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Defense Digest

Let It Snow

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021

December 1, 2021

by Carolyn Kelly Bogart

Key Points: 

  • Supreme Court of New Jersey applies ongoing storm doctrine.
  • Court held that a commercial landowner does not have the absolute duty to keep sidewalks of his property free from snow or ice during an ongoing storm.

In the September 2019 edition of Defense Digest, my colleague, Josie Scanlon, Esq., addressed the Storm in Progress Doctrine in her article “Emerging Liability Theory Provides New Defense for Premises Cases – The Ongoing Storm Doctrine.” The article discussed whether a commercial property owner could be held liable as a matter of law for failing to remove accumulated snow or ice until a reasonable time after the storm ends. This New Jersey premises liability law, while well established, did not provide an absolute elimination of liability for commercial property owners. Instead, it focused on whether or not reasonableness was the standard as it applied in the context of a commercial property owner’s removal of snow and ice from an abutting public sidewalk. 

However, in June of 2021, in Pareja v. Princeton International Properties, et al., 252 A.3d 1984 (N.J. 2021), the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed a case that had been pending since 2015. The court held that a commercial landowner did not have the absolute duty to keep sidewalks of his property free from snow or ice during an ongoing storm.

In Pareja, a pedestrian had brought a personal injury action against a commercial landowner after slipping and falling on an icy sidewalk during an ongoing storm. The matter had been heard in Mercer County, New Jersey, which is half-way between Philadelphia and New York, and known as the “I-95 Corridor.” It is an area often subject to various freeze, thaw and re-freeze cycles during the winter months. 

The Superior Court in Mercer County granted summary judgment to the landowner. The pedestrian appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed the findings of the trial court. The landowner petitioned for certification to the Supreme Court, which was granted. The judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, although a dissenting opinion was filed. The central issue for the court was the duty of the commercial landowner to clear snow and ice from its property during a storm.

For the first time, the court considered adoption of the “ongoing storm” rule rather than the preexisting “reasonableness standard.” The Supreme Court affirmed the standard that a “landowner does not have a duty to remove snow or ice from public walkways until a reasonable time after the cessation of precipitation.” 

The plaintiff in Pareja was walking to work in the early morning hours, and he slipped and fell on a commercial-abutting sidewalk. The trial court, although granting summary judgment to the landowner, found that the ongoing storm rule applied and that there was no duty to maintain the sidewalks during an ongoing snow. The Appellate Division reversed this finding, concluding that the landowner had a duty to maintain the sidewalk even when snow was falling.

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the standard established in the legal precedent supports the adoption of the ongoing storm rule. In addition to adopting the rule, the Supreme Court also recognized two exceptions that can create a duty: (1) if the owner’s conduct increases the risk; or (2) if the danger is pre-existing. The court recognized in Pareja that the storm was ongoing and held that commercial landowners did not have the absolute duty and impossible burden to keep sidewalks on their property free from snow or ice during an ongoing storm. Based upon the active storm condition, the court ruled that, absent unusual circumstances, commercial landowners’ duty to remove snow and ice hazards arises not during a storm but, rather, within a reasonable time after a storm. 

As in many cases, the court clarified that there are some exceptions to the rule. Those unusual circumstances are set forth in the Pareja holding and state that commercial landowners may be liable if their actions “increase” the risk to pedestrians. For instance, engaging in snow and ice removal while the storm is ongoing, thus allowing a thaw and re-freeze situation, could increase the severity of the risk and change the nature of the accumulation on outside surfaces.

Additionally, a commercial landowner may be liable when there is a pre-existing risk on the premises before a storm. For instance, pre-existing snow from a previous storm that had never been removed may create an icy base.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court has highlighted the nature of the ongoing storm doctrine. Indeed, New Jersey has not received significant snow fall in the past several years but, rather, has received mixtures of snow and ice, creating the I-95 Corridor effect seen on the Weather Channel. The ongoing storm doctrine permits a commercial property owner to wait until the storm has ended, whether it be ice or snow.
    
*Carolyn is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office. She can be reached at 856.414.6006 or ckbogart@mdwcg.com.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.