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Defense Digest

The Political Subdivision and Torts Claim Act’s Sexual Abuse Exception: Application to Post-Assault in School Harassment

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024

March 1, 2024

Key Points:

  • The Political Subdivision and Torts Claim Act still provides immunity to school districts in cases where a student adjudicated of sexual assault continues harassment of a student in the school setting because no additional duty is imposed. 
  • The ninth sexual abuse exception to the PSTCA is only intended to apply to the criminal statutes referenced. 
  • The PSTCA still provides immunity to school districts for incidents that occur outside of the school setting that are not caused by negligence by the school. 

Since the addition of the ninth immunity exception for sexual abuse to the Pennsylvania’s Political Subdivision and Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) in 2019, we are beginning to see courts decide when the exception applies. Recently, in Doe by Nied v. Riverside Sch. Dist., 2023 WL 8549035 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2023), the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania decided that the ninth exception did not apply to conduct that did not occur on school property and found no duty was imposed on a school district after the sexual assault occurred. 

In Riverside School District, the court granted the school district, its superintendent, and its principals’ motion to dismiss with respect to state law tort claims for negligence, negligence per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 

The plaintiff brought these claims against the school district, alleging they fell within the ninth exception because the injuries suffered were caused by the actions or omissions of the defendants. 

Jane Doe alleged she was sexually assault by another Riverside student while off campus. After the assault, the Riverside student was adjudicated a delinquent of Felony 2 Sexual Assault pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S. § 3124.1. 

While the case was pending against Doe’s assailant, her mother was in direct communication with the school district regarding the proceedings and also made sure the school was aware of the student-assailant’s adjudication. Doe’s mother voiced concerns regarding the contact between Doe and the student-assailant, but the school district informed Doe’s mother that nothing could be done to protect Doe from the other student. 

After the adjudication, assailant continued to attend the same lunch period as Doe, and he attended the same semi-formal dance where he was alleged to have harassed, embarrassed, and threatened Doe. The harassment continued after the dance, with the Doe’s assailant verbally harassing her in school hallways and mockingly shouting at her. Doe’s mother informed the school of the harassment and met with officials.

However, the meeting did not yield any action from the school because Doe’s mother was told there was nothing the school district could do. As a result of the harassment, Doe alleged she suffered from various psychological and physical damages.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss that raised immunity under the PSTCA. The plaintiffs responded by raising the ninth sexual abuse exception. Under the sexual abuse exception, immunity is waived for conduct that is an offense listed under a referenced criminal statute and the injuries to a plaintiff are caused by the actions or omissions of the local agency which constitute negligence. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542(b). In this case, Doe’s assailant was found guilty of an applicable criminal statute. 

The court began its analysis by determining whether the ninth sexual abuse exception imposed a duty on the school to prevent the harassment from Doe’s assailant. The court reviewed case law holding that the sexual abuse exception applies where the sexual abuse occurred on school property and the negligent action of the school or its employees were the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Riverside Sch. Dist., 2023 WL 8549035, at *9. The court also reviewed case law supporting the position that the sexual abuse exception does not apply in cases where the agency’s duties arose after the abuse. Id.

The court held that the sexual abuse waiver did not apply to the facts of this case because the sexual assault occurred outside the school setting and no duty was imposed on the school district to prevent further contact between the students. The court noted that if the drafters of the PSTCA wanted the exception to apply more broadly than the referenced criminal statutes, they did not say so. Id. The court also found that the individual defendants were entitled to immunity because they did not commit any willful misconduct towards Doe.

In conclusion, this ruling seems to reign in the applicability of the ninth exception by not imposing a duty on a school district for actions that occurred outside of the school setting. While case law is still being developed on the application of this exception, it is important for Pennsylvania school districts to remain vigilant in ensuring its students are equipped to understand sexual assault and what to do if it is occurring to them. Further, school districts should remain vigilant and take all allegations of sexual assault seriously. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.