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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN DELAWARE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2025

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 12, December 2025

December 1, 2025

by Linda L. Wilson and Alexander C. Landolfi

1.    Industrial Accident Board grants continuance but suspends temporary total disability benefits pending rescheduled hearing
Fortt v. Delaware Brick Company, IAB No. 1542958 (Dec. 12, 2024)

The claimant was injured in a work accident on January 16, 2024. On June 7, 2024, the employer filed a Petition for Review (PFR) to terminate the claimant’s ongoing total disability (TTD) benefits, which the Second Injury Fund began paying under 19 Del. C. § 2347(k). 

At the claimant’s request, the October 21, 2024, hearing was continued to December 16, 2024, due to scheduling issues with his medical expert. In November 2024, the claimant’s medical expert’s cancelled a December 12, 2024, deposition for personal reasons. The employer’s medical expert was deposed as scheduled on December 4, 2024. On December 5, 2024, the claimant sought a second continuance, arguing his expert’s testimony was essential and the cancellation beyond his control. 

The employer opposed, citing prejudice from delay, ongoing TTD payments, and risk of “stale” testimony. While the Second Injury Fund was currently paying those benefits, the employer was concerned they may have to repay those benefits once the petition was resolved. The Fund supported these arguments. 

Although the Industrial Accident Board granted the claimant’s request for a continuance, it also suspended TTD benefits and froze the evidentiary record. The Board relied on Section 2348 (c) and (h) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which states that petitions must be heard within 120 days of the Pre-Trial Conference notice, with extensions granted only for “good cause” and/or “extraordinary circumstances.” Accordingly, a doctor’s voluntary unavailability raises the question as to whether it qualifies as an unforeseen circumstance. Ultimately, the Board found that, although the doctor’s choice was not out of his control, the claimant had no influence over the matter, making the continuance appropriate.

In response to the employer’s concerns about prejudice, the Board deemed it reasonable to freeze the evidentiary record in consideration of case management procedures and to ensure the integrity of the employer’s testimony as if the hearing occurred on the original date. The Board determined that remedial action was necessary to minimize harm to both the employer and the Fund. Consequently, the Board ordered that claimant’s receipt of TTD benefits be suspended from the date of the rescheduled hearing on December 16, 2024, until the new hearing date, which was approximately 60 days later.
 

2.    Industrial Accident Board finds that claimant acted in self-defense; did not forfeit right to workers’ compensation benefits based on standards established by 19 Del. C. § 2353(b)
Liriano v. Delaware Transit Company (DART), IAB No. 1550708 (Feb. 24, 2025)

While working as a bus driver for the employer, an altercation transpired between the claimant and a drunk bystander, which was captured on video footage with limited audio. The footage showed the bystander leaning against a pole next to the claimant and asking for information. Unsatisfied with the claimant’s response, the bystander separated himself for a brief period and followed a second bus driver, Wayne Gardner. During this exchange, the bystander touched Mr. Gardner on the arm, prompting Mr. Gardner to swat the bystander’s hand away before continuing on his way. 

The bystander then reapproached the claimant, at which point the claimant is seen backing away from him with his hands in the air. The bystander is then seen standing chest to chest with the claimant, which led the claimant to push the individual away three times, resulting in a physical altercation. Another bus driver intervened to break up the altercation. The claimant reported the incident to the dispatch, stating that it would likely be held against him. The bystander later approached the bus to apologize, and he admitted that he was intoxicated. 

The employer argued that the claimant forfeited his workers’ compensation benefits under Section 2353(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act because he was the aggressor in the altercation. The employer claimed that the claimant acted with deliberate and reckless indifference to the danger inherent in such a physical altercation. The employer cited the video footage, directives that instruct drivers to walk away/retreat from conflict and the claimant’s acknowledgement that he might be held responsible for the event. 

The claimant contended that he acted in self-defense. He relied on the video evidence, asserting that he would not have been able to safely retreat. 

The Industrial Accident Board determined that the claimant had indeed acted in self defense. The Board mentioned that their review of the video contradicted the employer’s narrative and supported the claimant’s testimony that he tried to avoid confrontation. They noted that self-defense was justified because the unknown male continued to pursue the claimant and ultimately stood “chest to chest” with him. The Board further noted that the employer had not disciplined the claimant for misconduct or violations of the workplace violence policy following the incident, which was interpreted as an indication that they also recognized the claimant had acted in self-defense. As such, the employer’s petition was denied. 

 

3.    Superior Court reverses Industrial Accident Board, holding sole proprietor properly elected workers’ compensation coverage 
Bayly v. Red House Motors, 2025 WL 1305851 (Del. Super. May 6, 2025)

The claimant, the owner of Red House Motors, the employer, was assaulted by an employee on June 16, 2021, resulting in serious injuries. At the time of the assault, a workers’ compensation policy covered workplace injuries for the employer’s employees. The claimant had asked to be covered by the policy, but the policy and annual audits conducted by the insurance carrier did not inform the claimant that he was uninsured for his own workplace injuries. Despite this, when the claimant reported the assault, the insurer informed him that he was not covered under the policy, issued a partial refund for his premiums, and subsequently canceled his policy. 

The claimant filed a petition for benefits, which was denied by the Industrial Accident Board, which concluded that the claimant, as an experienced businessperson, was aware that he needed to elect workers’ compensation coverage for himself but had not done so. While not directly stated, the Board seemed to believe that the claimant needed to elect workers’ compensation coverage either in writing or on the insurer’s prescribed form. 

The Superior Court identified two flaws in the Board’s reasoning. First, regarding the workers’ compensation policy, the court noted that the policy included a section entitled “Who Is Insured” and the Extension of Information Page, which specifically listed the claimant as a “Named Insured.” Second, concerning the claimant’s status as an experienced businessperson, the court found that the expertise in insurance matters rested with the insurer, not the claimant. 

The court also found it concerning that the insurer had not informed the Board that, although a sole proprietor must affirmatively elect personal coverage under a workers’ compensation policy, this does not need to be done in writing or on a prescribed form. The court believed the Board had incorrectly assumed that the claimant needed to make his election in writing or using a prescribed form. According to the court’s interpretation of 19 Del. C. § 2306(b) and 19 Del. C. § 2308(b), the claimant was not required to request coverage in writing or on a specific form. Furthermore, neither party disputed that the claimant had requested to be covered. As a result, the court determined that, under these statutes and the insurer’s own procedures, the claimant properly elected coverage. The Superior Court reversed the Board’s decision and instructed the Board to find that the claimant was covered under the workers’ compensation policy. 

 

4.    Superior Court dismisses negligence claims but allows intentional tort action to proceed in electrical explosion case 
McGuckin v. PBF Energy, Inc., 2025 WL 2223109 (Del. Super. Aug. 5, 2025)

On January 24, 2023, the claimant was instructed by his manager to manually reset a circuit breaker for a machine that controls the speed and torque of an electric motor by varying frequency and voltage of its power supply. While doing so, an electrical explosion occurred, resulting in injuries to the claimant. After receiving benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the claimant filed several claims against the employer, including negligence, recklessness, intentional tortious conduct, strict products liability and loss of consortium. The employer moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting the Industrial Accident Board has exclusive jurisdiction over all claims that involve work-related injuries. 

Both parties referenced Segura v. M Cubed Tech., Inc., 2019 WL 1504048, to support their arguments. In Segura, an employee was injured when a transformer switchbox exploded. After receiving workers’ compensation benefits, the employee filed suit against the employer, alleging negligence and/or intentional conduct. The employer moved for a dismissal, and the court dismissed the negligence claim but allowed the intentional conduct claim to proceed. The court explained that while the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine bars suits by employees against their employers for work-related injuries based on negligence, it does not preclude claims involving intentional conduct by the employer. 

Here, the employer argued that the claimant had merely “repackaged” negligence allegations with labels of intentional conduct; however, the court disagreed and found that the claimant provided adequate facts to support his intentional tort claims. Therefore, the court dismissed the negligence claims against the employer but allowed the intentional tort claim to proceed. 

 

5.    Delaware Supreme Court allows workers’ compensation insurer to pursue subrogation against employee’s UIM recovery, subject to Horizon Services v. Henry, 304 A.3d 552 (Del. 2023) (Henry II)
ProAssurance Grp. d/b/a Eastern Alliance Ins. Co. v. Manz, 2025 WL 3124822 (Del. Nov. 7, 2025)

After the claimant was involved in a work-related motor vehicle accident, she filed a workers’ compensation claim. Ultimately, the claimant received a total of $454,070.72 from the workers’ compensation carrier, which included payments for medical expenses, lost wages and a lump sum intended to waive future entitlements to workers’ compensation benefits. The settlement documents included a clause granting ProAssurance, the workers’ compensation carrier, a lien against any recovery the claimant might receive from any entity, including an insurance carrier, as a result of the work accident. 

In addition to pursuing workers’ compensation benefits, the claimant sought compensation from the driver responsible for her injuries and pursed a claim against her employer’s Underinsured Motorist policy (UIM). The UIM policy contained a non-duplication provision, stating that it would not cover any element of loss for which a person is entitled to receive payment through workers’ compensation benefits. An arbitrator awarded the claimant $215,000 for her UIM claim, and ProAssurance then asserted a lien against the UIM award pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2326(e). 

The claimant filed a declaratory judgment action in Superior Court, seeking an order that would exempt her UIM award from ProAssurance’s lien. She argued that the non-duplicative clause in the UIM policy entitled her to funds that were not already compensated by ProAssurance for her workers’ compensation claim. ProAssurance countered that it was entitled to the claimant’s subsequent UIM recovery. The Superior Court ruled in favor of the claimant. 

The Delaware Supreme Court discussed workers’ compensation carriers’ right to subrogation under 21 Del. C. § 2326(e) for boardable damages and found that non-boardable damages, which include but are not limited to those covered by Personal Injury Protection (PIP) policies, are not subject to subrogation. The Supreme Court then reversed and remanded the case with instructions to determine what amount of the claimant’s UIM award is “boardable” and subject to subrogation.

 

6.    Revised Workers’ Compensation Act: direct deposit
19 Del. C. § 2344.
    
Amendments to 19 Del. C. § 2344, which went into effect on June 30, 2025, reflect current practices and technology, including enabling workers’ compensation payments to be made by direct deposit. 

 

7.    Revised Workers’ Compensation Act: penalties, including incarceration
19 Del. C. § 2386(b)

Section § 2386 of the Workers’ Compensation Act is titled “Violations by Insurers or Self-Insurers; Penalties.” Amendments to 19 Del. C. §2386(b), which went into effect on June 30, 2025, provide for mandatory fines and/or imprisonment for not more than 90 days. Section 2386(b) now reads: 

(b) Whoever in this State does any of the following shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 90 days, or both. 
(1) Acts or assumes to act as an agent in any capacity whatsoever for any insurance corporation, mutual association or company or interinsurance exchange, which is not authorized to do business in this State, or if such authority to do business in this State has been suspended, so acts or assumes to act while such suspension is in force. 
(2) Neglects or refuses to comply with any obligatory provisions of this section. 
(3) Willfully makes any false or fraudulent statement of the business or condition of any such insurance carrier or false or fraudulent return, shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than 90 days, or both.


8.    Revised Workers’ Compensation Act: assessments for administrative expenses or insurance carriers
19 Del. C. § 2392(c)

Amendments to 19 Del. C. § 2392(c), which went into effect on June 30, 2025, allow the Office of Workers’ Compensation to increase the reimbursement percentage for activities from 66.6% to 100%, ensuring that the inspection and safety functions of the Division of Industrial Affairs are fully funded, as they were previously only partially covered. Insurance carriers will be responsible to pay the assessments imposed by this section. The annual budget process sets caps or spending limits on these appropriated special funds each year. 

 

9.    Amendment to increase reimbursement rates for workers’ compensation medical services
19 Del. C. § 2322B(c)

This amendment permits a permanent one-time increase of 3% in aggregate workers’ compensation medical expenses to correct Evaluation and Management Code reimbursements, which have fallen below the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ rates. The amendment goes into effect on January 31, 2026.

 

10.    New workers’ compensation rates

The Department of Labor announced that the new workers’ compensation rates effective July 1, 2025, establish an average weekly wage of $1,386.46. Accordingly, the maximum weekly compensation rate is $924.31, and the minimum weekly compensation rate is $308.11. 


What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 12, December 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.