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Defense Digest

Celebrating 30 Years of the Defense Digest: A Look at the Last 30 Years in New Jersey Workers’ Compensation

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024

December 1, 2024

by Angela Y. DeMary

Key Points: 

  • The term “palliative” is not decisive as to liability to provide treatment.
  • When addressing requests for temporary total disability benefits from former employees, investigate entitlement beyond a doctor’s note changing work status. 
  • There are exclusions to the general principle that injuries during volunteering activities are not compensable.

Thinking back to 1994—30 years ago—many of us may not recall where we were or what we were doing. In fact, many readers may not have even been born at the time. However, the celebration of 30 years of Marshall Dennehey’s publication of Defense Digest provides a good opportunity to review a few significant New Jersey workers’ compensation judicial decisions from the last three decades that still impact claims handling today. This article will focus on one decision from each decade. 

1994–2004

The first decade, 1994–2004, brought the world such noteworthy events as the debut of the television show “Friends” (1994), the election of Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa (1994), and the unforgettable events of September 11, 2001. The decade also brought a notable New Jersey Appellate Division decision that still raises issues for practitioners today. 

In 1995, the Appellate Division analyzed the term “palliative” with regard to a respondent’s liability to provide medical treatment. In Hanrahan v. Township of Sparta, 284 N.J. Super. 327 (App. Div. 1995), the court held that an employer is required to provide such treatment if there is (1) competent medical testimony that (2) the treatment is both reasonable and necessary to (3) cure or relieve the effect of the work-related injury such as to improve ability to function. Prior to that time, defense counsel would use “palliative” as an indicator to cease liability. Per this decision, that is not the legal analysis.

However, according to the court, “palliative” treatment could cease if it is no longer curing or relieving the effect of the work-related injury to improve one’s ability to function. Therefore, a practitioner should determine whether these requirements apply when addressing this issue.

2004–2014

The next decade, 2004–2014, brought about additional significant events. The world was introduced to Facebook (2004) and saw the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States (2009). This decade also included the death of music icon Michael Jackson (2009). In addition to these events, this decade brought about important judicial decisions in New Jersey workers’ compensation. Next, we will take a look at one of them.

In 2006, the Appellate Division addressed the issue of entitlement to temporary total disability benefits when an injured worker is terminated from employment for reasons unrelated to the work-related injuries and is, thereafter, placed out of work or on modified duty status by the medical doctor. In Cunningham v. Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 386 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div. 2006), the court held that a former employee has the burden of proving that they would have been employed “but for” the work-related disability in order to receive temporary disability benefits. In other words, the work-related disability has to be the reason for the unemployment, not something else. 

It is important for practitioners to ask additional questions when a former employee is placed out of work or on modified-duty status following termination. Specifically, practitioners should inquire whether there was any active employment elsewhere, receipt of unemployment benefits, or proof of an active search for employment at the time of the medical change-in-work status. If the lack of employment was due to some other reason (i.e., simply had not sought employment since termination of employment or personal reasons unrelated to the work injury), there would be an argument that temporary total disability benefits are not due. Thorough investigation is key.

2014—2024

Lastly, 2014–2024. During this period, the world witnessed the marriage of Prince Harry and Meghan Markle (2018) and continues to be impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic (2020). In New Jersey, Chief Judge Maria Del Valle Koch was appointed as the first woman Director and Chief Judge of the Division of Workers’ Compensation (2022). In addition to these events, there continues to be important legal decisions. Of those, we will take a look at one New Jersey Supreme Court decision. 

In 2021, the court analyzed the compensability issue related to employee volunteers in Goulding v. NJ Friendship House, Inc., 245 N.J. 157 (2021). The court reiterated that an injury is compensable where there was compulsion by the employer for the employee to volunteer and that injuries during purely social or recreational events are not compensable. The court also reviewed the two-prong test used in analyzing the compensability issue for employees volunteering at employer-sponsored events: (1) whether the injury was a “regular incident of employment” and (2) whether the event provided a benefit to the employer beyond improvement in employee health and morale. 

When encountering this issue, practitioners should apply the two-prong test to the facts of the claim to determine if it is met. Analysis is very fact sensitive. As such, it is worthwhile to conduct a thorough investigation. 

The review of these decisions shows that, although a decision may have been rendered many years ago, it is necessary to be aware of it as it may continue to impact claims handling today. These decisions and analyses can influence your decision as to whether to provide compensation. Defense Digest will continue to be a source of information on legal trends, cases, and updates in the law. 

*Angela is a shareholder and member of our Workers’ Compensation Department. She works in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.