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Case Law Alerts

Insurance Policies, Including Exclusions, Need to Be Clear and Unambiguous, According to Delaware Court

Noble Eagle, LLC v. MESA Underwriters Specialty Insurance, et al., 2024 WL 2830922 (Del. Super. Ct. Jun. 4, 2024)

January 1, 2025

by Aaron E. Moore

A Delaware gun dealer, which also operates a shooting range for which it rents firearms, sued its insurer and its insurance broker in a matter arising from the insurer’s refusal to provide defense or indemnification in an underlying lawsuit brought by the estate of man who rented a firearm in order to terminate his own life. 

The insurer declined coverage because the policy excluded coverage for injuries caused by the rental of “sporting equipment.” Noble Eagle argued the exclusion did not clearly define “sporting equipment,” rendering the exclusion ambiguous and that, under Delaware law, ambiguities in an insurance policy are to be interpreted against the insurer that drafted the language. Noble Eagle further argued, if the policy does not provide for defense and indemnification for the estate’s lawsuit, its insurance broker should be held liable for negligently procuring a policy that did not satisfy Noble Eagle’s insurance needs. 

The Delaware Superior Court held that Noble Eagle’s insurance policy was ambiguous as to whether a firearm falls under “sporting equipment.” The court stated, it “cannot conclude all firearms are unequivocally and definitionally ‘sporting equipment.’ Nor can the Court conclude all activities that occur at a shooting range are sports.” 

Accordingly, the court granted Noble Eagle’s motion for summary judgment, holding Noble Eagle is entitled to coverage, defense and indemnity in the underlying lawsuit. As a result, Noble Eagle agreed to dismiss the negligent procurement claim it asserted against its insurance broker. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, January 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.