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Defense Digest

Celebrating 30 Years of the Defense Digest: A Look at the Last 30 Years in New Jersey Workers’ Compensation

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024

December 1, 2024

by Angela Y. DeMary

Key Points: 

  • The term “palliative” is not decisive as to liability to provide treatment.
  • When addressing requests for temporary total disability benefits from former employees, investigate entitlement beyond a doctor’s note changing work status. 
  • There are exclusions to the general principle that injuries during volunteering activities are not compensable.

Thinking back to 1994—30 years ago—many of us may not recall where we were or what we were doing. In fact, many readers may not have even been born at the time. However, the celebration of 30 years of Marshall Dennehey’s publication of Defense Digest provides a good opportunity to review a few significant New Jersey workers’ compensation judicial decisions from the last three decades that still impact claims handling today. This article will focus on one decision from each decade. 

1994–2004

The first decade, 1994–2004, brought the world such noteworthy events as the debut of the television show “Friends” (1994), the election of Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa (1994), and the unforgettable events of September 11, 2001. The decade also brought a notable New Jersey Appellate Division decision that still raises issues for practitioners today. 

In 1995, the Appellate Division analyzed the term “palliative” with regard to a respondent’s liability to provide medical treatment. In Hanrahan v. Township of Sparta, 284 N.J. Super. 327 (App. Div. 1995), the court held that an employer is required to provide such treatment if there is (1) competent medical testimony that (2) the treatment is both reasonable and necessary to (3) cure or relieve the effect of the work-related injury such as to improve ability to function. Prior to that time, defense counsel would use “palliative” as an indicator to cease liability. Per this decision, that is not the legal analysis.

However, according to the court, “palliative” treatment could cease if it is no longer curing or relieving the effect of the work-related injury to improve one’s ability to function. Therefore, a practitioner should determine whether these requirements apply when addressing this issue.

2004–2014

The next decade, 2004–2014, brought about additional significant events. The world was introduced to Facebook (2004) and saw the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States (2009). This decade also included the death of music icon Michael Jackson (2009). In addition to these events, this decade brought about important judicial decisions in New Jersey workers’ compensation. Next, we will take a look at one of them.

In 2006, the Appellate Division addressed the issue of entitlement to temporary total disability benefits when an injured worker is terminated from employment for reasons unrelated to the work-related injuries and is, thereafter, placed out of work or on modified duty status by the medical doctor. In Cunningham v. Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 386 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006), the court held that a former employee has the burden of proving that they would have been employed “but for” the work-related disability in order to receive temporary disability benefits. In other words, the work-related disability has to be the reason for the unemployment, not something else. 

It is important for practitioners to ask additional questions when a former employee is placed out of work or on modified-duty status following termination. Specifically, practitioners should inquire whether there was any active employment elsewhere, receipt of unemployment benefits, or proof of an active search for employment at the time of the medical change-in-work status. If the lack of employment was due to some other reason (i.e., simply had not sought employment since termination of employment or personal reasons unrelated to the work injury), there would be an argument that temporary total disability benefits are not due. Thorough investigation is key.

2014—2024

Lastly, 2014–2024. During this period, the world witnessed the marriage of Prince Harry and Meghan Markle (2018) and continues to be impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic (2020). In New Jersey, Chief Judge Maria Del Valle Koch was appointed as the first woman Director and Chief Judge of the Division of Workers’ Compensation (2022). In addition to these events, there continues to be important legal decisions. Of those, we will take a look at one New Jersey Supreme Court decision. 

In 2021, the court analyzed the compensability issue related to employee volunteers in Goulding v. NJ Friendship House, Inc., 245 N.J. 157 (2021). The court reiterated that an injury is compensable where there was compulsion by the employer for the employee to volunteer and that injuries during purely social or recreational events are not compensable. The court also reviewed the two-prong test used in analyzing the compensability issue for employees volunteering at employer-sponsored events: (1) whether the injury was a “regular incident of employment” and (2) whether the event provided a benefit to the employer beyond improvement in employee health and morale. 

When encountering this issue, practitioners should apply the two-prong test to the facts of the claim to determine if it is met. Analysis is very fact sensitive. As such, it is worthwhile to conduct a thorough investigation. 

The review of these decisions shows that, although a decision may have been rendered many years ago, it is necessary to be aware of it as it may continue to impact claims handling today. These decisions and analyses can influence your decision as to whether to provide compensation. Defense Digest will continue to be a source of information on legal trends, cases, and updates in the law. 

*Angela is a shareholder and member of our Workers’ Compensation Department. She works in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.