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Legal Updates for Construction Litigation

Proposed Changes to Florida’s Statutes of Limitations and Repose Would Greatly Impact Construction Defect Litigation

Legal Update for Construction Litigation – January 11, 2022

A new bill has been proposed in the Florida Legislature that would amend the statutes of limitations and repose greatly impacting construction defect litigation. 

The original bill proposed to rewrite Fla. Stat. 95.11(3)(c) by completely eliminating the ten-year statute of repose for latent defects, instead requiring all actions founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property to be filed within four years. The proposed four-year time period would begin from the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion of the contract or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is latest. 

After introduction of the bill, the Committee on Community Affairs proposed a complete overhaul of 95.11, as it relates to construction defect litigation. The Committee proposes a new subsection be added to Fla. Stat. 95.11, subsection 12, titled “ACTIONS RELATING TO AN IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY.” This new section lays out 4 categories of improvements:

Category 1 improvements cover detached single-family home, including pre-manufactured homes, or standalone building structures intended for use by a single business, occupant or owner, not exceeding three stories in height and related improvements to such homes, buildings or structures. 

Category 2 improvements include single-family dwelling units not exceeding three stories in height which are constructed in a series or group of attached units or a commercial or nonresidential building not exceeding three stories in height and related improvements to such dwellings, buildings or structures. 

Category 3 improvements include commercial or residential buildings or structures of four or more stories in height and related improvements to such buildings or structures. 

Category 4 improvements is a catchall for any improvement that does not fall under Categories 1-3.  

Further, the proposal amends the statute of limitations to read: “An action founded on the design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property may be commenced within 4 years after the time to commence an action begins to run.” The repose period would be shortened to five years after the time for commencing an action begins to run for category 1 improvements; seven years for category 2 improvements; 12 years for category 3 improvements, and 10 years for category 4 improvements. The time to commence such an action would begin to run from the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the issuance of a certificate of occupancy, the date of abandonment of construction if not completed, or the date of completion of the contract or termination of the contract between the professional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer, whichever date is earliest. 

The proposed amendment contains a limited one-year extension of time for counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims that arise out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out or attempted to be set out in a pleading that the current statute contains. It also maintains that warranty work or correction or repair of defects to completed does not extend the period of time within which an action must be commenced.  

If signed into law, these amendments would apply to any action commenced on or after July 1, 2022, regardless of when the cause of action accrued. However, any action that would not have been time barred before the amendments may be commenced before July 1, 2023. Any action not commenced by July 1, 2023, that is barred by the amendments is barred.
 

Legal Update for Construction Litigation – January 11, 2022, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.comATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

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Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.