Lauren is a shareholder in the Casualty Department. She concentrates her practice in the areas of product liability, premises liability, auto liability, and construction law. Lauren's litigation experience includes assisting in the management of discovery during the course of litigation, as well as drafting and arguing dispositive motions. Lauren participated in Marshall Dennehey's pro bono program where she was responsible for a social security disability appeal case. Further, Lauren has represented corporate entities at the arbitration and magistrate levels.
Lauren earned her Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Pittsburgh in Psychology, Political Science, and Anthropology, cum laude. Prior to law school, Lauren was an assistant buyer for Anthropologie. She received her juris doctor from the University of Pittsburgh, cum laude, in 2013. While in law school, Lauren served as a legal writing teaching assistant and as an editorial board member of the Journal of Law and Commerce. Prior to graduating from law school, Lauren served as a judicial intern for the Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and also as a legal intern for the legal department of Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc.
Prior to joining the firm, Lauren served as a judicial law clerk with the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County.
Lauren is admitted into practice in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Her memberships include the Pennsylvania and Allegheny County Bar Associations, and the W. Edward Sell American Inn of Court.
Results
Summary Judgment Secured in a Neighborhood Dispute Alleging Excess Water Runoff
We obtained summary judgment in the Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas in favor of our clients in a dispute over alleged excess water runoff. Our clients, a married couple, were sued by their neighbors for claims related to water runoff due to the installation of gutters and downspouts on a shed near the property line. We effectively argued for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ injunction, trespass, nuisance and negligence claims, demonstrating that the plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert testimony to substantiate their case as required under Pennsylvania law. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ negligence claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, which had expired at least six years before the suit was filed.
Summary Judgment for Wellhead Manufacturer
We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a wellhead manufacturer in a product liability matter pending in Western Pennsylvania. The plaintiff drill operator alleged a wellhead was defectively designed, causing oil and gas to escape during operation, which led to a fire at the well site. The plaintiff asserted economic losses in excess of $1.4 million. We successfully argued that the plaintiff failed to elicit sufficient expert opinion to support the defect claim and also spoliated evidence in discarding the subject wellhead.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Statutory Employer Immunity Bars Negligence Claim Against Youth Residential Operator
July 20, 2026
In a non-precedential opinion, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania determined the defendant residential operator was a statutory employer of the plaintiff, an employee of a kitchen contractor, and thus, was immune from the plaintiff’s negligence action. While the plaintiff worked in the kitchen of a youth residential institution, he was injured when a grill he was cleaning fell on his arm. The plaintiff was an employee of the food service contractor that was hired by the defendant to provide food services at the property. The defendant leased the property and operated the youth residential institution on the property. The plaintiff filed a negligence lawsuit and, after discovery, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued that it was immune from the plaintiff’s negligence action under the Workers’ Compensation Act since it was a statutory employer. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that the defendant sufficiently occupied the kitchen on the property to satisfy the second factor of the McDonald test. The Commonwealth Court ruled that, with regard to the second factor, an employer’s occupancy or control must be actual but need not be exclusive. The Commonwealth Court also ruled that an employer only needs to prove either occupancy or control, not both. In reviewing the evidence, the Commonwealth Court agreed with the trial court’s ruling that the defendant occupied the property and thus, satisfied the second factor of the McDonald test. The Commonwealth Court held that the defendant was a statutory employer under the Act and was immune from the plaintiff’s negligence action. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s order.
Case Law Alerts
Pennsylvania Court Finds Fact Issues on Visibility of Freestanding Sign’s Legs
July 20, 2026
In a non-precedential opinion, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that when determining whether a freestanding sign was an open and obvious condition, the legs of the sign were to be considered separately and warranted separate analysis. The plaintiff, while walking into the defendant store, tripped and fell on a leg of a freestanding lottery sign that was placed on the sidewalk outside of the store. While the plaintiff admitted she was able to observe the sign prior to the incident, she claimed that she did not notice the legs of the freestanding frame that supported the sign. The plaintiff filed negligence claims against the defendant store and, after discovery, the defendant store filed a motion for summary judgment. In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant store argued that the sign was an open and obvious condition. In her response in opposition, the plaintiff argued that the legs of the sign were not open and obvious, and created a tripping hazard. In support of her opposition, the plaintiff presented expert reports. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and ruled that there were no genuine issues of fact as to whether the sign was open and obvious. The trial court concluded that it did not consider the legs separate from the sign as a matter of law when considering the issue of whether the dangerous condition was open and obvious. Instead, the trial court found the sign with its legs was open and obvious. In support of its ruling, the trial court relied upon the Superior Court of Pennsylvania’s reasoning in Larose v. Berish, 334 A.3d 406 (Pa. Super. 2002). The plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that created genuine issues of material fact as to the open and obvious nature of the sign’s legs. The Superior Court held the trial court erred when it determined that Larose required it to consider the sign and its legs as one to determine whether it was open and obvious. The Superior Court reasoned that Larose does not stand for the proposition that an object resting on another object must be considered as one for purposes of determining whether the condition is open and obvious. Instead, the Superior Court found the circumstances in Larose to be distinguishable and that Larose did not dictate as a matter of law that the legs of the sign created an open and obvious danger. The Superior Court ruled that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant store and reversed the order.
