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Defense Digest

Don’t Forget Your Medical History: Why Fraud Never Pays, Nor Does Convenient Amnesia

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023

September 1, 2023

Key Points:

  • In Santiago Mendoza v. Talarico Bldg Svcs., Inc., Delaware Superior Court affirmed Industrial Accident Board’s voiding the underlying compensation agreement, as reached either by fraud or due to material misrepresentations.
  • Investigate a claimant’s prior medical history and treatment.

In the recent workers’ compensation case of Santiago Mendoza v. Talarico Bldg Svcs., Inc., d/b/a Service Master Cleaning, 2023 WL 2726923 (Del. Super. Mar. 30, 2023), the Delaware Superior Court considered an appeal from the Industrial Accident Board on the claimant’s allegation of error in the Board’s decision. In a joint hearing on the claimant’s petition for additional compensation due for spine fusion surgery, and the employers’ petition to terminate benefits, the Board found for the employer on both petitions. The Board terminated indemnity benefits and denied the claimant’s demand for surgical approval, and medical and indemnity workers’ compensation benefits.

The Industrial Accident Board had found that the claimant sustained total disability previously from a 2001 head injury that occurred in New York State and he received total disability from 2001–2007. The claimant did not work from 2007–2015 and obtained Social Security Disability benefits in the interim period. In 2016, the claimant requested a total disability slip from his primary care provider.

In 2017, the claimant went to work for Talarico Building Services. At that time, he did not report any disability or work restrictions. In 2018, he suffered a witnessed slip-and-fall injury, landing on his buttocks. He complained of headaches, dizziness, and head and neck pain. The injury was accepted. A month later, the claimant was in a car accident and injured his neck. Diagnostic imaging (CT Scan) evidenced degenerative changes in the cervical spine.

In 2021, the claimant underwent a three-level cervical fusion. He filed a petition for additional compensation due relative to the cervical spine fusion surgery. The employer defended and filed a petition for review in order to terminate indemnity benefits on the basis of fraud.

The Board denied the petition for additional benefits, finding that the cervical spine surgery was unrelated to the 2018 work accident. The Board found that the claimant failed to disclose his medical history to his own surgeon, thus depriving the surgeon of the ability to “accurately appreciate it [the medical history].” On the petition for review, the Board was asked by the employer to undo the total disability agreement on the basis of fraud and, also, to preclude any future claim petitions being filed by the claimant as a result of the precedent fraud. The Board struck the underlying agreement to compensation on the basis of fraud, but allowed the claimant to refile an initial petition to establish causation on any alternate set of facts. The claimant was ordered to repay the employer the amount of disability paid to him.

On appeal, the Delaware Superior Court considered the evidentiary standards without separately weighing the evidence as per the appellate rules. The court found that the undisputed evidence is that the claimant indicated to his surgeon that his physical neck and back symptoms developed for the first time after his 2018 slip and fall. The claimant’s testimony was found to be “incredulous.” He denied his prior medical treatment history as though it never existed. He denied having been found permanently and totally disabled prior to 2018, despite medical evidence of multiple prior disability ratings. The Superior Court affirmed the Board’s disregard of the claimant’s testimony as not credible and unreliable. The claimant’s lack of credibility was considered as enhanced in view of his surgeons’ inability to consider the effect of his prior injury, treatment, and therapy as it impacted his causal opinion and surgical determination.

On the issue of fraud, the Superior Court found the Board properly considered the fraud factors and acted correctly under Superior Court Rule 60(b) in re-opening the prior total disability determination reduced to an agreement on compensation. On that basis, the court affirmed the Board’s voiding the underlying compensation agreement, as reached either by fraud or due to material misrepresentations. The claimant had misrepresented his prior medical history and disability status to the employer and his own surgeon. The Superior Court found that the Board properly determined that the claimant’s lack of candor was “at best, chronically evasive, at worst, fatally fraudulent.”

Investigate prior medical history and treatment. Prior medical records and a medical canvass are valuable tools in considering a defense strategy. Consider the factual statements made by the claimant, any fact witnesses, and any workplace investigations. Social media canvassing can be helpful as well. Claimants often say one thing or allege disability, and, on social media accounts, are found to be contradicting their allegations. Also, other employment can be seen in photos, posts, tweets, and social media activities. Consider carefully the treatment notes of the current surgeon or main provider (orthopedist, pain management). Consider the consistency or inconsistency of the claimant’s recitation of events as compared against reports to other providers, such as occupational health, physical therapy, and chiropractic. With regard to surgeons, count the times the claimant actually sees the surgeon versus the physicians assistant or nurse practitioner. You may find the claimant treats for a time period and only sees the physician or surgeon infrequently, and that surgical opinions are actually delivered to the claimant by the midlevel provider and not the surgeon.

Where there is inconsistency, fraud should be a consideration and investigated.


 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.