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Case Law Alerts

Superior Court of Pennsylvania ruled that assumption of risk doctrine did not eliminate restaurant’s duty of care owed to business invitee.

Massaro v. McDonald’s Corporation, 2022 PA Super 127, 2022 WL 3036753 (Pa. Super. 2022)

October 1, 2022

by Lauren E. Purcell

The plaintiff alleged that he was continuously harassed and assaulted by a third party while mentoring a student in a McDonald’s restaurant. The plaintiff averred that he made repeated requests for help from the restaurant’s staff and manager that went unheeded for about an hour. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant knew that the third party was dangerous but failed to warn the plaintiff of the potential harm and danger. The plaintiff further alleged that he remained in the restaurant despite the third party’s conduct because he felt it was the safest option.

The defendant raised preliminary objections against the plaintiff’s complaint and argued that it could not be held liable since the plaintiff remained in the restaurant beyond the point where it was reasonable. The trial court granted the defendant’s preliminary objections and held that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care since the assumption of the risk doctrine was applicable. The trial court further held that recognizing an absolute duty of care on the part of the defendant would, as a matter of public policy, constitute an undue burden.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty as a business invitee to take reasonable precaution against harmful third-party conduct that might be reasonably anticipated. Noting that the assumption of risk doctrine was difficult to satisfy, the Superior Court found that the doctrine did not completely eliminate the defendant’s duty of care. In accepting the complaint’s factual allegations as true at the preliminary objection stage, the Superior Court found there were no allegations that the plaintiff knew in advance of the threat and danger posed by the third party. Instead, the plaintiff denied any such prior knowledge in his complaint. The Superior Court further held that there were no allegations that the plaintiff willingly remained in the restaurant after the threat from the third party became apparent. The Superior Court pointed to allegations in the complaint that the plaintiff remained in the restaurant because he believed it was the safest option. The Superior Court found that, even if there was some evidence that the plaintiff could have done something more to protect himself, this was an issue of comparative negligence for the jury to resolve. Finally, the Superior Court ruled that public policy concerns were immaterial in this matter as it was clear that the defendant owed a duty of care to business invitees. The Superior Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case.

 

Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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