.

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

The Office for Dispute Resolution’s Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2024 Details Due Process Filings, Bureau of Special Education Complaints

Legal Update for Special Education Law March 2026 – Updates from the U.S. Department of Education

March 5, 2026

by Christopher J. Conrad

In late November 2025, the Office for Dispute Resolution (ODR) released its annual report for fiscal year 2024 (July 1, 2024 - June 30, 2025).  In the report, the ODR provided detailed information about due process litigation in Pennsylvania for the entire fiscal year. In all, there were 900 requests for due process filed with ODR, a slight decrease from fiscal year 2023, which saw 958 cases filed. A majority of the cases were filed on behalf of parents/guardians/students by legal counsel, although 112 cases were filed pro se. Most of the 900 cases involved claims under the IDEA/Chapter 14 for school-age/non-gifted students. Only 14 cases were filed solely under Section 504/Chapter 15.

As has been the case for the past 20 years, due process litigation was most active in the City of Philadelphia and the southeastern Pennsylvania counties approximate to the city. There were 236 requests for due process filed within Philadelphia Intermediate Unit 26 alone.  More than 50 requests for due process were filed within Montgomery County Intermediate Unit 23 (84), Delaware County Intermediate Unit 25 (76), and Bucks County Intermediate Unit 22 (53). The only other intermediate units outside southeastern Pennsylvania that saw more than 50 due process filings were the Northeastern Educational Intermediate Unit 19 (65) and the Allegheny Intermediate Unit 3 (53).

For all school-age/non-gifted cases, the most predominant issue raised in the due process filings involved the IEP (development/implementation), with 442 occurrences. The next most prevalent issue was compensatory education (425 occurrences) followed by school evaluations (192 occurrences).

Although 900 due process cases were filed during fiscal year 2024, only 55 resulted in a written hearing officer decision. Most of the cases ended in a negotiated resolution, either outside of the IDEA resolution period (357 cases) or during the resolution period (214 cases).  Nearly 150 cases were either dismissed outright (24 cases) or voluntarily withdrawn (123 cases).  A significant number of cases filed in fiscal year 2024 remained active at of the end of the fiscal year and carried over into the next fiscal year (127 cases). 

Causes of the 24 case dismissals included a lack of hearing officer jurisdiction (10 cases), improper party name (4), res judicata/mootness (4), a case being consolidated with another case (4) or no response from the parent (2).

As to the 55 cases in which a hearing officer issued a written decision, the hearing officer found for the LEA in 21 cases, for the parent in 18 cases, and for both the parent and LEA in 16 cases. Notably, of these 55 cases, 21 involved pro se litigants.  The hearing officer found for the LEA in 14 of the pro se cases and for the parent/ guardian in 4 of the cases. In three of the pro se cases, the hearing officer found for the parent in part and the LEA in part.

Also of note, during fiscal year 2024,19 cases were appealed to federal court, and only one case was appealed to state court. Only four of these appeals involved due process requests filed during fiscal year 2024, as the balance of the due process cases at issue were filed prior to 2024.

Of the appeals filed during fiscal year 2024, parents were responsible for 75% of the filings.  Three of the appeals dealt solely with the issue of attorney fees. At the close of fiscal year 2024, 17 of the 20 cases were still pending on appeal. One case was dismissed following a settlement, another based upon the final resolution of a separate but related matter, and a third following a court-approved settlement. In that instance, the case was marked settled on the docket, and the court vacated its prior order remanding the case to the hearing officer.  Thirteen of the federal court appeals were filed with the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, three with the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and three with the Western District of Pennsylvania.

ODR also reported on compliance complaints filed with the Bureau of Special Education (BSE), including complaints under Section 504/Chapter 15. In all, 179 complaints were filed with BSE.  Of these cases, 50 resolved with a finding by BSE of LEA non-compliance. Seven complaints were dismissed or held in abeyance as the issues were being addressed in a due process complaint and 68 of the complaints were either resolved, withdrawn, or dismissed for not falling within the jurisdiction of the BSE.

For more information on ODR’s Annual Report, see: https://odr-pa.us12.list-manage.com/track/click?u=e6553c8850beb32e3c7ea9c8c&id=a1449490fc&e=bf4ea9f318

Firm Highlights

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

graphic announcing our 6 2027 Super Lawyers & Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case