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Case Law Alerts

Third District Court of Appeals Clarifies the Rules Surrounding Third-Party Intervention

Accident911 Help Medical Center Corp., et al. v. Direct General Insurance Company, 3rd District, Case No, 3D23-773. L.T. Case No. 22-9836, Aug. 23, 2023

October 1, 2023

The Third District Court of Appeal rules that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the medical providers’ and assignees’ motion to intervene in a declaratory judgment action between an insurer and an insured. The movant’s interest in litigation is of such direct and immediate character that they will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of judgment where the insurer sought declaration that the policy at issue was rescinded and void ab initio.

This appeal involved a suit filed by Direct General against its insured Ivet Caro and her son, Daniel Jose Alvare, who had been involved in a motor vehicle accident on September 8, 2021, while operating the insured vehicle. Ivet Caro had been involved in a motor vehicle accident on September 21, 2021, in which she was a passenger of a vehicle that was not insured under the immediate policy. As a result of both accidents, Caro and Alvare made a claim under the policy. Alvare had assigned his rights to PIP benefits under the policy to East Coast Medical Rehab, while Caro had assigned her rights to PIP benefits to both Accident911 Help and Rivero Diagnostic Center. 

After receiving the two claims, Direct General filed an action for breach of contract and declaratory judgment against both Caro and Alvare. In its complaint, Direct General alleged that it had rescinded Caro’s insurance policy and sought a declaration that the policy was now void ab initio because Caro made a material misrepresentation on the application for insurance by failing to disclose that her son, Alvare, was a household resident over the age of fifteen. Direct General asserted that the misrepresentation was material as, had it been disclosed, it would have resulted in an increase in the policy premium. In its prayer for relief, Direct General sought a declaration that, since the policy was void ab initio, any assignment of PIP benefits from Caro and Alvare to any medical provider, doctor, or medical entity is void. 

After a default was obtained against Alvare, 911Help Medical Center Corp, East Coast Medical Rehab Ctr., Inc. and Rivero Diagnostic Center, Inc. all filed a motion to intervene pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 which provides: “Anyone claiming an interest in pending litigation may at any time be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main proceeding, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion.” 

The lower court denied the motion and, in its decision, focused on the providers’ contention that they were “indispensable parties” to the action, after which the immediate appeal followed. In issuing its ruling, the Third District ruled that the trial court abused its discretion as the providers clearly met the well-established test for intervention, which was established in the Florida Supreme Court decision in Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Carlisle, 593 So. 2d 505, 507 (Fla. 1992). In Carlisle, the court articulated a two-part test that requires the trial court to “first make a preliminary determination whether the interest asserted is appropriate to support intervention” and, if so, must “exercise its sound discretion whether to permit the intervention” by taking into consideration “a number of factors, including the derivation of the interest, any pertinent contractual language, the size of the interest, the potential for conflicts or new issues, and any other relevant circumstance.”

In applying the test, the court noted that the allegations in Direct General’s complaint undermined any assertion that the providers lacked the requisite interest in the litigation to necessitate intervention. The court analyzed several of the allegations in the complaint, including the following: (1) the plaintiff Direct General, the defendant’s Caro and Alvare, and the claimants, Accident911 Help Medical Center Corp., East Coast Medical Rehab Ctr., Inc. and Rivero Diagnostic Center, “have an actual, present, adverse and antagonistic interest in the subject matter described herein; (2) Direct General “seeks a declaration of its rights and obligations under the automobile policy with respect to the claims asserted against [it]”; and (3) Direct General seeks a declaration that, because the insurance policy issued to Caro was rescinded and is void ab initio, “any assignment of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits” from Caro or Alvare to any medical provider, doctor and/or medical entity is void.” In analyzing these allegations, the court noted that, were Direct General successful in obtaining a judgment declaring that the policy is void ab initio, the providers’ right to policy benefits pursuant to the assignments from Caro and Alvare would be extinguished and that, based on same, it appeared the providers were the only entities who could adequately protect their rights in the suit. 

Ultimately, the court held that, since the providers’ interest in the suit is “of such a direct and immediate character that [it] will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment,” the lower court committed reversible error and ordered that the order denying intervention be reversed.

The significance of this case is that it arguably gives any provider who was assigned policy benefits the right to intervene in a suit between the insured and insurer, even when the insurer is alleging fraud or misrepresentation against its insured. SIU adjusters should be aware of this caveat when making the decision to initiate a declaratory action against an insured in a claim involving potential misrepresentations or fraud by the insured. 
 

 

Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.