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Legal Updates for Health Care Liability

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Resuscitates Peer Review Privilege

Legal Updates for Health Care Liability - August 18, 2021

August 18, 2021

by John J. Hare

In Leadbitter v. St. Clair Hospital et al., No. 19 WAP 2020 (Pa., August 17, 2021), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unanimously enforced peer review limitations on discovery set forth in the Pennsylvania Peer Review Protection Act (PRPA) and the federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA).
 
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant hospital’s credentialing and privileging process was inadequate, and that it knew or should have known that the physician who performed surgery on the plaintiff-husband lacked the expertise to perform the surgery. As a result, the plaintiffs served interrogatories and a request for documents seeking the complete credentialing and/or privileging file for the surgeon. The hospital asserted a privilege over certain documents, but the trial court compelled production of the entire credentialing file, and the Superior Court affirmed.
 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed and limited the scope of its prior decision in Reginelli v. Boggs, 181 A.3d 293 (Pa. 2018), which held that the PRPA’s evidentiary privilege applies to the documents of a “review committee” but not to the documents of all “review organizations.” Rejecting a focus on the particular name of the committee conducting a review, which had arisen in the lower courts in the wake of Reginelli, the Leadbitter court held that the PRPA’s protections extend to peer review conducted by any committee, regardless of whether the committee engages exclusively in peer review. In support of this conclusion, the court emphasized that the PRPA’s definition of “review organization” includes “any committee engaging in peer review.” Id., citing 63 P.S. § 425.2. Therefore, the court held that a hospital’s credentials committee enjoys the PRPA’s protection if (but only if) it engages in peer review.
 
Finally, the Supreme Court rejected the conclusion of the trial court and Superior Court that the protections of the PRPA and HCQIA are co-extensive, meaning that information that is not confidential under the PRPA necessarily is not confidential under the HCQIA. The court held that the HCQIA extends independent, federal protection to certain information provided by the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) to hospitals in response to requests concerning a specific practitioner. This protection is not dependent on state law and prevents discovery of information contained in the NPDB.
 
Leadbitter’s twin holdings—that a hospital’s credentials committee qualifies as a “review committee” under the PRPA if it engages in peer review and the HCQIA prohibits discovery of NPDB information—restore reasonableness to the scope of peer review protections under both state and federal law. These holdings are a welcome clarification of an area of law that had become muddled in the wake of Reginelli.

 

Updates for Health Care Liability - August 18, 2021, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Legal Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.