.

Sophia E. D. Philor

Associate

SEPhilor@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Sophia E. D. Philor

Sophia is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she focuses her practice on representing businesses, directors and officers, design professionals, contractors and homeowners' associations in commercial, professional liability, construct defect, architectural, engineering, and employment disputes

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Sophia practiced first-party property defense. In 2024, she was selected to the Super Lawyers© Rising Stars list for her exceptional work in civil litigation defense and was named a Top Lawyer by Palm Beach Illustrated.

Sophia received her juris doctor from Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law. During law school, Sophia participated in several student organizations. She served as the Social Media and Marketing Director for the Black Law Student Association. She also gained valuable experience and knowledge as an intern with Legal-Aid Coast to Coast Family law division, where she provided legal information and guidance to Pro Se litigants and a law clerk at an Immigration firm. Further, Sophia also participated in legal clinics including the Dispute Resolution Clinic, where she co-mediated and arbitrated cases and eventually became a Florida Supreme Court County Mediator and a Qualified Arbitrator, as well as the Sharon and Mitchell W. Berger Entrepreneur Law Clinic, where she offered transactional representation and legal advice to entry level entrepreneurs, innovators and start-up businesses under the supervision of the clinic director.

Sophia currently lives in Broward and enjoys spending her spare time at the beach, with family, and working with her non-profit providing support to Haiti.
 

    • Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law (J.D., 2021)
    • Nova Southeastern University (MBA, 2014)
    • Florida Atlantic University (B.A., 2013)
    • Florida, 2021
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2025
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2025
    • English (fluent)
    • French (fluent)
    • Haitian Creole (fluent)
    • Florida Super Lawyers, Rising Stars (2024-2026)
    • Palm Beach Illustrated, Top Lawyer (2024)
    • Florida Supreme Court Certified Mediator
    • Florida Supreme Court Qualified Arbitrator

Thought Leadership

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Case Law Alerts

Appellate Court Applies Business Judgment Rule and Reverses Summary Judgment in Condominium Assessment Dispute

April 1, 2026

An appeals court ruled that the trial court erred in judgement for condo owners in a dispute over association fees. While the court agreed that the association must turn over its financial audits, it was determined that the rest of the case should be reconsidered because courts should generally not interfere in board decisions without clear wrongdoing. The case involved a master condo association that provides shared services (like maintenance and cable) to several smaller associations. The board’s budget included about $248,000 for cable costs, although it had settled a dispute with the cable company for $100,000. One of the smaller associations, Fifth Horizons, argued this was unfair and that they overpaid their share. The trial court ruled in their favor, saying the board acted outside its authority and awarded damages. The appeals court disagreed, explaining that under the Business Judgment Rule, courts usually defer to decisions made by boards as long as they act in good faith. The court also clarified that in Florida, the business judgment rule has been codified by statute for corporations, limited liability companies, and not-for-profit corporations, See § 607.0831(1), Fla. Stat. (2021). This protection applies automatically, even if not specifically raised as a defense. Importantly, the appeals court stated that it was within the board’s authority to create budgets and charge assessments, so although this was a disputed act, it wasn’t illegal.

Defense Digest

Court Affirms Strong Liability Protections for Rideshare Companies Under Florida Law

March 1, 2026

Key Points: Florida law treats rideshare drivers as independent contractors when statutory conditions are met. The law in effect on the date of the accident controls liability analysis.  Isolated complaints and traffic citations are generally insufficient to prove negligent hiring.  A Florida appellate court recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lyft, highlighting the liability protections available to rideshare companies under Florida’s Transportation Network Company statute. In Abner v. Lyft Florida, Inc., 422 So.3d 1226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025), the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, held that Lyft could not be held liable for injuries caused by one of its drivers, rejecting claims for both vicarious liability and negligent hiring and retention. The case arose from an accident on July 5, 2017, where a Lyft driver collided with a motorcyclist, causing serious injuries. At the time, the driver was providing a prearranged ride through Lyft’s digital platform. The injured motorcyclist’s guardian sued both the driver and Lyft. While claims against the driver were settled, the claims against Lyft continued. The plaintiff argued Lyft was responsible in two ways: the driver was acting as Lyft’s employee or agent at the time of the accident, and that it was negligent in hiring and retaining the driver. Lyft moved for summary judgment, relying on Florida’s Transportation Network Company statute, section 627.748, Florida Statutes (2017), which had taken effect just days before the crash. The plaintiff argued the statute should not apply because the driver had been approved to drive for Lyft before it went into effect. The court rejected that argument, explaining that Florida law applies the statute in effect when the cause of action accrues. In negligence cases, that is the date of the accident. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Sheffield, 266 So. 3d 1230, 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). Since the accident occurred after the statute became effective, the statute governed the claims against Lyft. Under section 627.748(9), a rideshare driver is considered an independent contractor, not an employee, if certain conditions are met. These conditions include allowing drivers to set their own hours, permitting work on competing rideshare platforms, not restricting other business or employment, and confirming independent contractor status in writing. Lyft presented evidence that these conditions were satisfied, including the driver agreement and testimony from its corporate representative. The plaintiff argued that the driver did not qualify as an independent contractor because the agreement allegedly limited other work. The court disagreed, finding that the agreement only limited the driver’s activities while actively providing rides through the Lyft platform. Outside of those times, the driver remained free to pursue other employment or business activities. The agreement explicitly confirmed the driver’s discretion to work or not work. The court noted this is consistent with prior Florida cases recognizing rideshare drivers as independent contractors. McGillis v. Department of Economic Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 225-226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). Since the driver qualified as an independent contractor, Lyft could not be held vicariously liable for the driver’s alleged negligence. Florida law generally holds that companies are not responsible for the negligent acts of independent contractors when they do not control how the work is performed. Stander v. Dispoz-O-Prods., Inc., 973 So. 2d 603, 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). The plaintiff also claimed Lyft was directly liable for negligent hiring and retention, citing a speeding citation, a reckless driving citation, and two negative passenger complaints. The court found this evidence insufficient. Under the statute, disqualification is triggered by certain criminal convictions, and not merely by citations. The driver’s reckless driving incident was only a citation, and a single moving violation did not meet the statutory threshold for disqualification. The passenger complaints were similarly inadequate: one was a vague two-star review with no explanation, and the other involved a single passenger reporting unsafe driving. Given the hundreds of rides the driver had safely completed, the court considered this evidence isolated and minimal. The limited evidence led the court declining to broadly define negligent hiring claims against transportation network companies. Instead, it resolved the case narrowly, emphasizing judicial restraint. The court explained that if evidence is insufficient to survive a directed verdict at trial, it cannot survive summary judgment. CG Tides LLC v. SHEDDF3 VNB, LLC, 388 So. 3d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024); In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021). For insurance professionals, Abner v. Lyft Florida, Inc. reinforces the protections Florida law provides to transportation network companies. It highlights the importance of applying the law in effect on the date of loss, confirming independent contractor status, and assessing the sufficiency of evidence for negligent hiring claims. It also demonstrates how Florida’s summary judgment standard can resolve weak claims early, reducing exposure and defense costs. The appellate court ultimately affirmed summary judgment in Lyft’s favor. Sophia works in our Fort Lauderdale, FL office. She can be reached at (954) 233-3026 or SEPhilor@mdwcg.com.

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Firm Highlights

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

Thought Leadership

PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated

Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.

Result

Unanimous Verdict Obtained in a Medical Malpractice Matter in Bergen County, New Jersey

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

News

Veteran Trial Attorney Joseph M. Toddy Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department in Philadelphia

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial

Casey Alan Coyle Joins Marshall Dennehey's PA Appellate Practice as a Shareholder in Harrisburg and Philadelphia

News

Marshall Dennehey Expands Leading Pennsylvania Appellate Practice With Addition of Shareholder Casey Coyle

Congratulations to our 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Rising Stars: Elizabeth Ferguson, A.C. Nash, Taylor Naughton, Sophia Philor, Amara Rodriguez

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Florida Rising Stars