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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Finding that Proposal for Settlement Made by Carrier to Insured was not Ambiguous

Legal Update for Florida Coverage & Property Litigation – March 2026

March 1, 2026

by Brendan P. Smith

Sec. First Ins. Co. v. Cincotta, 2025 WL 3714668 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025)

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying Security First Insurance Company’s motion for attorney’s fees. The trial court ruled that the proposal for settlement (PFS) served by Security First on the insureds, Dominick Cincotta and Dominick Cincotta on behalf of the deceased Aurea Cincotta, was ambiguous. The appellate court reversed finding that there was no ambiguity in the PFS when it was interpreted as a whole.

The Cincottas purchased home insurance from Security First in 2014 through an insurance agency, Cochran Insurance, Inc. The Cincottas reported a fire loss to their home, which Security investigated. In the course of its investigation, Security First determined that the Cincottas failed to disclose a 2013 fire loss to the property on their insurance application to Security First. The Cincottas also failed to disclose a prior non-renewal of their insurance policy based upon the 2013 fire loss. Security First then rescinded the policy and denied coverage for the loss.

Cincotta proceeded to file suit against both Security First and Cochran. The claim against Cochran was abated and the lawsuit against Security First proceeded on the question of coverage. During the litigation, Security First served a PFS that included the following language:

“1. The party making the proposal is Security First Insurance Company (“Security First”). The party to whom the proposal is  being made is Dominick Cincotta.

2. This proposal resolves all damages that would otherwise be awarded to Dominick Cincotta in a final judgment in this action except for attorney’s fees and costs as set forth below.”

Security First obtained summary judgment in its favor and moved to enforce the PFS. The trial court held a hearing on Security First’s motion for entitlement and found that Security First was the prevailing party and entitled to costs. The trial court denied the motion as to attorney’s fees, finding that the PFS was ambiguous based upon the language in the second paragraph, stating it was “unclear whether Security First is requiring the Cincotta’s’ to give up their claims against Cochran as part of this.”

In reversing the trial court’s order, the Sixth DCA stated the PFS was sufficiently clear to inform Cincotta that the claim against Cochran was not being given up. The appellate court stated that while the second paragraph in isolation could be seen as vague, when the PFS was read as a whole, it was clear that the claims were limited to Security First. The appellate court pointed out that the PFS did not require dismissal against Cochran and, in fact, did not mention Cochran anywhere. The appellate court quoted language from Allen v. Nunez, 258 So. 3d 1207, 1211 (Fla. 2018) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 932 So. 2d 1067, 1079 (Fla. 2006)) stating, “courts are discouraged from ‘nitpicking’ proposals for settlement to search for ambiguity.” The appellate court looked at paragraph one, which specifically identified Security First as the party making the proposal, as well as other paragraphs that identified Security First as the party that would be paying the settlement amount and being the party that would be dismissed if the proposal was accepted. Based on these factors, the appellate court found no ambiguity in the proposal for settlement and reversed the order denying Security First’s entitlement to attorney’s fees.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.