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Thomas F. Glassman

Attorney, Thomas Glassman

Tom Glassman is a shareholder in the Casualty Department and an experienced litigator with more than 30 years representing insurers, insureds, governmental entities, and businesses of all sizes throughout Ohio and Kentucky. He has devoted his legal career defending a wide array of matters including litigation defense, pre-suit investigations, coverage analysis and SIU matters. He has extensive experience at both the trial and appellate levels.  Tom also works with clients in developing training programs and internal policies and procedures for both claim handling and loss response.

Tom has also handled significant appellate matters before the Ohio Supreme Court, including serving as lead appellate counsel in Dillon v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc., a case of first impression where the Supreme Court held that Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act does not apply to first-party automobile insurance claims.

Tom graduated cum laude from the Salmon P. Chase College of Law. He is admitted to practice before all state and federal courts in Ohio and Kentucky, as well as multiple federal courts in Indiana and Michigan.

Outside of his legal practice, Tom is passionate about legal education and international development. Through the Fulbright Program, he has taught at law schools in Azerbaijan, Latvia, and Moldova. He also serves on the Board of Trustees for the Leavitt Institute for International Development, which develops and implements educational programs for law schools throughout Ukraine.

Tom and his wife are proud empty nest parents of four children and enjoy hiking and traveling together.

    • NKU Salmon P. Chase College of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1993)
    • University of Cincinnati (B.A., 1988)
    • Ohio, 1993
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Ohio, 1993
    • Kentucky, 1995
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Kentucky, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio, 1999
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2000
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Kentucky, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Indiana, 2007
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan, 2008
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 6th Circuit, 1999
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 7th Circuit, 2013
  • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®

    Ohio Super Lawyer - 2017-2026

  • Obtained a defense verdict in a jury trial involving a fatal motorcycle accident in which the plaintiff alleged the collision was caused by an improper lane change. The favorable result followed a successful Daubert challenge excluding the plaintiff’s accident reconstruction expert. 

    Successfully obtained dismissal of claims against a school district based upon governmental immunity. The plaintiff, who alleged a traumatic brain injury and other significant injuries after being struck by oncoming traffic while crossing the street following a bus drop-off, claimed the school district was liable for the incident. The court held that the school district was statutorily immune from liability and owed no legal duty under the circumstances. 

    Served as lead appellate counsel in Dillon v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc., 145 Ohio St.3d 133, 2015-Ohio-5407, a case of first impression in which the Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act does not apply to first-party automobile insurance claims, establishing an important statewide precedent. 

    Obtained a defense verdict in a jury trial representing a church in litigation arising from daycare workers administering Melatonin to children during nap time. The jury determined that the employees’ conduct fell outside the course and scope of their employment, precluding vicarious liability against the church, and further found that the conduct was not reasonably foreseeable to church leadership.

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Coverage & Bad Faith

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

July 27, 2026

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.