.

Defense Digest

Florida’s New Property Insurance Statute Changes Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees and Costs in First Party Homeowner’s Insurance Cases

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021

December 1, 2021

by Corey K. Setterlund

Key Points:

  • Prior to enactment of Florida Statute § 627.70152, insureds’ attorneys obtained attorney’s fees under Florida Statute § 627.428. 
  • The entitlement to fees for either party is dependent on the insurer’s presuit offer and the insured’s judgment. 
  • It is unclear if Proposals for Settlement are still available to insurers to obtain attorney’s fees in first party homeowner’s insurance cases.

Prior to July 1, 2021, insureds suing their homeowners property insurance carriers simply obtained attorney’s fees under Florida Statute § 627.428, which states:

Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any of the courts of this state against an insurer and in favor of any named or omnibus insured or the named beneficiary under a policy or contract executed by the insurer, the trial court … shall adjudge or decree against the insurer and in favor of the insured or beneficiary a reasonable sum as fees or compensation for the insured’s or beneficiary’s attorney prosecuting the suit in which the recovery is had.

This system of obtaining attorney’s fees emboldened insureds to sue their property insurance carriers because they only needed to obtain $1 in a judgment to have all of their attorney’s fees paid for, and it increased the risk for the carrier to take cases to trial. However, the system began to change in 2019 when the Florida legislature amended Florida Statute § 627.7152, which changed the ability of assignees of insureds to get attorney’s fees when they would sue the insured’s carrier for insurance benefits under an assignment. Florida Statute § 627.7152 requires assignees to provide to carriers a written notice of intent to litigate and allows carriers the ability to make a presuit settlement offer. Subsection 10, which specifically addressed attorney’s fees, states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a suit related to an assignment agreement for post-loss claims arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy, attorney fees and costs may be recovered by an assignee only under s. 57.105 and this subsection.

(a)       If the difference between the judgment obtained by the assignee and the presuit settlement offer is:

1.          Less than 25 percent of the disputed amount, the insurer is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees.

2.         At least 25 percent but less than 50 percent of the disputed amount, no party is entitled to an award of attorney fees.

3.         At least 50 percent of the disputed amount, the assignee is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees.

Enactment of these changes appeared to greatly reduce litigation brought by assignees as it more evenly applied the risk of trial between the parties. In 2021, the Florida legislature enacted F.S. § 627.70152, which provides a similar system of notice of intent to litigate and for entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs. F.S. § 627.70152(8) states:

(a)       In a suit arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy not brought by an assignee, the amount of reasonable attorney fees and costs under s. 626.9373(1) or s. 627.428(1) shall be calculated and awarded as follows:

1.          If the difference between the amount obtained by the claimant and the presuit settlement offer, excluding reasonable attorney fees and costs, is less than 20 percent of the disputed amount, each party pays its own attorney fees and costs and a claimant may not be awarded attorney fees under … s. 627.428(1).

2.         If the difference between the amount obtained by the claimant and the presuit settlement offer, excluding reasonable attorney fees and costs, is at least 20 percent but less than 50 percent of the disputed amount, the insurer pays the claimant’s attorney fees and costs under … s. 627.428(1) equal to the percentage of the disputed amount obtained times the total attorney fees and costs.

3.         If the difference between the amount obtained by the claimant and the presuit settlement offer, excluding reasonable attorney fees and costs, is at least 50 percent of the disputed amount, the insurer pays the claimant’s full attorney fees and costs under … s. 627.428(1).

While § 627.70152 is not as restrictive as § 627.7152, it does force insureds to at least take a harder look at their case because, if insureds are unable to beat the 20% threshold, they will have to pay their own attorney’s fees. Further, attorneys have to consider not obtaining their full fees if an insured’s case does not result in 50% more of the pre-suit settlement offer.

One issue not addressed in § 627.70152 that was addressed in the assignee statute was the availability of Proposals for Settlement to protect attorney’s fees for carriers. Section 627.7152 specifically states that the only way to obtain attorney’s fees is under 57.105 (sanctions) or the instant statute. However, § 627.70152 does not specifically state such a restriction on attorney’s fees. Yet, the Senate Summary Committee states:

The bill provides that … attorney fees may only be awarded using the methodology created by the bill or when the court imposes sanctions under s. 57.105, F.S. Accordingly, claimants may no longer obtain attorney fees under s. 627.428, F.S., or s. 626.9373, F.S., nor may insurers recover attorney fees using an offer of judgment under s. 768.79, F.S.

Since it appears there was a change to the bill before it was enacted as § 627.70152, as attorney’s fees are available under 627.428, it would seem this comment is moot; however, challenges to an insurer’s use of the offer of judgment statute may arise in the future.

*Corey is an associate in our Jacksonville, Florida, office. She can be reached at 904.358.4215 or cksetterlund@mdwcg.com.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Legislation Updates

Since June 1, 2026, there have been no new New Jersey workers’ compensation related cases from the Appellate or Supreme Courts. As such, below will highlight any new legislative updates since February. A1023 | S3984 - Medical Use of Cannabis Under Certain Circumstances This requires workers’ compensation, PIP, and health insurance coverage for the medical use of cannabis under certain circumstances. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Financial Institutions and Insurance Committee. It was also introduced on March 19, 2026 and referred to the Senate Commerce Committee. A1045  - Certain Injuries to Volunteer and Professional Public Safety and Law Enforcement Personnel This revises workers’ compensation coverage for certain injuries to volunteer and professional public safety and law enforcement personnel. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1384 | S2757 - Reduce Statute of Limitations in Medical Fee Disputes This reduces statute of limitations from six years to two years in medical fee disputes in workers’ compensation matters. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A1870 | S1379 - Workers' Compensation Benefits For Certain Workers Due to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks This provides workers’ compensation benefits for certain public safety workers who developed illness or injury as result of responding to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On February 5, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. A2779 | S1521 - Excludes Certain Illegal Aliens This excludes certain illegal aliens from workers’ compensation and temporary disability benefits. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A2792 | S1555 -  Prevent Intoxicated Employees from Workers’ Compensation This prevents intoxicated employees from receiving workers’ compensation. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3167 | S2372 - Workers’ Compensation Insurance Requirements for Certain Corporations and Partnerships This concerns workers’ compensation insurance requirements for certain corporations and partnerships. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. A3548 | S3571 – Maximum Benefits for Certain Volunteers This provides certain volunteer and other workers with maximum compensation benefit for workers' compensation claim regardless of outside employment. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. On March 2, 2026, it was reported from the Senate Committee, 2nd Reading, and referred to the Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee. It was also introduced on the same day and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly State and Local Government Committee. A3724 - Personal Liability to Employer Officers for Failure to Pay for Coverage This provides personal liability for owner, executive officer, or executive director of employer for failure to pay for workers' compensation coverage. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. On May 7, 2026, it was reported and referred to Assembly Judiciary Committee. A4617  - Certain Workers' Compensation Supplemental Benefits and Funding Method This concerns certain workers' compensation supplemental benefits and funding method. For a permanently and totally disabled worker or surviving dependents after December 31, 1979, with some exceptions, this bill provides for an annual cost of living adjustment in the weekly workers’ compensation benefit rate. It was introduced on March 10, 2026 and referred to the Assembly Labor Committee. S241 - Inclusion in Database of Appointed Officials This requires that workers’ compensation judges and administrative law judges be included in database of appointed officials. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 to the Senate, Referred to Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism & Historic Preservation Committee. S2290 -  Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 72. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. S3144 - Testimony in Workers’ Compensation This concerns submission of testimony in workers’ compensation claims. It was introduced on January 13, 2026 and referred to the Senate Labor Committee. S3342  - Increase Mandatory Retirement Age This increases statutory mandatory retirement age for Supreme Court Justices, Superior Court Judges, Tax Court Judges, Administrative Law Judges, and Workers’ Compensation Judges from 70 to 75. It was introduced on February 5, 2026 and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Holds That a Claimant Who Was Struck By a Car While Crossing the Street During an Unpaid Break Was In the Course and Scope of Employment

This case involved a claim petition filed by a claimant who sustained injuries after being struck by a vehicle while crossing the street in front of the employer’s premises. The employer denied the claim based on course and scope, as the accident occurred during one of two mandatory fifteen (15) minute breaks provided to the claimant. The claimant would punch out at the beginning of a break and punch back in when the break was over.  On the date of the incident, the claimant punched out and left the building to get lunch at a restaurant, which required her to cross the employer’s parking lot, and then a public street, where the injury occurred. The Workers Compensation Judge (WCJ) dismissed the petition, noting that that during the two mandatory fifteen-minute breaks per shift allowed by the employer, the claimant was free to leave the employer’s premises, and during breaks, permitted to engage in whatever activity she desired. The WCJ found that at the time of the accident, the claimant was on her own time, in the middle of the street, and going to get lunch.   The claimant filed an appeal with the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), and the Board reversed.  According to the Board, the claimant’s location was still on the employer’s premises, as the claimant was taking her customary route while using a reasonable ingress/egress from the employer.  Further, the Board found that the “Personal Comfort Doctrine” applied, as the claimant was on a momentary departure to take care of her personal comfort, within the window of time she was allotted for her break.  The Board remanded the case, and a WCJ granted the claim petition.  The Board affirmed, and the employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Before the Court, the employer argued that the claimant was not in the course and scope of her employment, because the injury did not occur on its premises, and the claimant was outside the bounds of the Personal Comfort Doctrine. The Court, however, rejected these arguments, and dismissed the employer’s appeal.  The Court noted that the break given to the claimant was so cursory, when she set out to relieve her hunger for her own personal comfort,  she remained in the course of her employment when she sustained her injuries.  A Petition for Allowance of Appeal in the Supreme Court has been filed by the Employer, Giant Eagle.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Court Rejects Horizontal Immunity Defense to Company Not Acting as Statutory Subcontractor

The First District Court of Appeal held that a property management company was not entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in a negligence action brought by an employee of another company working on the property. The claimant was injured while servicing a swimming pool at an apartment complex. His employer had contracted with the property owner to maintain the pool. Following the accident, the claimant received workers' compensation benefits through his employer’s carrier. The claimant subsequently filed a negligence action against the property management company, alleging that it failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failed to warn him of a dangerous condition that caused his injuries. The property management company had been retained by the property owner to maintain the complex in good operating condition and to perform routine maintenance and repair work. The property management company argued that it was immune from suit under section 440.10(1)(e) of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law. That provision grants immunity to a subcontractor providing services in conjunction with a contractor on the same project or contract work from civil actions brought by employees of another subcontractor, subject to limited exceptions. According to the property management company, it qualified as a subcontractor working on the same project as the claimant’s employer and was therefore entitled to horizontal immunity. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, however, the claimant argued, and the appellate court agreed, that horizontal immunity applies only when a contractor has sublet work arising from a contractual obligation owed to a third party. The court noted that prior decisions consistently held that an entity acting solely on its own behalf as the owner of property, rather than pursuant to a contract with a third party, is not a “contractor” under section 440.10(1), even when it hires other companies to perform work on the property. In Teed, the property management company could not establish that the property owner had a primary contractual obligation to a third party to maintain either the apartment complex or the swimming pool, which it then delegated to the claimant’s employer or the property management company. As a result, the property owner did not qualify as a statutory contractor, and the property management company was not a subcontractor entitled to horizontal immunity under section 440.10(1)(e). The First District therefore reversed the lower court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings on the claimant’s negligence claim.