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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

New ABA Formal Ethics Opinion on Attorney Office Sharing Arrangements

Legal Update for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – February 2024

February 1, 2024

by Scott R. Eberle

The American Bar Association recently issued a Formal Ethics Opinion addressing the ethics of attorney office sharing arrangements. In Formal Opinion 507, issued on July 12, 2023, the ABA Standard Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility opined that office sharing arrangements among non-affiliated attorneys are generally permissible under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct so long as certain ethical duties relating to confidentiality, conflicts of interest and supervision of non-lawyers are observed. 

The Opinion recognizes that attorney office sharing arrangements come in many forms. There are traditional office sharing arrangements, where lawyers with separate law practices—mostly solo practitioners—share office space, support staff and equipment. There are office sharing arrangements where law firms rent unused office space to unaffiliated lawyers. Furthermore, lawyers often share an office suite, receptionist and conference room as part of a virtual law practice—an arrangement that has become increasing popular following the pandemic—as more lawyers are working from home offices. 

The ABA advises that lawyers working in these type of arrangements must be particularly vigilant to ensure they are complying with their ethical duties. Maintaining confidentiality is a concern in a shared office environment, especially if the lawyers are sharing a receptionist or other support staff. The opinion reminds attorneys that appropriate supervision of non-lawyer assistants is required under Model Rule 5.3 and it is necessary to instruct shared employees on confidentiality obligations, as well as have office procedures in place to guard sensitive client documents and communications.

Conflicts of interest are another concern in shared office environments. The Opinion advises that lawyers must pay attention to avoid imputation of conflicts of interest. Model Rule 1.10(a) imputes conflicts of interest to all lawyers “associated in a firm.” Non-affiliated lawyers in shared office arrangements are not automatically treated as a single law firm for conflicts purposes, but the ABA advises that they could be, depending on the facts and circumstances of each arrangement. In order to avoid the possibility of being treated as a single law firm for conflicts purposes, the Opinion advises attorneys to protect the confidentiality of their respective clients, avoid regularly consulting with each other on client matters, avoid sharing staff with access to client information, and take appropriate steps to clearly communicate the nature of their relationship to the public and to clients. 

Representing clients with adverse interests, even in the same lawsuit or transaction, is also discussed by the ABA Standard Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility in Formal Opinion 507. Although the Opinion recognizes that some state ethics opinions advise attorneys who share office space to avoid these situations entirely, the Committee opines that it may be permissible. The Opinion states that, although the determination will ultimately turn on the specifics of the office sharing arrangement and the nature of the proposed representation, Model Rules 1.4 (Communication) and 1.7 (Conflicts of Interest: Current Clients) may require the attorneys to adequately disclose the arrangement with the prospective clients and obtain informed consent, in writing, to permit the representation to proceed. The Opinion advises that lawyers considering an office sharing arrangement should discuss the nature of each other’s practices in order to determine whether conflicts of interest are likely to arise and, therefore, whether the arrangement is a good idea in the first instance. 

Finally, Formal Opinion 507 addresses consultations between lawyers sharing office space and conflict of interest implications. The Committee opines that occasional informal consultations do not result in lawyers being “associated in a firm” under Model Rule 1.10(a). However, attorneys should avoid divulging confidential client information and use hypothetical facts to avoid the possibility that the listener will be able to ascertain the identity of the client or the situation involved. The Opinion cautions that consultations between lawyers in office sharing arrangements could trigger unanticipated conflicts of interest that restrict the consulted attorney’s ability to represent a current or future client under Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) if that attorney receives too much information. 


 

Legal Update for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – February 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.