.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

The New Jersey Appellate Court affirms finding of compensability under Special Mission exception of Coming and Going Rule even though the petitioner sustained severe injuries as a result of his own actions in violation of company policy.

Van Sciver v. Jersey Mechanical Contractors, Inc., No. A-3525-20 (App. Div. Nov. 15, 2022)

March 1, 2023

by Angela Y. DeMary

The petitioner sustained severe injuries, including loss of the use of an eye, brain trauma and burns, as a result of a B-Tank/gas tank explosion. One issue of contention was that the petitioner had personally placed the B-Tank in his personal vehicle at the end of a workday with the intention of delivering the tank to a customer the following day on his way to work. It was undisputed that the petitioner’s actions violated company and union policies and that he had received training that included notice of the prohibition of using one’s personal vehicle for work and that B-Tanks are not to be stored in confined spaces. Also, it was undisputed that the petitioner was acting on his own accord and not at the direction or assignment of the respondent. Despite the training and policies, the petitioner loaded the tank in his personal vehicle anyway.

While on the way to work the following day, the petitioner received a text from a superior in the company, though not his direct supervisor, asking that he pick him up and take him to work. It was while the petitioner was on the way to pick up this individual that he heard a hissing sound in his car. At that point, he remembered he had placed the gas tank in his car but had forgotten to deliver it to the customer. Also, the petitioner had passed the customer’s location. The petitioner “stopped on the side of the road, opened all the windows, got out of his car, and went to the rear of his vehicle. As petitioner opened the hatch of his vehicle, the B-Tank exploded.” 

Following a trial on the petitioner’s motion for medical and/or temporary disability benefits, the Judge of Compensation held the incident to be compensable. The judge held that the 
“special mission” exception applied, finding that: (1) the petitioner had “embarked upon a special mission of delivering the B-Tank to the customer and that mission had not ended” before the accident and (2) the petitioner was engaged in a special mission for the respondent when he was driving to pick up the higher-up in the company. The respondent appealed.

The Appellate Court heard the matter and affirmed the lower court’s decision. It is noted that the respondent made the following arguments, which were rejected by the Appellate Court: 

1.    the petitioner’s injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment; 
2.    the legal determinations made by the judge were not supported by the facts; 
3.    the petitioner was not injured while engaged in a special mission as he was not asked to deliver the B-Tank outside of work hours or in his personal vehicle, in violation of policies and training, and the petitioner could have refused to pick up the higher-up that morning;
4.    the petitioner should be precluded from receiving benefits as he had engaged in reckless and unreasonable behavior by placing the B-Tank in his personal vehicle; and 
5.    the claim was not covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act due to the petitioner’s willful failure to make use of reasonable and proper personal protective devices. 

It is noted that the respondent raised the final argument for the first time at appellate level. 

In rejecting those arguments, the Appellate Court found that there existed substantial, credible evidence supporting the judge’s finding that the petitioner was on a special mission for the respondent when he was en route to pick up the higher-up. With that finding, the Appellate Court indicated that it was not necessary to address whether the petitioner was also on a special mission to deliver the B-Tank to the customer. 

Specifically, the court concentrated on the fact that the petitioner was en route to pick up someone in a high level of authority for the respondent, at the request of that individual, when the incident occurred. The court also focused on the fact that it was during this commute that the tank exploded. The court affirmed the judge’s finding that the petitioner was performing a “special mission” at the time of the explosion, thus, making the incident compensable. Although the court indicated that it was not addressing the petitioner’s actions in placing the tank into his personal vehicle against policy and training, it did comment that negligence or a foolhardy action by a petitioner does not necessarily remove an incident from the realm of compensability, hinting that compensability still would have been found.
 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 3, March 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.