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Defense Digest

Whispering Isn’t Enough for Harassment: Federal Court Sets a Boundary for Employers

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2026

March 1, 2026

by Veronica R. Sansone

Key Points:

  • The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently held that there are limits to workplace harassment.
  • The “severe and pervasive” standard cannot be stretched to cover a Title VII claim.
  • To establish a protected activity, plaintiffs must show that a reasonable person would perceive the conduct described in the complaint as harassment and/or illegal.

Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania limited the scope of workplace harassment. In Nyamu v. Merck & Co., 2025 WL 2599528, (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2025), the court ruled in favor of the defendant-employer. It granted summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for both retaliation and hostile work environment.

The plaintiff, Peter Nyamu, brought claims against his employer, Merck Sharp & Dohme LLC, for creating a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment and retaliating against him for reporting the harassment. The plaintiff was employed as a biotechnician and worked in a sterile lab. The plaintiff claimed that during a staff meeting, his supervisor forgot to hand him one of the schedules he was passing out. Allegedly, after the meeting, the supervisor came close to the plaintiff and whispered in his ear, “I don’t know how I missed to give you a schedule because I use your voice to know where you are standing ... You have a voice that is very specific to me.” Notably, the plaintiff is of African descent, and he perceived this remark as condescending – due to his heavy accent. After the meeting, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint about his supervisor.

The same year the incident at the staff meeting occurred, the plaintiff had failed six contamination tests, excluding him from working in a sterile area for one year as per policy. Under the policy, the plaintiff was able to request, and was later transferred to a department that did not involve entering a sterile area until his exclusion was lifted after a year. The transfer occurred after the plaintiff reported his supervisor’s conduct at the staff meeting. The defendant claimed the transfer was based on the exclusion policy, which the plaintiff was made aware of prior to logging his complaint, and he was placed back in his original unit once his exclusion ended.

Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by both the plaintiff and defendant. In deciding the motions, the court analyzed the standards for both a hostile work environment due to sexual harassment and retaliation. In most employment cases, summary judgment is uncommon and a high hurdle for defendants.

Here, the plaintiff alleged that his supervisor’s comments were about his distinct voice – yet he brought a hostile work environment claim under sexual harassment only. Thus, the court could only examine the instance based on the totality of the circumstances in reference to the plaintiff’s sex.

Under this type of claim, the plaintiff first had to show the sex discrimination was severe and pervasive. When analyzing this first prong of the claim, the court focused on the act of leaning in and whispering to a co-worker. It recognized that this act can be uncomfortable and interfere with one’s personal space. However, based on the facts presented, it did not find that the supervisor was making a sexual advance toward the plaintiff. The court ruled that, while the plaintiff may have felt uncomfortable, the singular act of whispering in this instance was not severe and pervasive enough to support a gender-based claim, especially because the allegations did not involve his sex. Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

The plaintiff also brought a retaliation claim, which was based on being transferred to another unit after he complained about the incident with his supervisor. Therefore, the court had to examine if the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity under Title VII.

In Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch. Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir. 2008), the Third Circuit held that if no reasonable person could believe the reported incident constituted unlawful discrimination, then the complaint is not considered a protected activity. In Nyamu v. Merck & Co., the District Court determined that the plaintiff’s supervisor whispering about his voice being distinct was not derogatory. In fact, the court further explained that this was an “isolated incident” and something one could reasonably determine was an attempt by the supervisor to be discrete. Ultimately, summary judgment was, again, granted in favor of the defendant.

This was a key win for employers. The ruling strengthens the legal standard for claims of hostile work environment and retaliation, providing employers with a strong defense to claims involving only isolated, minor incidents. The court’s holding was consistent with previous interpretations of “severe and pervasive,” and confirmed that not every workplace complaint meets the reasonable person standard required to establish a protected activity.

Veronica works in our King of Prussia, PA office. She can be reached at (610) 354-8261 or VRSansone@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.