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Alexander C. Landolfi

Portrait of Alexander C.  Landolfi

As a member of the Workers’ Compensation Department, Alex represents employers, insurance carries and third-party administrators in defense of workers’ compensation and employment discrimination claims before the Industrial Accident Board and Delaware courts.

Alex earned his Bachelor of Arts degree in Law and Justice from Rowan University. While pursuing his undergraduate degree, Alex worked for American Family Care Urgent Care where he gained valuable experience handling workers’ compensation coverage and claim issues.

While attending Widener University Delaware Law School, Alex was a staff editor to the Delaware Corporate Journal. After receiving his juris doctor, Alex served as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Carl C. Danberg, Chief Judge of the Delaware Court of Common Pleas.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2024)
    • Rowan University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2020)
    • Delaware, 2024

Thought Leadership

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

The Bite Behind the Burden: Delaware Supreme Court Affirms That Prior Factual Findings Do Not Automate Causation for New Injuries

October 20, 2026

Craig Peed, the claimant, suffered severe head injuries in 2012 when a falling tree limb struck him while working for Essential Staffing, Inc. As a result of the injury, he was intubated due to a coma. In 2016, the claimant’s upper teeth fractured at the gum line, prompting him to file a petition for compensability. In 2018, the Industrial Accident Board (“IAB” or the “Board”) weighed competing medical testimony and found a causal link between his coma and intubation to the “desiccation” (drying out) of his upper teeth. The employer and carrier were therefore held responsible for the upper-teeth dental work. Approximately five years later, Mr. Peed developed issues with his lower teeth, which had worn down to stumps and exposed the nerve roots. His treating dentist performed root canals and recommended crowns. The claimant filed a new petition for additional compensation, arguing that the 2018 IAB findings definitively established that his coma-induced desiccation caused long-term dental damage. The claimant’s treating dentist also testified that the dental bridges placed on the upper teeth caused the lower teeth to wear down. The employer vigorously defended the petition with their own medical expert, who testified that Mr. Peed’s lower teeth problems were due to poor pre-accident dental care and unrelated to the work injury.  Additionally, the expert testified that dental bridges on the upper teeth would not naturally cause rapid wear on the opposing lower teeth, and noted it was unlikely for someone to develop severe pain in “nine teeth in a row” just six months after previously reporting zero pain during routine visits. The IAB found the employer’s medical expert more credible and determined that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proof, denying compensation for Mr. Peed’s lower teeth issues.  The Board also found that the claimant’s treating dentist lost credibility by relying on post-root canal X-rays—taken after the teeth had already been ground down to the gum line—to support the claim that the teeth had naturally deteriorated from the accident. The claimant appealed the IAB’s decision, first to the Superior Court of Delaware and then to the Delaware Supreme Court. Mr. Peed argued that the Board was bound by its 2018 decision under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, claiming that the Board had already established his coma caused long-term dental decay. The Supreme Court disagreed. It found that the 2018 decision determined causation only for the upper teeth, while the 2023 petition involved the lower teeth under different clinical circumstances. The Court also clarified that, although the IAB cannot retroactively alter a past award, 19 Del. C. § 2347 permits the Board to evaluate whether a new claim is related to the original industrial accident. Additionally, the Court addressed a procedural objection about late-disclosed defense expert opinions, holding that the IAB’s relaxed evidentiary rules and the claimant’s opportunity for cross-examination were sufficient. The Delaware Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling and the Board’s denial of benefits for the lower teeth issues. In Delaware workers’ compensation cases, a claimant’s prior successful petition can often feel like an insurmountable hurdle for employers and insurers. However, the Supreme Court of Delaware recently delivered a pivotal victory for the defense in Peed v. Essential Staffing, Inc., reinforcing that a prior finding of causation does not give claimants a “carte blanche” for subsequent, distinct medical conditions. This decision provides important guidance for insurance adjusters and employers contesting causation on long-tail claims. A few takeaways from this decision: Separate the Anatomy: Never assume a settled or adjudicated claim dictates the outcome of a new body part.  Force the claimant to prove causation anew if the anatomy or clinical presentation changes (e.g., left knee v. right knee, upper teeth v. lower teeth). Examine Pre- and Post-Procedure Evidence: The turning point in this case was the treating provider’s use of post-procedure X-rays.  Always verify that the medical evidence depicting “degeneration” was captured before any surgical intervention or alteration took place. Equip Your Experts for Cross-Examination: The Court affirmed that defense experts can offer new, responsive opinions during depositions if new medical details come to light.  Ensure your defense experts are thoroughly briefed on the claimant’s long-term treatment records and are ready to pivot to address newly raised medical theories.

Defense Digest

Under Pressure: Delaware Court Rejects Workers’ Compensation Claim for Performance Review Stress

September 29, 2026

Key Points: • Always subpoena a claimant’s decade-long medical files immediately. • Ensure medical experts are aware of a claimant’s comorbidities and whether they are being properly controlled. • Review the literature relied on by the claimant’s expert(s) and expose any reliance on unrelated medical conditions. • Remember to use the more stringent Duvall substantial cause standard when there is no identifiable work accident. The Delaware Superior Court recently affirmed a major defense victory by holding that routine workplace evaluations do not constitute an identifiable work accident solely because they may induce stress. In Johnson v. Christiana School District, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 324 (Del. Super. Ct. July 16, 2026), the Court upheld the Industrial Accident Board’s denial of workers’ compensation benefits, clarifying that claims regarding occupational anxiety must meet a more rigorous causation standard than other workplace injuries.  Specifically, the Court explained that, absent an identifiable work accident, claimants must demonstrate that workplace stress was a substantial cause of injury under the Duvall standard, rather than relying on the more lenient “but for” test that typically applies. This decision illustrates how employers and insurers can shield themselves from claims involving occupational stress caused by normal work activities.  Angelina Johnson (“Ms. Johnson” or “Claimant”) worked as a third-grade teacher for the Christina School District (“District” or “Employer”). Ms. Johnson was scheduled for a performance evaluation, which occurred twice a year. If a teacher consistently received a poor rating, they would be placed on an “improvement plan,” and failure to improve could eventually result in the teacher’s termination. However, throughout her career at the District, Ms. Johnson had never received a poor rating nor was she ever placed on an improvement plan. Ms. Johnson was given a day’s notice that the school’s principal would conduct an evaluation. That night she began experiencing back spasms and pain. On January 6, 2026, the day of the evaluation, Ms. Johnson suffered a spinal stroke, which left her a paraplegic. At the hearing before the Industrial Accident Board (the “Board”), Claimant’s medical expert testified that the stress related to the performance evaluation triggered the spinal stroke.  Claimant’s medical expert relied on generalized cerebral stroke studies, only partially evaluated Claimant’s prior medical history, and never performed a physical examination of Claimant. The District’s medical expert testified that the stroke was unrelated to the work event. The District’s medical expert first explained that Claimant’s medical expert relied upon literature that linked stress as a cause to cerebral strokes, not spinal strokes. Second, the District’s medical expert pointed out that Claimant had an extensive history of preexisting comorbidities, such as poorly controlled diabetes and hypertension, and that the literature suggests that Claimant’s comorbidities are high-risk factors for both spinal and cerebral strokes. The Board determined that there was no identifiable work event and thus applied Duvall substantial cause standard. The District’s medical expert was more credible than Claimant’s for two reasons: (1) Claimant’s medical expert’s opinions were unsupported by the literature; and (2) Claimant’s medical expert did not have a sufficient understanding of Claimant’s medical history. Relying upon the District’s medical expert’s testimony, the Board found no evidence that stress was the contributing factor to her stroke and, therefore, her injury was not compensable. On appeal, the primary issue before the Court centered on causation and which standard should apply. Under Delaware’s Workers’ Compensation Act, typically, the “but for” standard is applied when determining whether an accident or injury is causally related. Under the “but for” standard, a work accident is compensable and causation is satisfied as long as the work event serves as the setting or trigger for the injury, regardless of pre-existing conditions or whether the accident is the sole or substantial cause of harm. Reese v. Home Budget Ctr., 619 A.2d 907, 910 (Del. 1992). However, when there is no identifiable work accident, the Duvall substantial cause standard is applied. Under the Duvall standard, an injury is compensable if the ordinary job stress is a substantial cause of the injury, regardless of any pre-existing condition, as established by the “usual exertion rule.” Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing, 564 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Del. 1989).  Ms. Johnson argued that the performance evaluation constituted a specific, identifiable event that triggered her stress, and thus that the Board should have used the more lenient “but for” test to asses causation. In contrast, the District maintained that the evaluation was a routine aspect of employment, not an “accident,” and that the board properly applied the more stringent “substantial cause” standard. The Court ultimately agreed with the District, concluding that the annual performance evaluation did not constitute a work accident and that the Board applied the correct legal standard. The Court emphasized that none of Ms. Johnson’s circumstances met the criteria for a work accident under Delaware Workers’ Compensation Act. Although Ms. Johnson experienced a distressing event at work, she failed to demonstrate a “work-related specific and identifiable, physical, and unexpected event.” This case serves as a significant guideline for insurers, employers, adjusters, and defense counsel, underscoring the necessity of systematically reviewing a claimant’s long-term medical history when handling occupational stress claims. Practically, this decision demands that legal and insurance professionals rigorously document all relevant medical information to accurately evaluate causation and potential liability. Furthermore, it reinforces the requirement that the claimant must establish unmistakable evidence of an industrial work accident or, if such evidence is lacking, to argue that the Duvall substantial cause standard should apply. In practice, isolating pre-existing conditions and scrutinizing the medical literature cited by claimant’s experts may not only inform case strategy but can directly influence both settlement negotiations and litigation outcomes. As a result, this decision is likely to influence how future claims are investigated, defended, and adjudicated, promoting more stringent evidentiary standards for stress-related workers’ compensation cases. Alexander is an Associate in our Wilmington, DE office. He can be reached at 302-552-4342 or ACLandolfi@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.