Address the Increased Dependency Rate," Defense Digest, 2007-09, Vol. 13, No. 3
    • Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Workers' Compensation Law Attorney, 2017

Results

Medical provider claim petition dismissed, with prejudice.

The parties were litigating a motion for medical treatment in which a physician was recommending an additional spinal surgery. The physician moved forward without authorization and performed spinal surgery on the petitioner. In order to complete the surgery, the physician brought in several ancillary services, including a vendor to perform diagnostic monitoring during the surgery. Following the surgery, the medical provider submitted its bills to the carrier, which were rejected based upon the lack of authorization. After a medical provider claim petition was filed, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the matter for failure to obtain the requisite statutory authorization. The medical provider argued that it was only providing ancillary services and, therefore, did not require the authorization of the carrier under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Statute. The medical provider also argued that they were the “victim” since they were advised by the physician that the procedure was authorized. The judge rejected both arguments, holding that all medical providers including providers that provide ancillary services for surgical procedures, are required to obtain the same authorization for their treatment, or risk not receiving financial reimbursement.

Workers’ comp claim dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and coverage for an occupational accident policy carrier.

The petitioner filed a claim petition within the New Jersey Division of Workers’ Compensation seeking benefits and alleging employment with a trucking company. However, the petitioner had previously obtained an occupational accident policy in the role of an independent contractor. When filing the workers’ compensation petition, counsel for the petitioner erroneously named the occupational accident policy carrier as carrier for the trucking company. Although it would appear clear that jurisdiction and coverage do not exist in such cases, most times it is a lengthy process to have such matters addressed by the court and ultimately dismissed. In this case, we were successful in obtaining the dismissal and ceasing further unnecessary financial costs to the client.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Celebrating 30 Years of the Defense Digest: A Look at the Last 30 Years in New Jersey Workers’ Compensation

December 1, 2024

Key Points:  The term “palliative” is not decisive as to liability to provide treatment. When addressing requests for temporary total disability benefits from former employees, investigate entitlement beyond a doctor’s note changing work status.  There are exclusions to the general principle that injuries during volunteering activities are not compensable. Thinking back to 1994—30 years ago—many of us may not recall where we were or what we were doing. In fact, many readers may not have even been born at the time. However, the celebration of 30 years of Marshall Dennehey’s publication of Defense Digest provides a good opportunity to review a few significant New Jersey workers’ compensation judicial decisions from the last three decades that still impact claims handling today. This article will focus on one decision from each decade.  1994–2004 The first decade, 1994–2004, brought the world such noteworthy events as the debut of the television show “Friends” (1994), the election of Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa (1994), and the unforgettable events of September 11, 2001. The decade also brought a notable New Jersey Appellate Division decision that still raises issues for practitioners today.  In 1995, the Appellate Division analyzed the term “palliative” with regard to a respondent’s liability to provide medical treatment. In Hanrahan v. Township of Sparta, 284 N.J. Super. 327 (App. Div. 1995), the court held that an employer is required to provide such treatment if there is (1) competent medical testimony that (2) the treatment is both reasonable and necessary to (3) cure or relieve the effect of the work-related injury such as to improve ability to function. Prior to that time, defense counsel would use “palliative” as an indicator to cease liability. Per this decision, that is not the legal analysis. However, according to the court, “palliative” treatment could cease if it is no longer curing or relieving the effect of the work-related injury to improve one’s ability to function. Therefore, a practitioner should determine whether these requirements apply when addressing this issue. 2004–2014 The next decade, 2004–2014, brought about additional significant events. The world was introduced to Facebook (2004) and saw the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States (2009). This decade also included the death of music icon Michael Jackson (2009). In addition to these events, this decade brought about important judicial decisions in New Jersey workers’ compensation. Next, we will take a look at one of them. In 2006, the Appellate Division addressed the issue of entitlement to temporary total disability benefits when an injured worker is terminated from employment for reasons unrelated to the work-related injuries and is, thereafter, placed out of work or on modified duty status by the medical doctor. In Cunningham v. Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 386 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006), the court held that a former employee has the burden of proving that they would have been employed “but for” the work-related disability in order to receive temporary disability benefits. In other words, the work-related disability has to be the reason for the unemployment, not something else.  It is important for practitioners to ask additional questions when a former employee is placed out of work or on modified-duty status following termination. Specifically, practitioners should inquire whether there was any active employment elsewhere, receipt of unemployment benefits, or proof of an active search for employment at the time of the medical change-in-work status. If the lack of employment was due to some other reason (i.e., simply had not sought employment since termination of employment or personal reasons unrelated to the work injury), there would be an argument that temporary total disability benefits are not due. Thorough investigation is key. 2014—2024 Lastly, 2014–2024. During this period, the world witnessed the marriage of Prince Harry and Meghan Markle (2018) and continues to be impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic (2020). In New Jersey, Chief Judge Maria Del Valle Koch was appointed as the first woman Director and Chief Judge of the Division of Workers’ Compensation (2022). In addition to these events, there continues to be important legal decisions. Of those, we will take a look at one New Jersey Supreme Court decision.  In 2021, the court analyzed the compensability issue related to employee volunteers in Goulding v. NJ Friendship House, Inc., 245 N.J. 157 (2021). The court reiterated that an injury is compensable where there was compulsion by the employer for the employee to volunteer and that injuries during purely social or recreational events are not compensable. The court also reviewed the two-prong test used in analyzing the compensability issue for employees volunteering at employer-sponsored events: (1) whether the injury was a “regular incident of employment” and (2) whether the event provided a benefit to the employer beyond improvement in employee health and morale.  When encountering this issue, practitioners should apply the two-prong test to the facts of the claim to determine if it is met. Analysis is very fact sensitive. As such, it is worthwhile to conduct a thorough investigation.  The review of these decisions shows that, although a decision may have been rendered many years ago, it is necessary to be aware of it as it may continue to impact claims handling today. These decisions and analyses can influence your decision as to whether to provide compensation. Defense Digest will continue to be a source of information on legal trends, cases, and updates in the law.  *Angela is a shareholder and member of our Workers’ Compensation Department. She works in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

The New Jersey Appellate Court affirms finding of compensability under Special Mission exception of Coming and Going Rule even though the petitioner sustained severe injuries as a result of his own actions in violation of company policy.

March 1, 2023

The petitioner sustained severe injuries, including loss of the use of an eye, brain trauma and burns, as a result of a B-Tank/gas tank explosion. One issue of contention was that the petitioner had personally placed the B-Tank in his personal vehicle at the end of a workday with the intention of delivering the tank to a customer the following day on his way to work. It was undisputed that the petitioner’s actions violated company and union policies and that he had received training that included notice of the prohibition of using one’s personal vehicle for work and that B-Tanks are not to be stored in confined spaces. Also, it was undisputed that the petitioner was acting on his own accord and not at the direction or assignment of the respondent. Despite the training and policies, the petitioner loaded the tank in his personal vehicle anyway. While on the way to work the following day, the petitioner received a text from a superior in the company, though not his direct supervisor, asking that he pick him up and take him to work. It was while the petitioner was on the way to pick up this individual that he heard a hissing sound in his car. At that point, he remembered he had placed the gas tank in his car but had forgotten to deliver it to the customer. Also, the petitioner had passed the customer’s location. The petitioner “stopped on the side of the road, opened all the windows, got out of his car, and went to the rear of his vehicle. As petitioner opened the hatch of his vehicle, the B-Tank exploded.”  Following a trial on the petitioner’s motion for medical and/or temporary disability benefits, the Judge of Compensation held the incident to be compensable. The judge held that the  “special mission” exception applied, finding that: (1) the petitioner had “embarked upon a special mission of delivering the B-Tank to the customer and that mission had not ended” before the accident and (2) the petitioner was engaged in a special mission for the respondent when he was driving to pick up the higher-up in the company. The respondent appealed. The Appellate Court heard the matter and affirmed the lower court’s decision. It is noted that the respondent made the following arguments, which were rejected by the Appellate Court:  1.    the petitioner’s injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment;  2.    the legal determinations made by the judge were not supported by the facts;  3.    the petitioner was not injured while engaged in a special mission as he was not asked to deliver the B-Tank outside of work hours or in his personal vehicle, in violation of policies and training, and the petitioner could have refused to pick up the higher-up that morning; 4.    the petitioner should be precluded from receiving benefits as he had engaged in reckless and unreasonable behavior by placing the B-Tank in his personal vehicle; and  5.    the claim was not covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act due to the petitioner’s willful failure to make use of reasonable and proper personal protective devices.  It is noted that the respondent raised the final argument for the first time at appellate level.  In rejecting those arguments, the Appellate Court found that there existed substantial, credible evidence supporting the judge’s finding that the petitioner was on a special mission for the respondent when he was en route to pick up the higher-up. With that finding, the Appellate Court indicated that it was not necessary to address whether the petitioner was also on a special mission to deliver the B-Tank to the customer.  Specifically, the court concentrated on the fact that the petitioner was en route to pick up someone in a high level of authority for the respondent, at the request of that individual, when the incident occurred. The court also focused on the fact that it was during this commute that the tank exploded. The court affirmed the judge’s finding that the petitioner was performing a “special mission” at the time of the explosion, thus, making the incident compensable. Although the court indicated that it was not addressing the petitioner’s actions in placing the tank into his personal vehicle against policy and training, it did comment that negligence or a foolhardy action by a petitioner does not necessarily remove an incident from the realm of compensability, hinting that compensability still would have been found.   What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 3, March 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.