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Aaron provides legal counsel to attorneys, accountants, real estate agents, home inspectors, home appraisers, insurance brokers, and other professionals. Aaron has strong experience representing insurance brokers throughout Pennsylvania and Delaware, including complex claims involving issues concerning duty of care, policy interpretation, whether alternative policies were available, and claims with nuanced statute of limitations issues. He handles a variety of claims including, but not limited to, legal and accounting malpractice, wrongful use of civil process, commercial litigation, negligence, breach of contract, municipal liability, and civil rights matters.  Aaron is also experienced in consumer financial services litigation and compliance, particularly representing attorneys and agencies in debt collection practices.

Outside of his professional liability practice, Aaron is also an experienced litigator, defending clients in matters involving premises liability, land use, automobile liability, intellectual property and employment law.

Aaron is a 1987 graduate of Millersville University. Following graduation, he taught grades six through eight in the School District of Philadelphia for 12 years. During that time, he earned a Master's Degree in Education from Temple University. While teaching, Aaron attended evening classes at the Beasley School of Law at Temple University where he made the Dean's List and earned honors in Trial Advocacy and Research and Writing. Aaron began his legal career as an associate with a Blue Bell, Pennsylvania law firm, where he primarily focused on defending Pennsylvania municipalities in areas of civil rights law, premises liability, land use and automobile liability.

Aaron has received an AV® Preeminent rating by the Martindale Hubbell.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2003)
    • Temple University (M.A., 1995)
      • El. Ed.
    • Millersville University of Pennsylvania (B.A., 1987)
    • Pennsylvania, 2003
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2016
    • Delaware, 2020
    • U.S. District Court District of Delaware, 2021
    • Top Lawyer, Legal Malpractice, Delaware Today (November 2024)
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance (CLM)
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Professional Liability Defense Federation
    • Proving a Case Within a Case in Legal Malpractice Actions, PLDF Annual Meeting, September 2018
    • Developments in Lawyer Liability in Pennsylvania & New Jersey, client seminar, March 2017 
    • Professional Liability - Issues for Attorneys, client seminar, June 2016
    • Virtual Law Office and Interstate Practice of Law, National Business Institute, April 2015
    • Aaron has been invited to speak to the Pennsylvania Institute of Certified Public Accountants as well as the Pennsylvania Home Inspector Association. Aaron has also given presentations to insurance companies concerning developments in legal malpractice law.
    • "LPL Claims Without Privity: Support for a Bright Line Rule", Professional Liability Defense Quarterly, Fall 2018
    • "Proving The 'Case-Within-A-Case' Standard," For The Defense, April 2018
    • "Demonstrative Evidence at Trial", Pennsylvania Civil Trial Practice, 2017, 2018, Reviewing Author 
    • "Common Evidentiary Issues at Trial", Pennsylvania Civil Trial Practice, 2017, 2018
    • "Responsive Pleadings", Pennsylvania Civil Pre-Trial Practice, 2017, 2018, Reviewing Author
    • Pennsylvania Legal Malpractice Handbook, 2017 Edition2019 Edition, Published by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Co-author 
    • "Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rejects Constitutional Challenge to the Dragonetti Act," Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2017
    • "An Argument Against Imposing Liability Against Attorneys for Aiding and Abetting Their Client's Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Pennsylvania Law," Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 4, December 2011
    • "Former Phillies Tyler Green Thrown a Curve on Appeal for Legal Fees," Defense Digest, September 2007
    • "Medical Malpractice Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment of Non Pros Lacks Merit," Defense Digest, March 2007
    • Regular contributor to MDWC&G Case Law Alerts.
    • Successfully obtained dismissal of claims brought derivatively and directly by a corporation, including aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with contract. The claims were brought against our client, an out of state attorney who previously represented the corporation and its former director. The Court granted the attorney’s Motion to Dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege facts that would confer personal jurisdiction over the attorney under a conspiracy theory.
    • Successfully obtained dismissal of wrongful use of civil proceedings claims brought against our clients, two attorneys who were alleged to have wrongfully prosecuted a professional negligence claim against the plaintiff, a real estate agent. The plaintiff would not accept any settlement that was less than policy limits. After five years of litigation, the Court granted the attorney defendants’ summary judgment motion, concluding that the plaintiff failed to adduce facts that would reflect that the attorneys prosecuted the for obtaining dismissal of wrongful use of civil proceedings claims brought against our clients, two attorneys who were alleged to have wrongfully prosecuted a professional negligence claim against the plaintiff, a real estate agent. The plaintiff would not accept any settlement that was less than policy limits. After five years of litigation, the Court granted the attorney defendants’ summary judgment motion, concluding that the plaintiff failed to adduce facts that would reflect that the attorneys prosecuted the underlying action in a grossly negligent manner, or without probable cause. The Court also held that the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that the underlying lawsuit was prosecuted for an improper purpose.
    • Successfully defended a home inspector before the Delaware Division of Professional Regulation. The Claimants sought disciplinary action against our client in connection with his inspection of their home. We were able to persuade the Division that the complained of defects at the property were not subject to inspection because they were not visible at the time of inspection. The Division weighed all concerns involved in the matter and on November 1, 2023, it concluded that the facts did not reflect a violation of the laws, rules, and regulations that governed the activities of the licensed professional.
    • A unanimous jury found in favor of our clients, a lawyer and his law firm in a legal malpractice case arising out of the lawyer’s drafting of a postnuptial agreement. The postnuptial agreement was invalidated by a family court judge, causing the husband to lose approximately $1.2 million as part of a subsequent property separation agreement. The jury considered testimony from the plaintiff’s ex-wife which reflected that she had signed the agreement under duress and concluded that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the postnuptial agreement was invalidated as a result of anything the lawyer did.
    • Plaintiff claimed that estate attorneys misinterpreted stock restriction agreement causing Plaintiff's husband's estate to lose in excess of $1 million.  Court held that agreement was properly interpreted by attorneys
    • Attorney prosecuted civil rights claim on behalf of mother of son who was shot and killed by a Philadelphia police officer while unarmed and posing no threat to the officer.  Mother of decedent served as administrator of estate and retained proceeds of settlement.  Decedent allegedly had two children who should have received the proceeds.  Attorney sued by children's mother on their behalf. Plaintiff's minor children made $1 million settlement demand  just prior to the court's dismissal of the claims. 
    • Plaintiff claimed that his attorney failed to properly prosecute his workers' compensation claim causing his benefits to be discontinued.  Plaintiff's claims dismissed by way of summary judgment motion.
    • Buyers of real property sued real estate agent for seller, claiming misrepresentations regarding use of the property.  Claims dismissed by way of summary judgment motion.
    • Success in getting a number of legal malpractice cases dismissed promptly by way of preliminary objections. In such cases, the Plaintiff failed to allege facts that, even if true, could yield liability as to our client.
    • Success in getting a number of legal malpractice cases dismissed upon the filing of motions for non pros as a result of opposing counsel's failure to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
    • Summary judgment and motions to dismiss granted on behalf of a number of clients. In one recent case, the plaintiff claimed that our attorney client was liable to him for wrongful use of civil proceedings and was seeking in excess of $3 million in damages. Upon the filing of a Motion for Summary Judgment, the court dismissed our client, finding no liability whatsoever.
    • Success in defending clients at arbitration hearings and bench trials, including cases involving alleged home inspector liability and insurance subrogation claims.

Results

One Month – 4 Outstanding Results! Aaron Moore Obtained Four Successful Results on Behalf of Clients in the Span of One Month

Defense verdict on behalf of a real estate broker and agent. The plaintiffs, homebuyers, claimed that the sellers’ broker and agent were liable to them for the value of fixtures that were taken by the sellers when they vacated the property, which were alleged to have been included in the sale. At a bench trial, the judge determined that neither the broker nor the agent could be held liable to the plaintiffs because the representations regarding what was included in the sale were made by the sellers. Supreme Court affirmance of dismissal of a complex legal malpractice lawsuit. Aaron and Carol Vanderwoude obtained a Delaware Supreme Court affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of a complex legal malpractice claim. The plaintiffs, seven affiliated companies and their owners in the business of developing property, had been sued by their bank for defaulting on multiple lines of credit. The bank filed multiple lawsuits against the property developers, claiming approximately $7 million in damages, plus attorneys’ fees, which were recoverable pursuant to the terms of the promissory notes. The property developers retained our client to defend the lawsuits, asserting that the amounts claimed to be owed to the bank were significantly overstated. Our client vigorously defended the bank’s underlying lawsuits. Ultimately, the property developers settled the bank’s lawsuits for the entire amount owed, plus interest and the bank’s legal fees. The developers argued that its attorneys should have advised them to settle the bank’s claims after the lawsuits were commenced and that, if they had done so, they would not have had to pay the bank’s legal fees, our client’s legal fees, or expert witness fees, or the additional interest on the loan. The property developers also claimed that not settling with the bank earlier caused them lost business opportunities valued at nearly $1 million. The plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims were dismissed because their expert witness, a Maryland attorney with no business litigation experience, was not qualified to serve as an expert and because their damages claims were speculative. Motion to dismiss in complex matter involving claims of fraud, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with contractual relations, and piercing the corporate veil. The plaintiff, an investment fund, had purchased a business that was controlled and primarily owned by our client. The business ultimately went bankrupt, and the plaintiff claimed that the purchase was premised upon misrepresentation by our client. The plaintiff maintained that jurisdiction in Delaware was proper pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement. The District Court was persuaded by arguments reflecting that it lacked personal jurisdiction over our client, a citizen of Canada, even though he signed the Asset Purchase Agreement which included language conferring jurisdiction over claims arising from the sale in Delaware. The court agreed that our client did not sign the agreement in his individual capacity, and the plaintiff’s piercing the corporate veil allegations were insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. Dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim. Obtained dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim brought by a condominium unit owner against the attorneys who represented her condominium association. The unit owner claimed that the law firm was liable to her for unjust enrichment in connection with legal fees it received from the association for legal services provided in efforts to collect on past due assessments owed by the unit owner. Pursuant to the association’s governing documents, the charges were passed on to the unit owner. The court agreed that the fees that were paid to our client by the condominium association were properly earned.

Unanimous Appellate Decision Preserves Defense Win in Legal Malpractice Suit

We successfully defended an appeal from a jury verdict previously secured by members of our Lawyers’ Professional Liability Department in favor of the firm’s client in a legal malpractice case. The plaintiffs initially asserted multiple tort claims and a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, which were dismissed by the trial court upon partial grant of the defense’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The case proceeded to trial on a remaining breach of contract claim, resulting in a defense verdict. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s rulings on both the motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion in limine related to evidentiary exclusions. The Pennsylvania Superior Court unanimously affirmed the trial court’s rulings, holding that the tort claims were time-barred and that the plaintiffs had waived their evidentiary argument by failing to properly develop it in their appellate brief.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Delaware Superior Court Addresses Continuous Representation Doctrine in Legal Malpractice Case—But Was It Really Applied?

January 1, 2026

In what the court stated was a matter of first impression, the Delaware Superior Court applied the “continuous representation doctrine” in a legal malpractice case. In this case, the plaintiff claimed that his attorneys did not take any meaningful action to prosecute his underlying lawsuit and failed to sufficiently communicate with him. The court dismissed the underlying action sua sponte for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff maintained he first learned that his underlying claims had been dismissed by the Superior Court 18 months after the dismissal. He then commenced his legal malpractice action more than three years after the dismissal. The defendant attorneys moved to dismiss the malpractice claims based on Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations, which, under the occurrence rule, began to accrue at the time of dismissal of the underlying action. The court held that the continuous representation doctrine was applicable because the “cause of action conceivably accrued at some point after the court dismissed the underlying suit” because the attorneys failed to take efforts to reopen the judgment. It appears that the Delaware Superior Court has conflated the “continuous representation doctrine” with the concept of continued negligence. There are some jurisdictions that recognize the continuous representation doctrine, which provides that a legal malpractice cause of action accrues at the end of the underlying representation, irrespective of when the negligence occurred during the representation. Delaware, however, follows the “occurrence rule,” which, in the absence of equitable tolling, provides that a cause of action accrues at the time of the alleged negligence. Here the court properly concluded that the cause of action could be deemed to have accrued after the dismissal of the underlying claims if the plaintiff could demonstrate continued negligence after the dismissal. The court’s use of the phrase “continuous representation doctrine,” however, could lead to confusion as to whether that doctrine is actually applicable in Delaware. The court entertained a motion for re-argument and issued a second opinion, where it made clear that the plaintiff’s claims were not time barred because of allegations of continued negligence. The second opinion did not reference the “continuous representation doctrine”; however, it did not specifically clarify that the doctrine was not applicable.

Case Law Alerts

Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Claims Based on Collateral Estoppel

October 1, 2025

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims under the collateral estoppel doctrine.  The plaintiffs, previously claimants in an underlying class action case as parents of an injured minor child, brought the legal malpractice claim against class counsel, claiming that counsel was negligent by failing to advise them to affirmatively opt out of the class in order to pursue an individual claim, given the nature and extent of the child’s injuries.  The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s determination that the claims administrator’s decision in the underlying class action was a final adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction as the claim process was an approved process set up by the court in the underlying action.  The collateral estoppel doctrine, often called “issue preclusion,” is a doctrine that prevents a party from re-litigating an issue of fact or law that has already been resolved in a prior proceeding. It is intended to promote finality, conserve judicial resources, and protect parties from the burden of duplicative litigation.   Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.