Brendan is a member of the Professional Liability Department where he focuses his practice on the defense of auto manufacturers in all stages of their warranty litigation from pre-suit, arbitration and jury trials. Additionally, he represents insurance carriers in coverage disputes and alleged bad faith actions. Many of the coverage disputes involves windstorm claims, interior water damage claims, mold claims and remediation claims.
Brendan started his career as a public defender in Miami-Dade County, where he gained extensive courtroom and trial experience. He later went on to work at a civil defense firm where he eventually became a named partner. While there, he defended many major American and European automotive companies in both state and federal court, as well as at the administrative level. Brendan has tried cases throughout the state of Florida on behalf of his clients.
Brendan received his Juris Doctorate from Saint Thomas University and his Bachelor of Arts in English from the College of William and Mary.
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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation
Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Striking Complaint as Sanction for Violating Discovery Order
June 11, 2026
All Dry USA v. Savell, 2026 WL 816093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026) The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying All Dry USA’s complaint as a sanction for violating a discovery order. The appellate court found that All Dry USA’s failure to comply with the trial court’s case management order did not give the trial court the authority to strike All Dry USA’s pleadings. All Dry USA provided water mitigation, mold remediation, and a restorative tarp at the property owned by the Savells. The property had been damaged by Hurricane Sally. All Dry USA provided invoices for the three services it performed in the amount of $90,130.61. The Savells refused to pay the invoices, stating that while they had retained All Dry USA, there was no agreement reached regarding the cost of the services. All Dry USA proceeded to file a lawsuit against the Savells, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Savells answered the lawsuit and served discovery upon All Dry USA. All Dry USA failed to respond to the discovery requests and the Savells moved for an order compelling discovery. The trial court issued an order compelling All Dry USA to respond to Savells discovery requests and comply with all outstanding discovery deadlines per the case management order. On the day its responses were due, All Dry USA filed a motion to extend the deadline to comply with the court’s order. Before the motion was ruled upon, the Savells filed a motion to have All Dry USA’s complaint stricken for violating the trial court’s order compelling All Dry USA’s responses. The trial court granted the motion to strike, and then granted the Savell’s request for entry of default final judgment, based upon there no longer being an operative complaint. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that an order striking pleadings is justified if it is found that a party has violated numerous discovery orders, or has shown a “deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983). The appellate court stated that a trial court’s authority to strike pleadings is not unbridled and that the situation before the court did not justify the striking of All Dry USA’s pleadings. In reaching its decision, the First District focused on the fact that the trial court only addressed the potential prejudice to Savell by All Dry USA failing to respond to discovery and seeking an extension of the deadline. The appellate court stated that prejudice is not the only factor to be considered and that the trial court needed to address if All Dry USA’s behavior in failing to comply with the discovery order was willful and deliberate. The First District also stated that nothing in rule 1.200 or 1.380 grants a trial court the authority to strike a pleading because certain case management deadlines are not met. The appellate court held that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow trial courts to bring the parties in, order them to comply with the case management discovery deadlines, and then strike pleadings if the subsequent discovery orders are disobeyed. This ruling shows the importance of understanding the authority that is binding on the trial court a party is appearing in front of. The First District’s view on a trial court’s ability to strike pleadings is in contrast with other appellate court’s throughout Florida.
Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation
Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Finding that Proposal for Settlement Made by Carrier to Insured was not Ambiguous
March 1, 2026
Sec. First Ins. Co. v. Cincotta, 2025 WL 3714668 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying Security First Insurance Company’s motion for attorney’s fees. The trial court ruled that the proposal for settlement (PFS) served by Security First on the insureds, Dominick Cincotta and Dominick Cincotta on behalf of the deceased Aurea Cincotta, was ambiguous. The appellate court reversed finding that there was no ambiguity in the PFS when it was interpreted as a whole. The Cincottas purchased home insurance from Security First in 2014 through an insurance agency, Cochran Insurance, Inc. The Cincottas reported a fire loss to their home, which Security investigated. In the course of its investigation, Security First determined that the Cincottas failed to disclose a 2013 fire loss to the property on their insurance application to Security First. The Cincottas also failed to disclose a prior non-renewal of their insurance policy based upon the 2013 fire loss. Security First then rescinded the policy and denied coverage for the loss. Cincotta proceeded to file suit against both Security First and Cochran. The claim against Cochran was abated and the lawsuit against Security First proceeded on the question of coverage. During the litigation, Security First served a PFS that included the following language: “1. The party making the proposal is Security First Insurance Company (“Security First”). The party to whom the proposal is being made is Dominick Cincotta. 2. This proposal resolves all damages that would otherwise be awarded to Dominick Cincotta in a final judgment in this action except for attorney’s fees and costs as set forth below.” Security First obtained summary judgment in its favor and moved to enforce the PFS. The trial court held a hearing on Security First’s motion for entitlement and found that Security First was the prevailing party and entitled to costs. The trial court denied the motion as to attorney’s fees, finding that the PFS was ambiguous based upon the language in the second paragraph, stating it was “unclear whether Security First is requiring the Cincotta’s’ to give up their claims against Cochran as part of this.” In reversing the trial court’s order, the Sixth DCA stated the PFS was sufficiently clear to inform Cincotta that the claim against Cochran was not being given up. The appellate court stated that while the second paragraph in isolation could be seen as vague, when the PFS was read as a whole, it was clear that the claims were limited to Security First. The appellate court pointed out that the PFS did not require dismissal against Cochran and, in fact, did not mention Cochran anywhere. The appellate court quoted language from Allen v. Nunez, 258 So. 3d 1207, 1211 (Fla. 2018) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 932 So. 2d 1067, 1079 (Fla. 2006)) stating, “courts are discouraged from ‘nitpicking’ proposals for settlement to search for ambiguity.” The appellate court looked at paragraph one, which specifically identified Security First as the party making the proposal, as well as other paragraphs that identified Security First as the party that would be paying the settlement amount and being the party that would be dismissed if the proposal was accepted. Based on these factors, the appellate court found no ambiguity in the proposal for settlement and reversed the order denying Security First’s entitlement to attorney’s fees.
