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Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Third Circuit Holds that Commercial Property Policies Do Not Provide Coverage for Businesses’ COVID-19 Closure Claims

Legal Updates for Insurance Services – Florida Alert – January 9, 2023

January 9, 2023

by Todd J. Leon

On January 6, 2023, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a unanimous opinion in Law Offices of Rhonda H. Wilson, et al. v. USI Insurance Service, et al., which was drafted by Judge Michael A. Chagares. The case is particularly notable as it involved consolidated claims for coverage by businesses located in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and Delaware and holds that, under both New Jersey and Pennsylvania law, claims by businesses for COVID-19-related business losses are not covered under standard commercial property policies.

The businesses involved in the consolidated litigation spanned multiple industries, including the food service, medical, health and wellness, art, music and legal sectors. However, each of the insureds made the same essential arguments in favor of coverage; namely, that their policies’ business income, extra expense and civil authority provisions were triggered. The Third Circuit rejected each of these arguments and held that the insurers owed no such coverage.

The opinion framed the key issue as “whether the businesses’ inability to use their properties for their intended business purposes constitutes ‘physical loss of’ property as that phrase is used in the policies.” In concluding that the answer to the question was “no,” the Third Circuit focused upon the specific language of the policies at issue, which required that there be a “direct physical loss” in order for coverage to be triggered. In addition, at least some of the policies included “virus exclusions” that precluded coverage for losses caused by or relating to a virus.

The panel began its analysis by acknowledging that the phrase “physical loss of or damage” was not defined in the policies. The court, thus, looked to the plain meaning of the text and concluded that “loss” meant the “failure to keep or maintain possession” or “the state or fact of being destroyed.” “Damage,” in turn, was taken to mean “injury or harm to property.” Taking these two definitions together, the Third Circuit concluded that “the loss of damage must be physical, which means natural, tangible, concrete.”

In looking to its previous jurisprudence, the panel noted that physical damage to property has typically been defined to mean “a distinct, demonstrable, and physical alteration of its structure.” However, the court also recognized that there may be circumstances where a building suffers physical damage that is unnoticeable to the naked eye. On these occasions, insureds seeking to trigger coverage must show that the “contamination of the property [is] such that its function is nearly eliminated or destroyed, or the structure is made useless or uninhabitable.”

The Third Circuit concluded that, in the context of a COVID-19 business interruption claim, the Supreme Courts of both Pennsylvania and New Jersey would apply a similar standard in order to ensure that “any insured will have lost tangible possession of property sufficient to constitute physical loss or damage.” As such, the businesses were required to “show that the functionalities of their properties were nearly eliminated or destroyed, that the structures were made useless or uninhabitable, or that there was an imminent risk of either of those things happening.”

In an effort to meet that stringent test, the businesses argued that their loss of the ability to use their properties for their intended business purposes was sufficient. The Third Circuit rejected that position, holding that the “argument is completely divorced from the physical condition of the premises. The businesses lost the ability to use their properties for their intended business purposes because the governors of the states in which they operate issued orders closing or limiting the activities of nonessential businesses, not because there was anything wrong with their properties.”

The court continued by noting that “the loss of the ability to use property in certain ways does not render the properties useless or uninhabitable. The properties could certainly be used or inhabited, just not in the way the businesses would have liked. Restaurants remained open for carry out, and medical providers could perform emergency procedures…. No one was ‘physically restrained’ from entering the businesses’ properties.” Ultimately, the Third Circuit concluded that “loss of use caused by government edict and untethered to the physical condition of the premises is not a physical loss or damage to the properties.”

The Third Circuit also rejected arguments by those businesses that sought coverage under the civil authority coverage afforded by their policies. In so holding, the panel noted that coverage under civil authority provisions requires physical loss or damage to a property other than the insured premises and that an action of civil authority prohibited access to the insured premises because of that loss or damage. The opinion found that the businesses failed to meet both requirements, as there were no claims of damage or loss to other properties, nor did the closure orders prohibit access to the businesses’ properties.

The Third Circuit’s ruling is, thus, another strong pronouncement that COVID-19-related business losses are not covered under the standard language of commercial property policies. Of note, the panel acknowledged in a footnote the recent decisions by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in MacMiles, LLC v. Erie Insurance Exchange and Ungarean v. CNA and Valley Forge Insurance Company and observed its belief that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, if called upon to decide the issue, would decide the coverage questions in a manner consistent with the opinion in Law Offices of Rhonda H. Wilson.

We will continue to monitor the various cases involving issues of COVID-19-related business losses as the various courts considering the issues weigh in on the question of whether coverage should be afforded for such claims.

 

The material in Legal Updates for Insurance Services – Florida Alert – January 9, 2023, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.