As a shareholder in the Workers’ Compensation Department, Linda devotes her entire practice to representing employers in workers’ compensation and unemployment matters. She also assists clients in handling matters pertaining to Medicare set-asides. Whether counseling clients, negotiating settlements or trying cases, Linda always seeks to minimize the client’s exposure/expenditures.
Linda’s extensive litigation experience began at the Delaware Department of Justice, where she prosecuted both criminal and civil matters. As a deputy attorney general, she represented various state agencies, including the Delaware Industrial Accident Board (IAB). Linda left the Department of Justice to become a workers’ compensation hearing officer. Following her appointment to that position by the Delaware Secretary of Labor, Linda provided legal counsel to the IAB, wrote its decisions and, upon stipulation of the parties, sat in place of the IAB, hearing and deciding matters. That experience gave Linda the invaluable perspective of the tribunal, which is helpful in her current practice.
Today, Linda actively appears before the IAB on behalf of employers in a variety of matters. Her experience extends to practice before the Delaware Superior and Supreme courts with regard to workers compensation appeals. Linda also appears before Delaware Unemployment Insurance Referees and the Delaware Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
Linda received her B.S. in Economics from the University of Delaware and her juris doctor from Widener University School of Law, where she was a member of the Phi Delta Phi Honor Society. In her free time, Linda enjoys watching lacrosse and gardening.
Thought Leadership
What's Hot in Workers' Comp
Another Case of Superior Court Weighing the Facts Rather than Simply Examining the Record to Determine if Substantial Evidence Exists to Support the Board’s Factual Findings and Conclusions?
June 8, 2026
In the May 2026 edition of What’s Hot, I highlighted a Delaware Supreme Court decision, Red House Motors v. Bayly, that reversed a Superior Court decision because the Superior Court is not free to make its own factual findings contrary to those of the board when there is substantial evidence to support the board’s conclusions. In Franceschi-Rodriguez v. Perdue Foods, LLC, C.A. No. S25A-09-001 RHR (Del. Super. May 22, 2026), the court reversed the board’s decision, terminating claimant’s temporary total disability benefits. The board terminated the claimant’s total disability benefits after determining that Franceschi was not prima facie a displaced worker. In reversing the board, the Franceschi court stated that the board’s decision that claimant was not prima facie a displaced worker was not supported by substantial evidence. Under Delaware law, once the board determines that a claimant is no longer totally medically disabled, the claimant can show continued entitlement to “economic” total disability benefits by showing prima facie displacement. In Franceschi, it was undisputed that the claimant was no longer totally medically disabled because he could perform sedentary work. In considering whether Franceschi was prima facie displaced and thus possibly entitled to ongoing “economic” total disability benefits, the board found that the claimant was a 58-year old male, had a four-year degree achieved in Puerto Rico in Spanish, had a ten-year work history in law enforcement in Puerto Rico, and was unable to communicate in English. It also found that, since being in the United States, he only performed construction or work for Perdue. After weighing the evidence before it, the board determined that the claimant was not prima facie displaced. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the board’s decision that the claimant was not prima facie a displaced worker. In so doing, the court appeared to weigh the facts differently than was done by the board. It held that the board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The Superior Court’s opinion largely emphasized the claimant’s language barrier and how his inability to speak, read, or write in English, combined with his inability to transfer his degree to Delaware without acquiring a local certification, rendered the claimant “effectively uneducated.” This finding by the Superior Court is contrary to the board’s weighing of the evidence presented during the hearing regarding the claimant’s mental capacity, education, and training that led the board to believe that the claimant “exhibited a host of skills beyond basic labor.” Given the foregoing, it appears that Franceschi may be another instance of the court substituting its factual findings for those of the board, instead of simply determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
What's Hot in Workers' Comp
Delaware Supreme Court Again Reverses Judge, Litigants Still Pay
May 1, 2026
In 2022, the Delaware Supreme Court, en banc, reversed a decision of Superior Court Judge Karsnitz in a pro hac vice matter, writing that “[b]oth the tone and the explicit language of the Superior Court’s memorandum opinion and order suggest that the courts’ interest extended beyond the mere propriety and advisability of Wood’s continued involvement in the case before it.” Page v. Oath Inc., 270 A.3d 833 (Del. 2022), 2022 WL 162965 at *3. Two of the justices that decided Page recently heard and decided Red House Motors v. Bayly, No. 234, 2025, 2026 WL 568964 (Del. Mar. 2, 2026), again reversing a decision of Judge Karsnitz. The law is clear that, in workers’ compensation matters, the board is the finder of fact. If a board decision is appealed, the reviewing court is required to defer to the factual findings of the board, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Unfortunately, some judges seek to substitute their factual findings for those of the board, often resulting in significant litigation expenses for the parties. Such was the case of Red House Motors v. Bayly. This case initially came before the board as a coverage matter. Robert Bayly was a sole proprietor of several businesses. The employees of the businesses were covered by workers’ compensation insurance. After being injured at work, Bayly sought workers’ compensation benefits, which were denied by the carrier because Bayly was not considered an employee and had not paid for additional coverage for sole proprietors. The board, agreeing with the carrier, found that, as a factual matter, Bayly never elected additional sole proprietor coverage. Bayly appealed the board decision. Contrary to the factual findings of the board, Judge Karsnitz concluded that they should have found that Bayly “orally” elected sole proprietor coverage. He then reversed and entered judgment for Bayly. The carrier appealed. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the decision because the Superior Court is not free to make its own factual findings contrary to those of the board when there is substantial evidence to support the board’s conclusions. Here, the board explained why, based on the record, it concluded as a factual matter that Bayly did not elect sole proprietor coverage and that those findings are entitled to deference. Unfortunately, while the board decision was eventually upheld, the litigants still had to bear the expense of extra litigation.
