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SIU Spotlight

Fraud Act and RICO Claims Belong in Court, Says NJ Appellate Court

SIU Spotlight, Issue 2, Vol. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

by Ariel C. Brownstein

The ongoing battle over whether disputes under the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (the Fraud Act) and the New Jersey Anti-Racketeering Act (RICO) can be litigated in court recently resulted in a favorable determination for insurance carriers in the New Jersey Appellate Division case of Allstate v. Carteret Comprehensive Care, PC, et al., No. A-4605-91 (App. Div. January 9, 2025). 

In March 2023, Allstate Insurance filed a complaint against more than 30 defendants, alleging violations of the Fraud Act and RICO, among other claims. A group of defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration. On October 27, 2023, the trial court issued three orders granting the moving defendants’ request, compelling all claims asserted by Allstate to arbitration under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA). The trial court ruled that AICRA’s language mandated arbitration for all disputes concerning the recovery of Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits, that any party to the dispute could invoke arbitration, and that the arbitration provision covered a broad range of legal disputes related to PIP benefits. 

Allstate appealed the order dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration, arguing the trial court erred because: (1) AICRA could not strip the right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Fraud Act and RICO; (2) AICRA only mandates arbitration for disputes regarding the recovery of medical expense benefits under PIP; (3) AICRA, the Fraud Act, and RICO do not support the conclusion that fraud claims can be subject to PIP arbitration; and (4) statutory interpretation does not support the notion that claims under the Fraud Act and RICO should be arbitrated.

The Appellate Division distinguished the objectives of the PIP arbitration process from those of the Fraud Act and RICO. The court emphasized that PIP arbitrators have limited discovery enforcement powers and discovery in PIP arbitration is confined to assessing the nature, extent, and validity of a PIP claim. Furthermore, PIP benefits are statutory in origin, and remedies for their denial are restricted to interest and attorneys’ fees. 

In contrast, the Fraud Act and RICO serve broader purposes, such as combating insurance fraud and addressing serious threats to New Jersey’s political, social, and economic institutions. The Fraud Act allows for the recovery of compensatory damages, investigative expenses, costs, attorneys’ fees, and, when a pattern of fraud is established, treble damages. RICO provides both civil and criminal sanctions. The court astutely noted that PIP arbitration regulations do not expressly provide for injunctive relief, compensatory damages, treble damages, or attorneys’ fees for an insurance carrier. 

Additionally, the court highlighted that PIP arbitration rules do not allow for (1) broad discovery, (2) discovery from third parties, or (3) the joinder of third parties. Ultimately, the court concluded that AICRA’s history demonstrated that PIP arbitration was intended as an expedited and streamlined process strictly for resolving PIP benefit disputes.

The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that they had a right to arbitration under Allstate’s Decision Point Review Plan (DPRP). It determined that by referencing N.J.A.C. 11:3, Allstate had made clear that arbitration under its DPRP was no broader than PIP arbitration under AICRA. Since the plan’s scope was identical to AICRA, the defendants had no independent right to arbitration under the DPRP.

Additionally, Allstate argued that interpreting AICRA to require arbitration for insurance fraud claims would violate its constitutional right to a jury trial under the Fraud Act and RICO. The New Jersey Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial for statutory causes of action sounding in law, as affirmed in Lajara. While private parties may waive this right through arbitration agreements, the Legislature cannot mandate such waivers without allowing for a de novo jury trial, per Jersey Central Power & Light. 

The court noted that arbitration for PIP claims is permissible because there is no constitutional right to a jury trial for determining PIP entitlements, as established in Endo Surgi Center. By limiting AICRA’s arbitration provision to PIP claims and excluding fraud claims, the court avoided potential constitutional conflicts, adhering to the principle of statutory interpretation that preserves constitutionality.

A key issue was the conflicting decision from the Third Circuit in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Center, 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024). In GEICO, the Third Circuit held that Fraud Act claims are arbitrable under AICRA. However, the Appellate Division noted that this decision was not binding on the case before it and disagreed with the Third Circuit’s interpretation of New Jersey law. 

The Appellate Division found that the Third Circuit had reasoned that AICRA’s arbitration provisions implicitly encompassed fraud claims but had overlooked the distinct legislative purposes of AICRA and the Fraud Act. The Third Circuit also relied on arbitration agreements in GEICO’s DPRP and assignment forms, but the Appellate Division had already determined that these were limited by AICRA’s regulations to PIP arbitration. Ultimately, the Appellate Division rejected the Third Circuit’s conclusions as unpersuasive.

Given the impracticalities of litigating Fraud Act and RICO claims through arbitration, the Appellate Division correctly distinguished between PIP claims involving medical providers—intended for arbitration—and claims brought by insurance carriers under the Fraud Act and RICO, which were meant to be litigated in court. 

After a series of setbacks in federal court on these issues, this decision by the Appellate Division strengthens insurance carriers’ ability to investigate and litigate Fraud Act and RICO claims in the appropriate judicial forum rather than through limited arbitration proceedings.

*Ari is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, NJ office and a member of the Insurance Fraud/SIU Practice Group. (856) 414.6075 | ACBrownstein@mdwcg.com 



 

SIU Spotlight, Issue 2, Vol. 1, March 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.