Aaron provides legal counsel to attorneys, accountants, real estate agents, home inspectors, home appraisers, insurance brokers, and other professionals. Aaron has strong experience representing insurance brokers throughout Pennsylvania and Delaware, including complex claims involving issues concerning duty of care, policy interpretation, whether alternative policies were available, and claims with nuanced statute of limitations issues. He handles a variety of claims including, but not limited to, legal and accounting malpractice, wrongful use of civil process, commercial litigation, negligence, breach of contract, municipal liability, and civil rights matters. Aaron is also experienced in consumer financial services litigation and compliance, particularly representing attorneys and agencies in debt collection practices.
Outside of his professional liability practice, Aaron is also an experienced litigator, defending clients in matters involving premises liability, land use, automobile liability, intellectual property and employment law.
Aaron is a 1987 graduate of Millersville University. Following graduation, he taught grades six through eight in the School District of Philadelphia for 12 years. During that time, he earned a Master's Degree in Education from Temple University. While teaching, Aaron attended evening classes at the Beasley School of Law at Temple University where he made the Dean's List and earned honors in Trial Advocacy and Research and Writing. Aaron began his legal career as an associate with a Blue Bell, Pennsylvania law firm, where he primarily focused on defending Pennsylvania municipalities in areas of civil rights law, premises liability, land use and automobile liability.
Aaron has received an AV® Preeminent™ rating by the Martindale Hubbell.
Results
One Month – 4 Outstanding Results! Aaron Moore Obtained Four Successful Results on Behalf of Clients in the Span of One Month
Defense verdict on behalf of a real estate broker and agent. The plaintiffs, homebuyers, claimed that the sellers’ broker and agent were liable to them for the value of fixtures that were taken by the sellers when they vacated the property, which were alleged to have been included in the sale. At a bench trial, the judge determined that neither the broker nor the agent could be held liable to the plaintiffs because the representations regarding what was included in the sale were made by the sellers. Supreme Court affirmance of dismissal of a complex legal malpractice lawsuit. Aaron and Carol Vanderwoude obtained a Delaware Supreme Court affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of a complex legal malpractice claim. The plaintiffs, seven affiliated companies and their owners in the business of developing property, had been sued by their bank for defaulting on multiple lines of credit. The bank filed multiple lawsuits against the property developers, claiming approximately $7 million in damages, plus attorneys’ fees, which were recoverable pursuant to the terms of the promissory notes. The property developers retained our client to defend the lawsuits, asserting that the amounts claimed to be owed to the bank were significantly overstated. Our client vigorously defended the bank’s underlying lawsuits. Ultimately, the property developers settled the bank’s lawsuits for the entire amount owed, plus interest and the bank’s legal fees. The developers argued that its attorneys should have advised them to settle the bank’s claims after the lawsuits were commenced and that, if they had done so, they would not have had to pay the bank’s legal fees, our client’s legal fees, or expert witness fees, or the additional interest on the loan. The property developers also claimed that not settling with the bank earlier caused them lost business opportunities valued at nearly $1 million. The plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims were dismissed because their expert witness, a Maryland attorney with no business litigation experience, was not qualified to serve as an expert and because their damages claims were speculative. Motion to dismiss in complex matter involving claims of fraud, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with contractual relations, and piercing the corporate veil. The plaintiff, an investment fund, had purchased a business that was controlled and primarily owned by our client. The business ultimately went bankrupt, and the plaintiff claimed that the purchase was premised upon misrepresentation by our client. The plaintiff maintained that jurisdiction in Delaware was proper pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement. The District Court was persuaded by arguments reflecting that it lacked personal jurisdiction over our client, a citizen of Canada, even though he signed the Asset Purchase Agreement which included language conferring jurisdiction over claims arising from the sale in Delaware. The court agreed that our client did not sign the agreement in his individual capacity, and the plaintiff’s piercing the corporate veil allegations were insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. Dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim. Obtained dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim brought by a condominium unit owner against the attorneys who represented her condominium association. The unit owner claimed that the law firm was liable to her for unjust enrichment in connection with legal fees it received from the association for legal services provided in efforts to collect on past due assessments owed by the unit owner. Pursuant to the association’s governing documents, the charges were passed on to the unit owner. The court agreed that the fees that were paid to our client by the condominium association were properly earned.
Unanimous Appellate Decision Preserves Defense Win in Legal Malpractice Suit
We successfully defended an appeal from a jury verdict previously secured by members of our Lawyers’ Professional Liability Department in favor of the firm’s client in a legal malpractice case. The plaintiffs initially asserted multiple tort claims and a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, which were dismissed by the trial court upon partial grant of the defense’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The case proceeded to trial on a remaining breach of contract claim, resulting in a defense verdict. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s rulings on both the motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion in limine related to evidentiary exclusions. The Pennsylvania Superior Court unanimously affirmed the trial court’s rulings, holding that the tort claims were time-barred and that the plaintiffs had waived their evidentiary argument by failing to properly develop it in their appellate brief.
Thought Leadership
Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability
Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims
July 29, 2026
In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.
Case Law Alerts
Delaware Superior Court Addresses Continuous Representation Doctrine in Legal Malpractice Case—But Was It Really Applied?
January 1, 2026
In what the court stated was a matter of first impression, the Delaware Superior Court applied the “continuous representation doctrine” in a legal malpractice case. In this case, the plaintiff claimed that his attorneys did not take any meaningful action to prosecute his underlying lawsuit and failed to sufficiently communicate with him. The court dismissed the underlying action sua sponte for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff maintained he first learned that his underlying claims had been dismissed by the Superior Court 18 months after the dismissal. He then commenced his legal malpractice action more than three years after the dismissal. The defendant attorneys moved to dismiss the malpractice claims based on Delaware’s three-year statute of limitations, which, under the occurrence rule, began to accrue at the time of dismissal of the underlying action. The court held that the continuous representation doctrine was applicable because the “cause of action conceivably accrued at some point after the court dismissed the underlying suit” because the attorneys failed to take efforts to reopen the judgment. It appears that the Delaware Superior Court has conflated the “continuous representation doctrine” with the concept of continued negligence. There are some jurisdictions that recognize the continuous representation doctrine, which provides that a legal malpractice cause of action accrues at the end of the underlying representation, irrespective of when the negligence occurred during the representation. Delaware, however, follows the “occurrence rule,” which, in the absence of equitable tolling, provides that a cause of action accrues at the time of the alleged negligence. Here the court properly concluded that the cause of action could be deemed to have accrued after the dismissal of the underlying claims if the plaintiff could demonstrate continued negligence after the dismissal. The court’s use of the phrase “continuous representation doctrine,” however, could lead to confusion as to whether that doctrine is actually applicable in Delaware. The court entertained a motion for re-argument and issued a second opinion, where it made clear that the plaintiff’s claims were not time barred because of allegations of continued negligence. The second opinion did not reference the “continuous representation doctrine”; however, it did not specifically clarify that the doctrine was not applicable.
