As a shareholder in the Workers’ Compensation Department, Linda devotes her entire practice to representing employers in workers’ compensation and unemployment matters. She also assists clients in handling matters pertaining to Medicare set-asides. Whether counseling clients, negotiating settlements or trying cases, Linda always seeks to minimize the client’s exposure/expenditures.
Linda’s extensive litigation experience began at the Delaware Department of Justice, where she prosecuted both criminal and civil matters. As a deputy attorney general, she represented various state agencies, including the Delaware Industrial Accident Board (IAB). Linda left the Department of Justice to become a workers’ compensation hearing officer. Following her appointment to that position by the Delaware Secretary of Labor, Linda provided legal counsel to the IAB, wrote its decisions and, upon stipulation of the parties, sat in place of the IAB, hearing and deciding matters. That experience gave Linda the invaluable perspective of the tribunal, which is helpful in her current practice.
Today, Linda actively appears before the IAB on behalf of employers in a variety of matters. Her experience extends to practice before the Delaware Superior and Supreme courts with regard to workers compensation appeals. Linda also appears before Delaware Unemployment Insurance Referees and the Delaware Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
Linda received her B.S. in Economics from the University of Delaware and her juris doctor from Widener University School of Law, where she was a member of the Phi Delta Phi Honor Society. In her free time, Linda enjoys watching lacrosse and gardening.
Thought Leadership
What's Hot in Workers' Comp
Delaware Superior Court Affirms Denial of Workers' Compensation for Teacher's Spinal Stroke: Work Stress Alone Insufficient Under "Substantial Cause" Standard
August 13, 2026
Angelina Johnson, a third-grade teacher, filed a workers' compensation petition seeking benefits for a spinal stroke she suffered on January 6, 2022, while at school preparing for a scheduled performance evaluation. The Industrial Accident Board denied her claim, finding that her work-related stress was not a substantial cause of the stroke. Johnson appealed to the Delaware Superior Court, On January 6, 2022, Johnson was at school making copies in preparation for a scheduled annual performance evaluation when she suffered a spinal stroke. Johnson had multiple poorly controlled pre-existing medical conditions, including hypertension with readings reaching 187/95 and 170/100, and diabetes with A1C levels between 9.8 and 11.9. Medical records dating to 2013 documented chronic uncontrolled hypertension and diabetes. Johnson was frequently non-compliant with her blood pressure medication, including during the three weeks before her stroke. With regard to her performance, Johnson had never received an "ineffective" rating and was not on probation or any performance improvement plan. The scheduled evaluation was a routine annual employment activity required of all teachers. The central issue on appeal was whether the Industrial Accident Board correctly applied Delaware's workers' compensation causation standards. Specifically, the court addressed two questions: (1) whether the Board properly applied the "substantial cause" standard from Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing rather than the "but for" standard from Reese v. Home Budget Center, and (2) whether substantial evidence supported the Board's determination that Johnson's work stress was not a substantial cause of her spinal stroke. The Superior Court affirmed the Industrial Accident Board's decision, holding that the "substantial cause" standard applied because Johnson's scheduled annual teacher evaluation, though stressful, was not an identifiable industrial accident—it was a routine employment activity, not a physical or unexpected event. The court further held that substantial evidence supported the Board's acceptance of the employer's medical expert testimony over Johnson's expert because the employer's expert reviewed a more complete medical history and relied on literature specific to spinal strokes. The Superior Court held that the Board correctly applied the Duvall "substantial cause" standard rather than the Reese "but for" standard. The court reasoned that Johnson's scheduled annual performance evaluation was a routine employment activity, not an unexpected physical accident. The court next addressed whether substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that Johnson's work stress was not a substantial cause of her stroke. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's decision to accept Dr. Townsend's testimony over Dr. Dogali's. Dr. Townsend reviewed Johnson's medical records dating back to 2013, which documented a decade-long history of chronic uncontrolled hypertension and diabetes. He relied on medical literature specific to spinal strokes. In contrast, Dr. Dogali reviewed only post-2022 medical records, relied on studies concerning cerebral strokes rather than spinal strokes, and incorrectly assumed that Johnson's medical conditions were recent developments.
What's Hot in Workers' Comp
Another Case of Superior Court Weighing the Facts Rather than Simply Examining the Record to Determine if Substantial Evidence Exists to Support the Board’s Factual Findings and Conclusions?
June 8, 2026
In the May 2026 edition of What’s Hot, I highlighted a Delaware Supreme Court decision, Red House Motors v. Bayly, that reversed a Superior Court decision because the Superior Court is not free to make its own factual findings contrary to those of the board when there is substantial evidence to support the board’s conclusions. In Franceschi-Rodriguez v. Perdue Foods, LLC, C.A. No. S25A-09-001 RHR (Del. Super. May 22, 2026), the court reversed the board’s decision, terminating claimant’s temporary total disability benefits. The board terminated the claimant’s total disability benefits after determining that Franceschi was not prima facie a displaced worker. In reversing the board, the Franceschi court stated that the board’s decision that claimant was not prima facie a displaced worker was not supported by substantial evidence. Under Delaware law, once the board determines that a claimant is no longer totally medically disabled, the claimant can show continued entitlement to “economic” total disability benefits by showing prima facie displacement. In Franceschi, it was undisputed that the claimant was no longer totally medically disabled because he could perform sedentary work. In considering whether Franceschi was prima facie displaced and thus possibly entitled to ongoing “economic” total disability benefits, the board found that the claimant was a 58-year old male, had a four-year degree achieved in Puerto Rico in Spanish, had a ten-year work history in law enforcement in Puerto Rico, and was unable to communicate in English. It also found that, since being in the United States, he only performed construction or work for Perdue. After weighing the evidence before it, the board determined that the claimant was not prima facie displaced. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the board’s decision that the claimant was not prima facie a displaced worker. In so doing, the court appeared to weigh the facts differently than was done by the board. It held that the board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The Superior Court’s opinion largely emphasized the claimant’s language barrier and how his inability to speak, read, or write in English, combined with his inability to transfer his degree to Delaware without acquiring a local certification, rendered the claimant “effectively uneducated.” This finding by the Superior Court is contrary to the board’s weighing of the evidence presented during the hearing regarding the claimant’s mental capacity, education, and training that led the board to believe that the claimant “exhibited a host of skills beyond basic labor.” Given the foregoing, it appears that Franceschi may be another instance of the court substituting its factual findings for those of the board, instead of simply determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
