Linda L. Wilson

In the May 2026 edition of What’s Hot, I highlighted a Delaware Supreme Court decision, Red House Motors v. Bayly, that reversed a Superior Court decision because the Superior Court is not free to make its own factual findings contrary to those of the board when there is substantial evidence to support the board’s conclusions. 

In Franceschi-Rodriguez v. Perdue Foods, LLC,  C.A. No. S25A-09-001 RHR (Del. Super. May 22, 2026), the court reversed the board’s decision, terminating claimant’s temporary total disability benefits. The board terminated the claimant’s total disability benefits after determining that Franceschi was not prima facie a displaced worker. In reversing the board, the Franceschi court stated that the board’s decision that claimant was not prima facie a displaced worker was not supported by substantial evidence.

Under Delaware law, once the board determines that a claimant is no longer totally medically disabled, the claimant can show continued entitlement to “economic” total disability benefits by showing prima facie displacement. In Franceschi, it was undisputed that the claimant was no longer totally medically disabled because he could perform sedentary work.   

In considering whether Franceschi was prima facie displaced and thus possibly entitled to ongoing “economic” total disability benefits, the board found that the claimant was a 58-year old male, had a four-year degree achieved in Puerto Rico in Spanish, had a ten-year work history in law enforcement in Puerto Rico, and was unable to communicate in English. It also found that, since being in the United States, he only performed construction or work for Perdue. After weighing the evidence before it, the board determined that the claimant was not prima facie displaced. 

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the board’s decision that the claimant was not prima facie a displaced worker. In so doing, the court appeared to weigh the facts differently than was done by the board. It held that the board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.

The Superior Court’s opinion largely emphasized the claimant’s language barrier and how his inability to speak, read, or write in English, combined with his inability to transfer his degree to Delaware without acquiring a local certification, rendered the claimant “effectively uneducated.” This finding by the Superior Court is contrary to the board’s weighing of the evidence presented during the hearing regarding the claimant’s mental capacity, education, and training that led the board to believe that the claimant “exhibited a host of skills beyond basic labor.” 

Given the foregoing, it appears that Franceschi may be another instance of the court substituting its factual findings for those of the board, instead of simply determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.