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Legal Updates for Insurance Services

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Rules That COVID-19 Closure Claims Are Not Covered in Pennsylvania, Absent Physical Damage to Property

Legal Update for Insurance Services - September 26, 2024

September 26, 2024

by Todd J. Leon

Earlier today, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down its heavily anticipated decisions in Ungarean v. CNA and Valley Forge Insurance Company and MacMiles, LLC v. Erie Insurance Exchange, holding that Pennsylvania, like the vast majority of federal and state decisions around the country, will not find coverage under a commercial property claim for economic loss unaccompanied by a physical alteration to the property. The twin cases were decided just shy of eleven months after the Superior Court of Pennsylvania came to very different results in the two matters, which include the same essential facts and legal issues, and now make clear the state of the law on what constitutes a “direct physical loss” in Pennsylvania.

By way of brief review, commercial property policies typically provide coverage for “direct physical loss of or damage to covered property.” In terms of the scope of coverage afforded, these policies extend coverage for buildings, business personal property and personal property of others, and income protection, as well as for losses resulting from certain actions from civil authorities.

In Ungarean, a deeply divided 5-4 panel of the Superior Court looked at the language of CNA’s policy and held that a dentist’s claims related to his practice’s COVID-19 closures were covered under the “Business Income and Extra Expense” coverage because the terms “direct,” “physical,” “damage” or “loss” were not defined and were, thus, ambiguous. The Superior Court looked to ordinary dictionary definitions of the terms and held that at least one definition of “loss” included “deprivation.” Understood in that context, the majority decision held that “loss” could be interpreted to mean “deprivation,” while damage—which needed to be considered in the disjunctive—would mean “destruction or ruin.” As such, the majority concluded that “loss of property includes the act of being deprived of the physical use of one’s property.” The appellate panel also rejected CNA’s claim that the terms “direct” and “physical” were being read out of the policy, since the dictionary definitions of those terms permitted a reasonable interpretation that the spread of COVID-19 had “a close, logical, causal and/or consequential relationship to the ways in which [Ungarean] materially utilized his physical space.” In short, the panel concluded that “[a]ny economic losses were secondary to the businesses’ physical losses.”

By contrast, in MacMiles the issue involved a claim by a bar owner that its “loss of use” of its covered property (the building in which the bar was located) as a result of the closures mandated by the governor during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a covered loss. In short, the panel that decided MacMiles concluded that the Erie policy’s coverage for “direct physical loss or damage to covered property” could not be read in the disjunctive and that the purely economic damages suffered by the bar owner were, therefore, not covered. 

Given this split in the outcomes of the twin cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took up the issues and heard argument on both cases. In a unanimous opinion drafted by Justice Kevin Brobson, the court reversed the Superior Court’s decision in Ungarean and opted to follow the lower court’s rationale in MacMiles. (In MacMiles, the court issued a simple order affirming the decision below and referencing its opinion in Ungarean). Simply put, the justices held that the meaning of the “operative phrase ‘direct physical loss of or damage to physical property’…was clear: There must be either (1) a direct physical disappearance, partial or complete deterioration, or absence of a physical capability or function of the property (loss), or (2) a physical harm or injury to the property (damage).” The requirement of direct physical loss or damage necessitating repairs, rebuilding or replacement of the property extends to all of the coverages afforded by a commercial property policy, including the building and business income and extra expense coverage claims asserted by Ungarean. 

In the Ungarean matter (as in most COVID-19 business closure cases), the Supreme Court found there was no evidence of any physical damage or loss to the bar. Indeed, Ungarean did not allege that the COVID-19 virus was on or at the property or that the virus caused any damage to the property during the shutdown. Rather, “the sole reason Ungarean’s business suffered financial losses during the period in question was due to the government-ordered shutdown, not any alleged physical condition of” the bar. As purely economic claims do not fall within the coverage afforded under a commercial property policy, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court’s opposite conclusion was incorrect and reversed.

With Ungarean and MacMiles now decided, the state of the law on the question of whether COVID-19 closure claims are covered in Pennsylvania is now clear: such claims will not be covered absent a showing of actual, direct physical loss or damage to the property. In so holding, Pennsylvania now finds itself aligned with the predominant view of courts that have decided the issue nationwide.

We will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that percolate before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country. 



 

Legal Update for Insurance Services - September 26, 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.

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New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

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Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.