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Aaron provides legal counsel to attorneys, accountants, real estate agents, home inspectors, home appraisers, insurance brokers, and other professionals. Aaron has strong experience representing insurance brokers throughout Pennsylvania and Delaware, including complex claims involving issues concerning duty of care, policy interpretation, whether alternative policies were available, and claims with nuanced statute of limitations issues. He handles a variety of claims including, but not limited to, legal and accounting malpractice, wrongful use of civil process, commercial litigation, negligence, breach of contract, municipal liability, and civil rights matters.  Aaron is also experienced in consumer financial services litigation and compliance, particularly representing attorneys and agencies in debt collection practices.

Outside of his professional liability practice, Aaron is also an experienced litigator, defending clients in matters involving premises liability, land use, automobile liability, intellectual property and employment law.

Aaron is a 1987 graduate of Millersville University. Following graduation, he taught grades six through eight in the School District of Philadelphia for 12 years. During that time, he earned a Master's Degree in Education from Temple University. While teaching, Aaron attended evening classes at the Beasley School of Law at Temple University where he made the Dean's List and earned honors in Trial Advocacy and Research and Writing. Aaron began his legal career as an associate with a Blue Bell, Pennsylvania law firm, where he primarily focused on defending Pennsylvania municipalities in areas of civil rights law, premises liability, land use and automobile liability.

Aaron has received an AV® Preeminent rating by the Martindale Hubbell.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2003)
    • Temple University (M.A., 1995)
      • El. Ed.
    • Millersville University of Pennsylvania (B.A., 1987)
    • Pennsylvania, 2003
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2016
    • Delaware, 2020
    • U.S. District Court District of Delaware, 2021
    • Top Lawyer, Legal Malpractice, Delaware Today (November 2024)
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance (CLM)
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Professional Liability Defense Federation
    • Proving a Case Within a Case in Legal Malpractice Actions, PLDF Annual Meeting, September 2018
    • Developments in Lawyer Liability in Pennsylvania & New Jersey, client seminar, March 2017 
    • Professional Liability - Issues for Attorneys, client seminar, June 2016
    • Virtual Law Office and Interstate Practice of Law, National Business Institute, April 2015
    • Aaron has been invited to speak to the Pennsylvania Institute of Certified Public Accountants as well as the Pennsylvania Home Inspector Association. Aaron has also given presentations to insurance companies concerning developments in legal malpractice law.
    • "LPL Claims Without Privity: Support for a Bright Line Rule", Professional Liability Defense Quarterly, Fall 2018
    • "Proving The 'Case-Within-A-Case' Standard," For The Defense, April 2018
    • "Demonstrative Evidence at Trial", Pennsylvania Civil Trial Practice, 2017, 2018, Reviewing Author 
    • "Common Evidentiary Issues at Trial", Pennsylvania Civil Trial Practice, 2017, 2018
    • "Responsive Pleadings", Pennsylvania Civil Pre-Trial Practice, 2017, 2018, Reviewing Author
    • Pennsylvania Legal Malpractice Handbook, 2017 Edition2019 Edition, Published by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Co-author 
    • "Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rejects Constitutional Challenge to the Dragonetti Act," Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2017
    • "An Argument Against Imposing Liability Against Attorneys for Aiding and Abetting Their Client's Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Pennsylvania Law," Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 4, December 2011
    • "Former Phillies Tyler Green Thrown a Curve on Appeal for Legal Fees," Defense Digest, September 2007
    • "Medical Malpractice Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment of Non Pros Lacks Merit," Defense Digest, March 2007
    • Regular contributor to MDWC&G Case Law Alerts.
    • Successfully obtained dismissal of claims brought derivatively and directly by a corporation, including aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with contract. The claims were brought against our client, an out of state attorney who previously represented the corporation and its former director. The Court granted the attorney’s Motion to Dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege facts that would confer personal jurisdiction over the attorney under a conspiracy theory.
    • Successfully obtained dismissal of wrongful use of civil proceedings claims brought against our clients, two attorneys who were alleged to have wrongfully prosecuted a professional negligence claim against the plaintiff, a real estate agent. The plaintiff would not accept any settlement that was less than policy limits. After five years of litigation, the Court granted the attorney defendants’ summary judgment motion, concluding that the plaintiff failed to adduce facts that would reflect that the attorneys prosecuted the for obtaining dismissal of wrongful use of civil proceedings claims brought against our clients, two attorneys who were alleged to have wrongfully prosecuted a professional negligence claim against the plaintiff, a real estate agent. The plaintiff would not accept any settlement that was less than policy limits. After five years of litigation, the Court granted the attorney defendants’ summary judgment motion, concluding that the plaintiff failed to adduce facts that would reflect that the attorneys prosecuted the underlying action in a grossly negligent manner, or without probable cause. The Court also held that the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that the underlying lawsuit was prosecuted for an improper purpose.
    • Successfully defended a home inspector before the Delaware Division of Professional Regulation. The Claimants sought disciplinary action against our client in connection with his inspection of their home. We were able to persuade the Division that the complained of defects at the property were not subject to inspection because they were not visible at the time of inspection. The Division weighed all concerns involved in the matter and on November 1, 2023, it concluded that the facts did not reflect a violation of the laws, rules, and regulations that governed the activities of the licensed professional.
    • A unanimous jury found in favor of our clients, a lawyer and his law firm in a legal malpractice case arising out of the lawyer’s drafting of a postnuptial agreement. The postnuptial agreement was invalidated by a family court judge, causing the husband to lose approximately $1.2 million as part of a subsequent property separation agreement. The jury considered testimony from the plaintiff’s ex-wife which reflected that she had signed the agreement under duress and concluded that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the postnuptial agreement was invalidated as a result of anything the lawyer did.
    • Plaintiff claimed that estate attorneys misinterpreted stock restriction agreement causing Plaintiff's husband's estate to lose in excess of $1 million.  Court held that agreement was properly interpreted by attorneys
    • Attorney prosecuted civil rights claim on behalf of mother of son who was shot and killed by a Philadelphia police officer while unarmed and posing no threat to the officer.  Mother of decedent served as administrator of estate and retained proceeds of settlement.  Decedent allegedly had two children who should have received the proceeds.  Attorney sued by children's mother on their behalf. Plaintiff's minor children made $1 million settlement demand  just prior to the court's dismissal of the claims. 
    • Plaintiff claimed that his attorney failed to properly prosecute his workers' compensation claim causing his benefits to be discontinued.  Plaintiff's claims dismissed by way of summary judgment motion.
    • Buyers of real property sued real estate agent for seller, claiming misrepresentations regarding use of the property.  Claims dismissed by way of summary judgment motion.
    • Success in getting a number of legal malpractice cases dismissed promptly by way of preliminary objections. In such cases, the Plaintiff failed to allege facts that, even if true, could yield liability as to our client.
    • Success in getting a number of legal malpractice cases dismissed upon the filing of motions for non pros as a result of opposing counsel's failure to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
    • Summary judgment and motions to dismiss granted on behalf of a number of clients. In one recent case, the plaintiff claimed that our attorney client was liable to him for wrongful use of civil proceedings and was seeking in excess of $3 million in damages. Upon the filing of a Motion for Summary Judgment, the court dismissed our client, finding no liability whatsoever.
    • Success in defending clients at arbitration hearings and bench trials, including cases involving alleged home inspector liability and insurance subrogation claims.

Results

One Month – 4 Outstanding Results! Aaron Moore Obtained Four Successful Results on Behalf of Clients in the Span of One Month

Defense verdict on behalf of a real estate broker and agent. The plaintiffs, homebuyers, claimed that the sellers’ broker and agent were liable to them for the value of fixtures that were taken by the sellers when they vacated the property, which were alleged to have been included in the sale. At a bench trial, the judge determined that neither the broker nor the agent could be held liable to the plaintiffs because the representations regarding what was included in the sale were made by the sellers. Supreme Court affirmance of dismissal of a complex legal malpractice lawsuit. Aaron and Carol Vanderwoude obtained a Delaware Supreme Court affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of a complex legal malpractice claim. The plaintiffs, seven affiliated companies and their owners in the business of developing property, had been sued by their bank for defaulting on multiple lines of credit. The bank filed multiple lawsuits against the property developers, claiming approximately $7 million in damages, plus attorneys’ fees, which were recoverable pursuant to the terms of the promissory notes. The property developers retained our client to defend the lawsuits, asserting that the amounts claimed to be owed to the bank were significantly overstated. Our client vigorously defended the bank’s underlying lawsuits. Ultimately, the property developers settled the bank’s lawsuits for the entire amount owed, plus interest and the bank’s legal fees. The developers argued that its attorneys should have advised them to settle the bank’s claims after the lawsuits were commenced and that, if they had done so, they would not have had to pay the bank’s legal fees, our client’s legal fees, or expert witness fees, or the additional interest on the loan. The property developers also claimed that not settling with the bank earlier caused them lost business opportunities valued at nearly $1 million. The plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims were dismissed because their expert witness, a Maryland attorney with no business litigation experience, was not qualified to serve as an expert and because their damages claims were speculative. Motion to dismiss in complex matter involving claims of fraud, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with contractual relations, and piercing the corporate veil. The plaintiff, an investment fund, had purchased a business that was controlled and primarily owned by our client. The business ultimately went bankrupt, and the plaintiff claimed that the purchase was premised upon misrepresentation by our client. The plaintiff maintained that jurisdiction in Delaware was proper pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement. The District Court was persuaded by arguments reflecting that it lacked personal jurisdiction over our client, a citizen of Canada, even though he signed the Asset Purchase Agreement which included language conferring jurisdiction over claims arising from the sale in Delaware. The court agreed that our client did not sign the agreement in his individual capacity, and the plaintiff’s piercing the corporate veil allegations were insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. Dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim. Obtained dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim brought by a condominium unit owner against the attorneys who represented her condominium association. The unit owner claimed that the law firm was liable to her for unjust enrichment in connection with legal fees it received from the association for legal services provided in efforts to collect on past due assessments owed by the unit owner. Pursuant to the association’s governing documents, the charges were passed on to the unit owner. The court agreed that the fees that were paid to our client by the condominium association were properly earned.

Unanimous Appellate Decision Preserves Defense Win in Legal Malpractice Suit

We successfully defended an appeal from a jury verdict previously secured by members of our Lawyers’ Professional Liability Department in favor of the firm’s client in a legal malpractice case. The plaintiffs initially asserted multiple tort claims and a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, which were dismissed by the trial court upon partial grant of the defense’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The case proceeded to trial on a remaining breach of contract claim, resulting in a defense verdict. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s rulings on both the motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion in limine related to evidentiary exclusions. The Pennsylvania Superior Court unanimously affirmed the trial court’s rulings, holding that the tort claims were time-barred and that the plaintiffs had waived their evidentiary argument by failing to properly develop it in their appellate brief.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Delaware Superior Court Addresses Continuous Representation Doctrine in Legal Malpractice Case—But Was It Really Applied?

January 1, 2026

In what the court stated was a matter of first impression, the Delaware Superior Court applied the “continuous representation doctrine” in a legal malpractice case. In this case, the plaintiff claimed that his attorneys did not take any meaningful action to prosecute his underlying lawsuit and failed to sufficiently communicate with him. The court dismissed the underlying action sua sponte for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff maintained he first learned that his underlying claims had been dismissed by the Superior Court 18 months after the dismissal. He then commenced his legal malpractice action more than three years after the dismissal. The defendant attorneys moved to dismiss the malpractice claims based on Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations, which, under the occurrence rule, began to accrue at the time of dismissal of the underlying action. The court held that the continuous representation doctrine was applicable because the “cause of action conceivably accrued at some point after the court dismissed the underlying suit” because the attorneys failed to take efforts to reopen the judgment. It appears that the Delaware Superior Court has conflated the “continuous representation doctrine” with the concept of continued negligence. There are some jurisdictions that recognize the continuous representation doctrine, which provides that a legal malpractice cause of action accrues at the end of the underlying representation, irrespective of when the negligence occurred during the representation. Delaware, however, follows the “occurrence rule,” which, in the absence of equitable tolling, provides that a cause of action accrues at the time of the alleged negligence. Here the court properly concluded that the cause of action could be deemed to have accrued after the dismissal of the underlying claims if the plaintiff could demonstrate continued negligence after the dismissal. The court’s use of the phrase “continuous representation doctrine,” however, could lead to confusion as to whether that doctrine is actually applicable in Delaware. The court entertained a motion for re-argument and issued a second opinion, where it made clear that the plaintiff’s claims were not time barred because of allegations of continued negligence. The second opinion did not reference the “continuous representation doctrine”; however, it did not specifically clarify that the doctrine was not applicable.

Case Law Alerts

Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Claims Based on Collateral Estoppel

October 1, 2025

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims under the collateral estoppel doctrine.  The plaintiffs, previously claimants in an underlying class action case as parents of an injured minor child, brought the legal malpractice claim against class counsel, claiming that counsel was negligent by failing to advise them to affirmatively opt out of the class in order to pursue an individual claim, given the nature and extent of the child’s injuries.  The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s determination that the claims administrator’s decision in the underlying class action was a final adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction as the claim process was an approved process set up by the court in the underlying action.  The collateral estoppel doctrine, often called “issue preclusion,” is a doctrine that prevents a party from re-litigating an issue of fact or law that has already been resolved in a prior proceeding. It is intended to promote finality, conserve judicial resources, and protect parties from the burden of duplicative litigation.   Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.