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Defense Digest

On App: Good to Go! Off App: No Bueno! How Rideshare Companies Are Defeating Vicarious Liability in Florida

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025

Key Points:

  • Innovative technologies being utilized by rideshare companies are raising their chances of defeating vicarious liability claims in Florida and throughout the United States.
  • In Campo v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2025 WL 15388, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals affirmed a motion for summary judgment in favor of Uber after the court was presented with evidence that the former Uber driver was “off app” at the time of the accident.

Florida, along with many other jurisdictions throughout the country, has seen a dramatic uptick in the amount of litigation involving rideshare and food delivery companies, such as Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash. While the increasing number of rideshare and food delivery drivers on the roads has certainly contributed to the dramatic surge in litigation, plaintiff firms have also become increasingly daring in the nature of their allegations against these companies. However, the innovative technologies being utilized by these gig economy companies are raising their chances of defeating vicarious liability claims in Florida and throughout the United States. A recent Florida case demonstrates exactly this scenario. 

In Campo v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2025 WL 15388 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 2, 2025), Florida’s Third District Court of Appeals affirmed a motion for summary judgment in favor of Uber after the court was presented with evidence that the former Uber driver was “off app” at the time of the accident. The plaintiff, as personal representative of the estate of Arlevys Molina, brought claims against Uber and Orlando Baez Castillo, a former Uber driver, in a wrongful death action after a tragic accident in Molina’s driveway. The plaintiff argued that Uber was vicariously liable for Castillo’s negligent acts as Castillo was acting within the course and scope of his purported employment with Uber at the time of the accident. 

Uber moved for summary judgment based on the fact that Castillo was not logged in to the Uber application at the time of the accident and, in fact, had not logged on to the Uber application for nearly five months. In support of its summary judgment, Uber attached internal data records, amongst other things, showing that Castillo was not logged in to the application at the time of the accident nor had he logged in to the Uber application in months. Castillo also attested several times that he was logged out of the application and driving his personal car when the accident occurred. 

After reviewing the evidence, the trial court granted summary judgment in Uber’s favor, finding that the record evidence demonstrated that Castillo was not logged in to the Uber application at the time of the accident. Thus, it held that Uber could not be held liable for conduct outside the scope of any alleged employment because “[w]hen a driver goes offline, it is analogous to a traditional worker ‘clocking out’ or being ‘off the clock.’” 

The plaintiff appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Uber and argued that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether Castillo was logged in to the Uber application on the day of the accident. In support of her argument, the plaintiff argued that Castillo had two cell phones in his vehicle at the time of the accident and could have been using the Uber application on one of the two phones. The plaintiff, however, offered no evidence and nothing more than speculation for this assertion. 

Despite being presented with this speculative argument, the appellate court ultimately agreed that the trial court had correctly considered all of the record evidence in the case and had correctly entered summary judgment in favor of Uber. The appellate court reiterated that all of the record evidence conclusively showed that Castillo was logged off of the Uber application for months and was driving his own vehicle at the time of the accident. As a result, Uber could not be held vicariously liable for Castillo’s negligent actions. 

The Campo case demonstrates that obtaining and utilizing the innovative technology available to companies in the gig economy space can be vital to the effective and early resolution of these cases. In rideshare cases, do not forget to inquire as to whether the driver was “off app” at the time of the accident. 

*Sheri-Lynn is a member of our Casualty Department and works in our Fort Lauderdale, FL office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.