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Walter F. Kawalec III

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WFKawalec@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Walter F. Kawalec III

Walt focuses the majority of his practice on post-trial appellate advocacy with particular emphasis in the areas of public entity liability and civil rights, insurance coverage/bad faith litigation and professional liability. He has handled several hundred appeals to date, many of which have been in representation of physicians and attorneys, in appeals connected with malpractice litigation.

In his capacity as an appellate attorney, Walt has developed extensive experience briefing and arguing cases before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate courts, the Superior Court and Commonwealth Court, and New Jersey's intermediate court, the Appellate Division. As well, Walt has experience, thus far, up to the petition stage before the United States Supreme Court.

In addition to Walt's involvement in the appellate courts, he has also briefed and argued cases and motions before the Pennsylvania Board of Finance and Revenue, the Pennsylvania Courts of Common Pleas, and the New Jersey Superior Court Law Division.

Walt is a graduate of Glassboro State College and the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, where he earned his juris doctor, cum laude, in 1998. He was the recipient of the Dean's Scholarship for three years, first year moot court competition award for "Best Brief," and served as an officer in Phi Alpha Delta legal fraternity.

In 1999 Walt joined Marshall Dennehey as a member of the Appellate Group. Since that time, he has developed an proficiency in all aspects of appellate law, from legal research, brief writing and other written advocacy to oral argument, and appellate-level motion practice.

Walt's published opinions in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals have established and clarified important legal principles on subjects ranging from insurance coverage and remittitur, to informed consent claims in medical malpractice actions, and contributory negligence in accountant malpractice cases.

From 2002 to 2011, Walt also worked as the editor of Defense Digest—Marshall Dennehey's quarterly newsletter that updates our clients on important legal cases and issues of the day.

    • University of Pittsburgh School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1998)
    • Rowan University (B.A., 1991)
    • Pennsylvania, 1998
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1999
    • New Jersey, 2002
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2002
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2002
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2002
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 4th Circuit, 2017
    • “Reconsidering Reconsideration,” Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021
    • “Walters v. YMCA, Putting Some Limitations on Stelluti v. Casapenn,” Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2014
    • "De Facto Appeals Eliminate Federal Jurisdiction," Defense Digest, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2004
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Rejects Request To Void Stacked Coverage," Defense Digest, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2004
    • "'Advertising Injury' in the Third Circuit: A Frog Switch and a Green Machine," Defense Digest, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2003
    • "An Injury Is Not An 'Injury' If The Pain Is Non-Compensable," Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2002
    • "Superior Court, S.I.R.'s and the Direct Action Statute: Contracts Rule, Penna. Bar Ass'n, Civil Litigation Newsletter," orig. published in the Defense Digest, 2002
    • "Pennsylvania Appellate News," Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2001
    • "Appellate Courts Refine Pennsylvania Settlement Law," Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No.1, 2000
    • "Pennsylvania Appellate News," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1999
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of an obstetrician in a medical malpractice action. The plaintiff alleged that our client did not obtain the requisite informed consent from our client to undergo a trial of labor after having two prior cesarean section deliveries (“TOLAC x2”). The court found that the plaintiff’s lack of informed consent claim was without foundation as she had an awareness of the risks of TOLAC x2. Rather, the court found that her claim was premised on the assertion that the physician performing the TOLAC x2 failed to convert the TOLAC to a C-section quickly enough when complications arose. The court held that as matter of law our client had no obligation to discuss the risk that the doctor in the delivery room may wait too long to pivot to a C-section, which was the actual cause of the plaintiff’s alleged harm.
    • Successfully defended a grant of summary judgment in the New Jersey Appellate Division that resulted in a published opinion. Our clients were the owner and manager of an apartment complex for seniors. The plaintiff resident had returned from walking her dog and alleged she received injuries entering the elevator. She had allowed the dog to enter first, when the doors began to close. She alleged injuries occurring when the right door struck her arm, and when she used her left arm and left side of her body to slow the doors from closing while she leapt into the elevator.  
    • She sued our clients and the company hired to maintain the elevator, but was unable to establish any proof of negligence. The trial judge dismissed the case, declining to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in part, because the plaintiff could not establish the third element of the doctrine: that the injury did not result from the plaintiff’s own voluntary act or neglect. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Appellate Division should eliminate this third element. The Appellate Division, in a published opinion, concluded that the third element is a well-established law in New Jersey and only the New Jersey Supreme Court could eliminate it, and that court has shown no inclination to do so. Because the plaintiff could not demonstrate the third prong, res ipsa was not applicable and the failure of the plaintiff to establish negligence resulted in summary judgment in the defendants’ favor.
    • Successfully argued to the New Jersey Supreme Court that the grant of a new trial by the Appellate Division in medical malpractice action was erroneous, as the plaintiff failed to object to the matter at trial and could not establish plain error.
    • Successfully argued to the US District Court and Third Circuit Court of Appeals that a municipalities decision close a property to the public during the removal of a significant amount of buried military ordinance did not constitute a constitutional violation or takings.
    • Successfully argued that the represented municipality enacted a valid regulatory ordinance and not an improper licensing ordinance notwithstanding the use of the term “license” in the ordinance.
    • Successfully briefed arbitration argument and achieved a defense result in multi-million dollar binding arbitration in construction defect case.
    • Successfully persuaded the Appellate Division to reinstate multi-million dollar complaint dismissed in the Law Division.
    • Successfully argued for the reversal of a dismissal of the insurance carrier's fraud complaint, which clarified the operation of the entire controversy doctrine in New Jersey.
    • Successfully argued that a minor deviation on the form for rejecting the stacked limits for UIM coverage was not enough to vitiate the policy-holder's rejection of stacked coverage.
    • Successfully argued that a trial court committed reversible error when, after the Appellate Division found the verdict to be excessive and remanded the case for remittitur, remitted the verdict by one cent.
    • Successfully argued that parties who were found guilty of criminal tax evasion were estopped from denying their contributory negligence in a civil suit against their accountant, stemming from the preparation of those income tax returns.
    • Successfully argued that the term "advertising injury" in policy was limited to claims arising out of the misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business.
    • Successfully argued that a plaintiff who was successful against a carrier's policyholder has no claim against the carrier for the amount of the self-insured retention of the policyholder.
    • T.L. v. Goldberg, N.J., A-11-18 (N.J. 2019)
    • Cona v. Tp. of Wash., 456 N.J. Super. 197, 201 (N.J. App. Div. 2018)
    • Estate of  Brust v. ACF Industries, LLC, 443 N.J. Super. 103 (N.J. App. Div. 2015)
    • Bermudez v. Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation , 439 N.J. Super. 45 (N.J. App. Div. 2015) 
    • Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2013)
    • Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99 (N.J. 2014)
    • EEOC v. Geo Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265 (3rd Cir. 2010)
    • Biber Partnership, P.C. v. Diamond Hill Joint Venture, LLC, 404 N.J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 2008)  
    • Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Cherry Hill Pain & Rehab. Institute, 389 N.J. Super. 130 (App.Div 2006)
    • Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 2004)
    • Vosk v. Encompass Ins. Co., 851 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. 2004)
    • Columbia Med. Group, Inc. v. Herring & Roll, P.C., 829 A.2d 1184 (Pa. Super. 2003)
    • Tomaino v. Burman, 364 N.J. Super. 224 (App. Div. 2003)
    • Green Machine v. Zurich-American Ins. Co., 313 F.3d 837 (3d Cir. 2002)
    • Hohns v. Gain, 806 A.2d 16 (Pa. Super. 2002)
    • Kleban v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 771 A.2d 39 (Pa. Super. 2001)
    • Miller v. Sacred Heart Hospital, 753 A.2d 829 (Pa. Super. 2000)

Results

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Successfully Overturned $1.8 Million Judgment on Appeal in New Jersey

We successfully overturned a $1.8 million judgment on appeal in a case that involved the Laidlow exclusion in a workers’ compensation/employers liability policy. The decedent succumbed to heat exhaustion while at work, and the plaintiff alleged the death was due to working conditions the employer knew were substantially certain to lead to injury. Our client, the insurer, offered to defend the employer, but only to the extent of obtaining dismissal of the workers’ compensation claim, which was filed in the wrong forum. The insured rejected the offer, and suit for the injury and coverage claims commenced. At summary judgment, the trial court refused to apply the policy’s clear and prominent Laidlow exclusion barring all coverage for claims in the Superior Court whether alleged as negligent or intentional. The trial court entered judgment in the amount of the arbitration award and awarded defense costs for the Laidlow suit, costs of the declaratory judgment action and interest. The matter went up on appeal. After briefing, but before argument, the New Jersey Supreme Court released the Rodriguez decision, which validated our client’s position on application of the Laidlow exclusion and went even further to hold that the employer’s liability carrier has no obligation to provide a defense for the common law negligence claims filed in the Superior Court. The trial court refused to apply the principles enunciated by the appellate division in the Rodriguez decision and refused to apply the reasoning of a second unpublished appellate court decision directly on point. The trial court simply ignored the cases, reasoning they were unpublished. Prior to oral argument in our matter, the Rodriguez decision was published, and the plaintiffs abandoned the case, settling for nuisance value.

Favorable Decision Obtained from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

We received a favorable decision from the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in a First Amendment case. The circuit court affirmed the District of New Jersey’s denial of a preliminary injunction in which the plaintiff claimed that federal and local officials violated her First Amendment rights through censorship and retaliation after she posted comments on Facebook. In a published decision, the Third Circuit agreed with our arguments that the plaintiff lacked standing since she could not demonstrate a substantial risk of future harm specific to our client, the former chief of police of North Hanover, NJ, as well as the other co-defendants.   

Thought Leadership

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Defense Digest

Reconsidering Reconsideration

December 1, 2021

Key Points: The standards applicable to reconsideration vary depending on whether it is a motion from an interlocutory order or a final order. Reconsideration of final orders is a much harder standard, whereas reconsideration of interlocutory orders only requires consideration of the court’s “sound discretion” and the “interest of justice.” Parties who want to seek interlocutory appeal after requesting reconsideration should take special care to file a timely motion for reconsideration so as not to miss the time limit for petition for interlocutory appeal. Let us take a moment to reconsider reconsideration. In a recent case before the New Jersey Appellate Division, Lawson v. Dewar, 256 A.3d 388 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2021), the court took the opportunity to clarify the different standards that apply to reconsideration. In Lawson, the plaintiff filed suit against a municipality and a number of police officers, alleging the officers used excessive force when arresting him. After a case management conference, the plaintiff moved for an additional extension of discovery, the right to take certain depositions, reconsideration of an order barring a witness from testifying after the witness failed to appear for a subpoenaed deposition, leave to file an amended complaint, and for the defendant to turn over all use-of-force reports. On May 14, 2020, the court denied most of the relief sought, and the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. While the reconsideration motion was pending, the venue of the case was changed from Somerset to Middlesex County. The parties argued the reconsideration motion, and the Middlesex County judge denied it. The plaintiff filed a petition for leave to appeal, which the Appellate Division granted.  On appeal, the Appellate Division first set out the legal principles that the Middlesex County judge invoked, including the coordinate-jurisdiction rule, which cautions against reversing the decisions of coequal members of the judiciary, and the law-of-the-case doctrine, that cautions against reconsidering decisions that have already been determined in the case. It also noted that the Middlesex County judge found that the reconsideration motion presented no new facts; that the plaintiff failed to show that the Somerset County judge acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner; that the initial decision was not based on a palpably incorrect or irrational basis; and that the previous judge did not fail to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. The Appellate Division then took the opportunity to clarify the rules that apply to the two general species of reconsideration: reconsideration of an interlocutory order and reconsideration of a final order or judgment. The New Jersey Rules of Court and case law treat each differently, but they are often confused. The court noted that the principles the Middlesex County judge discussed apply to a motion for reconsideration from a final order. In that situation, Rule 4:49-2 applies, and a party must file within 20 days. Further, the standard that the Middlesex Court described—usually credited to the case of Cummings v. Bahr, 685 A.2d 60 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996)—applies. In motions for reconsideration after a final order, a party must demonstrate that the judge who issued the order sought to be reconsidered decided it in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner; that the decision was based on a palpably incorrect or irrational basis; or that the judge failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence. However, on motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders, by contrast, the same standard does not apply. Rule 4:42-2 governs reconsideration of interlocutory orders and provides a far more liberal approach. Until a final order is issued, the “interest of justice” and the judge’s “sound discretion” guide reconsideration of an interlocutory order. Moreover, there is no time limit to reconsider interlocutory orders. Additionally, the Appellate Division restated that neither the coordinate-jurisdiction rule nor law-of-the-case doctrine apply to interlocutory reconsideration motions and should correct errors made by other judges when justice requires. The Lawson court, however, did not address an important consideration regarding reconsideration. While there is no time limit to petition for reconsideration of an interlocutory order, if a party wants to seek an immediate appeal of an interlocutory order, a 20-day time limit applies. A motion for reconsideration tolls that time limit, but only if the reconsideration motion is filed within 20 days. Therefore, while there is no time limit for filing a reconsideration motion on an interlocutory order, a party wishing to file a motion for interlocutory appeal after filing for reconsideration must file the reconsideration motion within 20 days or they may be out of time to seek interlocutory appeal. *Walt is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office and is a member of our Appellate Advocacy and Post-Trial Practice Group. He can be reached at 856.414.6024 or wfkawalec@mdwcg.com.   Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

Thought Leadership

Coverage Determined, Judgment Paid, Bad Faith Survives: Fourth DCA’s Opinion Highlights the Distinction Between Contractual and Extra-Contractual Damages

In Healthy Food Experts, LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 4D2025-0181 (4th DCA June 10, 2026), the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that an insurer’s payment of a judgment in a breach of contract case does not automatically eliminate a later bad faith claim seeking extra-contractual damages. The decision provides guidance on when a first-party bad faith claim may still proceed after a coverage dispute has already been resolved by a judgment. Healthy Food Experts, LLC involved a dispute related to a property damage claim submitted under a commercial insurance policy issued by the insurer following a ceiling collapse at the insured’s restaurant. The insurer denied coverage for the insured’s losses for business personal property and business income, but extended coverage for the food spoilage losses. As a result, the insured filed a breach of contract action and ultimately obtained a jury verdict. The insurer appealed the verdict and, while the appeal was pending, the insured filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) seeking payment for the judgment plus interest. The insurer failed to cure the CRN within the statutory sixty-day cure period, but paid the judgement in full with accrued interest following the appeals court’s per curiam affirmance. Nevertheless, the insured filed a first party bad faith lawsuit claiming to have suffered extra-contractual damages. In response to the bad faith suit, the insurer filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Fridman v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, 185 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 2016) stating that damages were fixed by judgment of the breach of contract suit and the insured could not recover additional damages beyond those already awarded. The insurer also argued that the judgment did not exceed the insured’s policy limits, which was a required element of a first party bad faith claim. The trial court dismissed the bad faith action based on Fridman, concluding the insured could not seek any additional damages.  The insured appealed the court’s ruling to the Fourth DCA arguing the trial court’s order conflicts with Florida law and misapplies Fridman, as a contractual damage determination in the underlying suit establishes the “condition precedent to prosecute a first party bad faith action.” Cingari v. First Protective Ins. Co., 377 So. 3d 1169, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). Further, the insured argued that the only purpose to the binding language in Fridman is to prevent the re-litigating of the same damages, which in this case are the contractual damages. The insured asserted the damages were not the “same” as they were seeking consequential damages from the insurer’s alleged bad faith. The Fourth District emphasized in its ruling that a first party bad faith claim is not ripe for litigation until there has been the following: a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; a determination of the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the required civil remedy notice is filed pursuant to §624.155(3)(a).  Demase v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 239 So. 3d 218, 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) The court concluded that the necessary conditions were satisfied as the jury verdict determined both coverage and the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the insured properly filed a civil remedy notice, so the bad faith claim was ripe for litigation. The Fourth DCA further explained the insured could not seek contractual damages in its bad faith action, which was previously litigated in its breach of contract suit. However, the court determined the insured could seek “extra-contractual damages,” which were not recoverable in the insured’s breach of contract suit, which may include interest, court cost, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the insured. Further, the court held excess judgment is not essential in a first party bad faith claim and the insurer’s late payment of the judgment did not preclude the insured’s bad faith action. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final dismissal order of the bad faith action. This opinion highlights the distinction between contractual and extra-contractual damages. Moreover, this case demonstrates that a judgment does not necessarily end the dispute in a first party property claim as it is could also serve as a prerequisite of a bad faith action. The decision serves as a reminder that insurers may face bad faith exposure notwithstanding the payment of a judgment in an underlying breach of contract action.

News

Veteran Trial Attorney Joseph M. Toddy Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department in Philadelphia

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

Congratulations to our 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Rising Stars: Elizabeth Ferguson, A.C. Nash, Taylor Naughton, Sophia Philor, Amara Rodriguez

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Florida Rising Stars

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial

Result

Unanimous Verdict Obtained in a Medical Malpractice Matter in Bergen County, New Jersey

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.