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Defense Digest

Recent Florida PIP Appellate Decisions Put Focus Back on Swift and Automatic Medical Benefits Payments

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 2022

April 1, 2022

by Sean P. Greenwalt

Key Points:

  • Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal has recently taken up two separate cases relating to the PIP litigation ancillary issues of interest and penalty and postage. 
  • In South Florida Pain & Rehabilitation of West Dade v. Infinity Auto Ins. Co., the court examined the question of whether a provider is entitled to attorney’s fees under § 627.736(8), Florida Statutes (2018), after having recovered a judgment solely on the statutory penalty and postage costs authorized by § 627.736(10). 
  • In Precision Diagnostic, Inc. v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., the court answered whether the interest rate owed on a PIP claim should fluctuate quarterly or be paid based on the fixed quarter date the amount became overdue, and whether the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex is applicable to interest within the no-fault context.

It is promulgated that the purpose of Florida’s no-fault personal injury protection (PIP) statute is to ensure the “swift and virtually automatic payment” to the insured. Nunez v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 117 So.3d 388, 391 (Fla. 2013). However, PIP litigation has evolved over the years, and ancillary issues, such as the payment of penalty and postage reimbursement and various theories of interest calculation, began to develop, even in circumstances without no-fault benefits at issue. The result of a judgment for interest, penalty or postage alone in these instances would commonly result in an award of attorney’s fees and costs for plaintiffs. 

These ancillary issues involving interest, penalty and postage often evaded higher-level review until the January 1, 2021, statutory change to Florida’s appellate court jurisdiction, when most small claims and county court cases could be appealed directly to Florida’s District Courts of Appeal. Palmetto Physical Therapy Inc. v. Progressive Select Ins. Co., 320 So.3d 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). As a result of the appellate jurisdiction change, within the last year, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal has taken up two separate cases on the issues of interest and penalty and postage. Both decisions have focused on the purpose of Florida’s no-fault statute, which is to reimburse a claimant’s insurance benefits as a result of a motor vehicle accident. 

Penalty and postage reimbursements are essentially financial incentives for an insurer to pay PIP benefits correctly to avoid the pre-suit litigation phase entirely. Section 627.736(10)(d) reads: “[i]f, within 30 days after receipt of notice by the insurer, the overdue claim specified in the notice is paid by the insurer together with applicable interest and a penalty of 10 percent of the overdue amount paid by the insurer, subject to a maximum penalty of $250, no action may be brought against the insurer.” See also United Auto Ins. Co. v. 5-Star Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 2020 WL 6304285 (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. App. 2020). The requirement for postal cost reimbursements is actually found separately in Section 627.736(10)(c).

In April 2021, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in South Florida Pain & Rehabilitation of West Dade v. Infinity Auto Ins. Co., 318 So.3d 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021), took up the question of “whether [a] provider is entitled to attorney’s fees under section 627.736(8), Florida Statutes (2018), after it recovered a judgment solely on the statutory penalty and postage costs authorized by section 627.736(10)[.]” 

The court answered the question in the negative, citing to a plain language interpretation of the PIP statute. The court noted that an exception to section 627.736(8)’s entitlement to attorney’s fees occurs under “section 627.736(10)(d) [where] an insurer is not obligated to pay any attorney fees if it pays the insured’s PIP claim within thirty days after receipt of the pre-suit demand letter.” The Fourth District held that the absence of penalty and postage within the statute’s language controlled, finding: “[i]f the Legislature had intended for attorney’s fees to be otherwise recoverable under the statute, it would have said so.” 

Upon review of the totality of the opinion, it is evident that the importance of no-fault insurance is not ancillary issues or technicalities but the recovery of medical benefits to the actual plaintiffs. The court went on to clarify “[t]he Legislature’s intent when enacting the no-fault statute was to ensure the swift payment of ‘medical, surgical, funeral, and disability insurance benefits.’” 

While this particular opinion was limited to scenarios only involving penalty and postage, it appeared from the court’s judicial history concerning the recovery of attorney fees and costs that the same line of reasoning could potentially apply to the recovery of interest payments alone when no actual PIP benefits were at issue. To date, this has not occurred, but further opinions on interest have recently shaped the issue’s jurisprudence in the no-fault context. 

Later in the year, on October 20, 2021, the Fourth District Court of Appeal also issued two front opinions concerning interest. Interest as a legal issue in PIP has been well on its way to developing multiple legal theories, bolstering it as a matter almost as prevalent as recovering actual PIP benefits. Certain theories of recovery against interest stem from whether it was subject to the pre-suit demand requirement, if it must be specifically pled in a complaint, if the interest rate should change quarterly, or whether the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex to interest alone applied to the no-fault statute. 

Fla. Stat. Section 627.736(4)(d) provides the context for no-fault interest payments: 

All overdue payments bear simple interest at the rate established under s. 55.03 or the rate established in the insurance contract, whichever is greater for the quarter in which the payment became overdue, calculated from the date the insurer was furnished with written notice of the amount of covered loss. Interest is due at the time payment of the overdue claim is made.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Precision Diagnostic Inc. v. Progressive American Ins. Co., 330 So.3d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) took on two of the above issues in its interest decision. First, whether the interest rate owed on a PIP claim should fluctuate quarterly or be paid based on the fixed quarter date the amount became overdue, and second, whether the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex is applicable to interest within the no-fault context. 

As for the fluctuating interest issue, the court clarified a recently brewing interest argument by opining that interest should not be adjusted quarterly or left as to the specific quarter date that interest is due. Rather, interest should adjust based on the annually set rate. The court reasoned that, even though “the Chief Financial Officer sets the interest rate quarterly, section 55.03 [where PIP interest rates are taken from] only provides for an already established interest rate to adjust annually, not quarterly.” 

While the fluctuating interest decision will have far-reaching consequences much beyond the scope of this article, there will be an equally significant effect from the court’s recognition of the de minimis non curat lex doctrine to interest amounts in the no-fault context.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex as “the law does not concern itself with trifles.” The Florida Supreme Court has described the legal maxim to mean that “the law does not care for small things.” Loeffler v. Roe, 69 So.2d 331, 338 (Fla. 1953). 

De minimis non curat lex “is a hallowed, long established and long recognized principle of law, and a party is entitled to call it in aid.” Precision Diagnostic, Inc., 330 So.3d at 35 (quoting Alec Samuels, De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 1985 Statute L. Rev. 167, 167 (1985)). Without the doctrine, litigation over trifling amounts will be a “waste of the time and money, and impair[] the dignity of the court and judge.” Id. (quoting Alec Samuels, De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 1985 Statute L. Rev. 167, 168 (1985)).  

In Precision Diagnostic, the provider sued over an interest difference of $4.17 based on the fluctuating interest argument above. When the trial court ruled in favor of the insurer’s de minimis argument, that the interest alone amount was too little to recover, the plaintiff’s appeal followed. The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the insurer’s argument and noted the long history of the de minimis doctrine applying to a wide range of legal fields, including criminal, workers’ compensation and attorney fee awards for de minimis recoveries. However, the Precision Diagnostic decision is the first statewide binding appellate opinion explicitly recognizing the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex in the no-fault PIP context, although it is limited to interest-alone recoveries. 

A cause for concern for the Fourth District was the appearance that the case at issue was not brought for a genuine desire to recover $4.17 in miscalculated interest, “but rather for the award of attorney’s fees.” 

Time will tell the lasting effects of the above opinions. However, one common theme seems clear, the objective of Florida’s no-fault statute centers on the speedy reimbursement of medical, surgical, funeral and disability insurance benefits, not ancillary matters outside the core of the statute.

*Sean is an associate in our Tampa, Florida office. He may be reached at 813.989.1814 or spgreenwalt@mdwcg.com. 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Thought Leadership

Court Reaffirms That Actual Cash Value Includes Labor and Overhead, Not Just Materials

Greenaker v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 2D2024-1964, (Fla. 2nd DCA May 8, 2026). The plaintiffs filed a breach of contract suit against Universal for refusal to pay for all of plaintiffs’ damages from a storm in November 2020. Universal filed a motion in limine to prevent the plaintiffs from introducing evidence concerning both actual cash value and replacement cost value of the loss. They argued that the plaintiffs did not complete repairs or incur any expenses in repairing the damaged property, thus being limited to actual cash value as their measure of damage and the plaintiffs’ submitted estimate of damages contained labor costs necessary for repair and, therefore, not an actual cash value estimate. Universal further asked for a directed verdict at the hearing because the plaintiffs would have no evidence to support the claim for damages. The trial court agreed and granted Universal’s motion, entering a final judgment in Universal’s favor.  The plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration due to the court improperly converting Universal’s motion in limine to a motion for final summary judgment. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion and the plaintiffs appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs and determined that the trial court improperly entered a final judgment based on a pretrial ruling in limine, advising there was recognized procedures, including summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and default judgment that could have been exercised. Further, the court continued that the improper procedure was not the only reason for the judgment to be reversed. They noted the insurance policy did not provide a definition of actual cash value nor how to calculate it, and the parties disputed the definition and calculation of such.  Universal argued that actual cash value is defined as the value of the property that suffered the direct physical loss less depreciation and deductible, i.e. costs of physical materials that were damaged.  The plaintiffs argued that actual cash value includes the amount of repair costs in addition to the value of the property that suffered direct physical loss because it is calculated as the replacement cost minus depreciation.  The court agreed with the plaintiffs, noting that Universal’s definition was not supported by the insurance contract, the statute governing replacement value insurance contracts, nor decisional authority.  The court noted that Universal “cherry-picked” the phrase “direct physical loss” from the perils insured against provision and applied it to the loss settlement provision, which doesn’t state “direct physical loss,” but instead states “insured loss.”  Further, the court conveyed that application of “direct physical loss” would be used on both actual cash value and replacement cost value, as they are both present in the loss settlement provision, which would mean insureds never got payments beyond costs of physically damaged material, which is contradictory to the replacement cost value definition.  The court advised that the Florida Supreme Court had approved the court’s interpretation of actual cash value as including costs other than damaged physical property, including overhead and profit, noting that these costs can be included in actual cash value to which a portion, like all other costs, could be depreciated. The court noted the difference between actual cash value and replacement cost value is not between types of costs, i.e. materials vs. labor, but between the valuation of the costs with the distinction of being a depreciated vs. undepreciated value. The court refused to exclude intangible costs such as labor, profit and overhead from actual cash value, finding these costs inclusions were consistent with statutory and contractual language as well as Florida Supreme Court precedent. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Striking Complaint as Sanction for Violating Discovery Order

All Dry USA v. Savell, 2026 WL 816093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026) The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying All Dry USA’s complaint as a sanction for violating a discovery order. The appellate court found that All Dry USA’s failure to comply with the trial court’s case management order did not give the trial court the authority to strike All Dry USA’s pleadings. All Dry USA provided water mitigation, mold remediation, and a restorative tarp at the property owned by the Savells. The property had been damaged by Hurricane Sally. All Dry USA provided invoices for the three services it performed in the amount of $90,130.61. The Savells refused to pay the invoices, stating that while they had retained All Dry USA, there was no agreement reached regarding the cost of the services. All Dry USA proceeded to file a lawsuit against the Savells, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Savells answered the lawsuit and served discovery upon All Dry USA. All Dry USA failed to respond to the discovery requests and the Savells moved for an order compelling discovery. The trial court issued an order compelling All Dry USA to respond to Savells discovery requests and comply with all outstanding discovery deadlines per the case management order. On the day its responses were due, All Dry USA filed a motion to extend the deadline to comply with the court’s order. Before the motion was ruled upon, the Savells filed a motion to have All Dry USA’s complaint stricken for violating the trial court’s order compelling All Dry USA’s responses. The trial court granted the motion to strike, and then granted the Savell’s request for entry of default final judgment, based upon there no longer being an operative complaint. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that an order striking pleadings is justified if it is found that a party has violated numerous discovery orders, or has shown a “deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983). The appellate court stated that a trial court’s authority to strike pleadings is not unbridled and that the situation before the court did not justify the striking of All Dry USA’s pleadings. In reaching its decision, the First District focused on the fact that the trial court only addressed the potential prejudice to Savell by All Dry USA failing to respond to discovery and seeking an extension of the deadline. The appellate court stated that prejudice is not the only factor to be considered and that the trial court needed to address if All Dry USA’s behavior in failing to comply with the discovery order was willful and deliberate.  The First District also stated that nothing in rule 1.200 or 1.380 grants a trial court the authority to strike a pleading because certain case management deadlines are not met. The appellate court held that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow trial courts to bring the parties in, order them to comply with the case management discovery deadlines, and then strike pleadings if the subsequent discovery orders are disobeyed. This ruling shows the importance of understanding the authority that is binding on the trial court a party is appearing in front of. The First District’s view on a trial court’s ability to strike pleadings is in contrast with other appellate court’s throughout Florida.