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Alexander C. Landolfi

Portrait of Alexander C.  Landolfi

As a member of the Workers’ Compensation Department, Alex represents employers, insurance carries and third-party administrators in defense of workers’ compensation and employment discrimination claims before the Industrial Accident Board and Delaware courts.

Alex earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in Law and Justice from Rowan University. While pursuing his undergraduate degree, Alex worked for American Family Care Urgent Care where he gained valuable experience handling workers’ compensation coverage and claim issues.

While attending Widener University Delaware Law School, Alex was a staff editor to the Delaware Corporate Journal. After receiving his juris doctor, Alex served as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Carl C. Danberg, Chief Judge of the Delaware Court of Common Pleas.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2024)
    • Rowan University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2020)
    • Delaware, 2024

Thought Leadership

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

The Bite Behind the Burden: Delaware Supreme Court Affirms That Prior Factual Findings Do Not Automate Causation for New Injuries

October 20, 2026

Craig Peed, the claimant, suffered severe head injuries in 2012 when a falling tree limb struck him while working for Essential Staffing, Inc. As a result of the injury, he was intubated due to a coma. In 2016, the claimant’s upper teeth fractured at the gum line, prompting him to file a petition for compensability. In 2018, the Industrial Accident Board (“IAB” or the “Board”) weighed competing medical testimony and found a causal link between his coma and intubation to the “desiccation” (drying out) of his upper teeth. The employer and carrier were therefore held responsible for the upper-teeth dental work. Approximately five years later, Mr. Peed developed issues with his lower teeth, which had worn down to stumps and exposed the nerve roots. His treating dentist performed root canals and recommended crowns. The claimant filed a new petition for additional compensation, arguing that the 2018 IAB findings definitively established that his coma-induced desiccation caused long-term dental damage. The claimant’s treating dentist also testified that the dental bridges placed on the upper teeth caused the lower teeth to wear down. The employer vigorously defended the petition with their own medical expert, who testified that Mr. Peed’s lower teeth problems were due to poor pre-accident dental care and unrelated to the work injury.  Additionally, the expert testified that dental bridges on the upper teeth would not naturally cause rapid wear on the opposing lower teeth, and noted it was unlikely for someone to develop severe pain in “nine teeth in a row” just six months after previously reporting zero pain during routine visits. The IAB found the employer’s medical expert more credible and determined that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proof, denying compensation for Mr. Peed’s lower teeth issues.  The Board also found that the claimant’s treating dentist lost credibility by relying on post-root canal X-rays—taken after the teeth had already been ground down to the gum line—to support the claim that the teeth had naturally deteriorated from the accident. The claimant appealed the IAB’s decision, first to the Superior Court of Delaware and then to the Delaware Supreme Court. Mr. Peed argued that the Board was bound by its 2018 decision under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, claiming that the Board had already established his coma caused long-term dental decay. The Supreme Court disagreed. It found that the 2018 decision determined causation only for the upper teeth, while the 2023 petition involved the lower teeth under different clinical circumstances. The Court also clarified that, although the IAB cannot retroactively alter a past award, 19 Del. C. § 2347 permits the Board to evaluate whether a new claim is related to the original industrial accident. Additionally, the Court addressed a procedural objection about late-disclosed defense expert opinions, holding that the IAB’s relaxed evidentiary rules and the claimant’s opportunity for cross-examination were sufficient. The Delaware Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling and the Board’s denial of benefits for the lower teeth issues. In Delaware workers’ compensation cases, a claimant’s prior successful petition can often feel like an insurmountable hurdle for employers and insurers. However, the Supreme Court of Delaware recently delivered a pivotal victory for the defense in Peed v. Essential Staffing, Inc., reinforcing that a prior finding of causation does not give claimants a “carte blanche” for subsequent, distinct medical conditions. This decision provides important guidance for insurance adjusters and employers contesting causation on long-tail claims. A few takeaways from this decision: Separate the Anatomy: Never assume a settled or adjudicated claim dictates the outcome of a new body part.  Force the claimant to prove causation anew if the anatomy or clinical presentation changes (e.g., left knee v. right knee, upper teeth v. lower teeth). Examine Pre- and Post-Procedure Evidence: The turning point in this case was the treating provider’s use of post-procedure X-rays.  Always verify that the medical evidence depicting “degeneration” was captured before any surgical intervention or alteration took place. Equip Your Experts for Cross-Examination: The Court affirmed that defense experts can offer new, responsive opinions during depositions if new medical details come to light.  Ensure your defense experts are thoroughly briefed on the claimant’s long-term treatment records and are ready to pivot to address newly raised medical theories.

Defense Digest

Under Pressure: Delaware Court Rejects Workers’ Compensation Claim for Performance Review Stress

September 29, 2026

Key Points: • Always subpoena a claimant’s decade-long medical files immediately. • Ensure medical experts are aware of a claimant’s comorbidities and whether they are being properly controlled. • Review the literature relied on by the claimant’s expert(s) and expose any reliance on unrelated medical conditions. • Remember to use the more stringent Duvall substantial cause standard when there is no identifiable work accident. The Delaware Superior Court recently affirmed a major defense victory by holding that routine workplace evaluations do not constitute an identifiable work accident solely because they may induce stress. In Johnson v. Christiana School District, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 324 (Del. Super. Ct. July 16, 2026), the Court upheld the Industrial Accident Board’s denial of workers’ compensation benefits, clarifying that claims regarding occupational anxiety must meet a more rigorous causation standard than other workplace injuries.  Specifically, the Court explained that, absent an identifiable work accident, claimants must demonstrate that workplace stress was a substantial cause of injury under the Duvall standard, rather than relying on the more lenient “but for” test that typically applies. This decision illustrates how employers and insurers can shield themselves from claims involving occupational stress caused by normal work activities.  Angelina Johnson (“Ms. Johnson” or “Claimant”) worked as a third-grade teacher for the Christina School District (“District” or “Employer”). Ms. Johnson was scheduled for a performance evaluation, which occurred twice a year. If a teacher consistently received a poor rating, they would be placed on an “improvement plan,” and failure to improve could eventually result in the teacher’s termination. However, throughout her career at the District, Ms. Johnson had never received a poor rating nor was she ever placed on an improvement plan. Ms. Johnson was given a day’s notice that the school’s principal would conduct an evaluation. That night she began experiencing back spasms and pain. On January 6, 2026, the day of the evaluation, Ms. Johnson suffered a spinal stroke, which left her a paraplegic. At the hearing before the Industrial Accident Board (the “Board”), Claimant’s medical expert testified that the stress related to the performance evaluation triggered the spinal stroke.  Claimant’s medical expert relied on generalized cerebral stroke studies, only partially evaluated Claimant’s prior medical history, and never performed a physical examination of Claimant. The District’s medical expert testified that the stroke was unrelated to the work event. The District’s medical expert first explained that Claimant’s medical expert relied upon literature that linked stress as a cause to cerebral strokes, not spinal strokes. Second, the District’s medical expert pointed out that Claimant had an extensive history of preexisting comorbidities, such as poorly controlled diabetes and hypertension, and that the literature suggests that Claimant’s comorbidities are high-risk factors for both spinal and cerebral strokes. The Board determined that there was no identifiable work event and thus applied Duvall substantial cause standard. The District’s medical expert was more credible than Claimant’s for two reasons: (1) Claimant’s medical expert’s opinions were unsupported by the literature; and (2) Claimant’s medical expert did not have a sufficient understanding of Claimant’s medical history. Relying upon the District’s medical expert’s testimony, the Board found no evidence that stress was the contributing factor to her stroke and, therefore, her injury was not compensable. On appeal, the primary issue before the Court centered on causation and which standard should apply. Under Delaware’s Workers’ Compensation Act, typically, the “but for” standard is applied when determining whether an accident or injury is causally related. Under the “but for” standard, a work accident is compensable and causation is satisfied as long as the work event serves as the setting or trigger for the injury, regardless of pre-existing conditions or whether the accident is the sole or substantial cause of harm. Reese v. Home Budget Ctr., 619 A.2d 907, 910 (Del. 1992). However, when there is no identifiable work accident, the Duvall substantial cause standard is applied. Under the Duvall standard, an injury is compensable if the ordinary job stress is a substantial cause of the injury, regardless of any pre-existing condition, as established by the “usual exertion rule.” Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing, 564 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Del. 1989).  Ms. Johnson argued that the performance evaluation constituted a specific, identifiable event that triggered her stress, and thus that the Board should have used the more lenient “but for” test to asses causation. In contrast, the District maintained that the evaluation was a routine aspect of employment, not an “accident,” and that the board properly applied the more stringent “substantial cause” standard. The Court ultimately agreed with the District, concluding that the annual performance evaluation did not constitute a work accident and that the Board applied the correct legal standard. The Court emphasized that none of Ms. Johnson’s circumstances met the criteria for a work accident under Delaware Workers’ Compensation Act. Although Ms. Johnson experienced a distressing event at work, she failed to demonstrate a “work-related specific and identifiable, physical, and unexpected event.” This case serves as a significant guideline for insurers, employers, adjusters, and defense counsel, underscoring the necessity of systematically reviewing a claimant’s long-term medical history when handling occupational stress claims. Practically, this decision demands that legal and insurance professionals rigorously document all relevant medical information to accurately evaluate causation and potential liability. Furthermore, it reinforces the requirement that the claimant must establish unmistakable evidence of an industrial work accident or, if such evidence is lacking, to argue that the Duvall substantial cause standard should apply. In practice, isolating pre-existing conditions and scrutinizing the medical literature cited by claimant’s experts may not only inform case strategy but can directly influence both settlement negotiations and litigation outcomes. As a result, this decision is likely to influence how future claims are investigated, defended, and adjudicated, promoting more stringent evidentiary standards for stress-related workers’ compensation cases. Alexander is an Associate in our Wilmington, DE office. He can be reached at 302-552-4342 or ACLandolfi@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.